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Brown v. Thompson

Court of Appeals of Minnesota
Jan 25, 2022
No. A21-0840 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2022)

Opinion

A21-0840

01-25-2022

Jacob Brown, Appellant, v. CO2 Officer Ed Thompson, et al., Respondents.


Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CV-19-1030

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.

ORDER OPINION

MICHELLE A. LARKIN JUDGE

BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:

1. Appellant Jacob Brown was an inmate at the Minnesota Correctional Facility in Lino Lakes from 2015 to 2016. Respondents Ed Thompson, Frank Haubrick, Nathan Bartz, and Sarah Wittenburg were employees with the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) during that time. In February 2019, Brown sued respondents for negligence. According to his amended complaint, Brown was a member of the Institution Community Work Crew (ICWC). On March 17, 2016, he was working on Highway 96 in Shoreview when Haubrick ran over his foot with a trailer hitched to the crew van, causing Brown to sprain his ankle. Brown alleged that respondents were negligent and engaged in "obstruction and deception" in the treatment, report, and investigation of the incident.

2. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. They argued that under Minn. Stat. § 3.738 (2020), all claims arising from an injury to an inmate of a state correctional facility while performing assigned duties must be presented to the Minnesota Legislature. In response, Brown asked the district court to voluntarily dismiss his complaint pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(a), so he could exhaust that legislative remedy. The district court dismissed Brown's claims without prejudice, and judgment was entered on May 14, 2019.

3. On February 5, 2021, Brown moved to vacate the dismissal on the grounds of mistake and fraud. He claimed that he voluntarily dismissed his complaint because respondents' counsel misled him about the applicability of Minn. Stat. § 3.738. He also asserted that he submitted a claim to the legislature, but the legislative subcommittee did not review his claim. Shortly afterward, Brown moved to compel the discovery of Thompson's last known address so he could serve Thompson with the summons and complaint.

4. The district court denied the motion to vacate. It determined that the motion was untimely and that it failed on the merits. The district court noted that Brown had filed a claim with the legislature and that his claim was still being processed by the legislature. The district court reasoned that it was "abundantly clear from a review of the First Amended Complaint that Minn. Stat. § 3.738 provides the exclusive remedy for [Brown's] injury" and that "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction, therefore, lies with the legislature and not with this court." The district court denied the motion to compel discovery because the lawsuit had been dismissed. Brown appeals.

5. Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, a district court may relieve a party from a final judgment for various reasons, including mistake or fraud. A motion to vacate a judgment must be made "within a reasonable time," and for mistake or fraud, must be made within one year after judgment was entered. Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. We review the district court's decision whether to grant relief under rule 60.02 for an abuse of discretion. Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Minn. 2016).

6. The district court determined that Brown's motion to vacate was untimely. Because the motion was based on mistake and fraud, Brown was required to make the motion within one year of the judgment. Judgment was entered on May 14, 2019, and Brown filed the motion to vacate on February 5, 2021. The district court correctly concluded that Brown's motion was untimely.

7. Brown argues that his motion was based on fraud on the court and that rule 60.02 does not limit the district court's power to set aside a judgment obtained under such circumstances. Brown's argument regarding an alleged fraud on the court is not persuasive.

8. Even if Brown's motion had been timely, it would fail on the merits, as the district court determined. "Claims and demands arising out of injury to or death of . . . an inmate of a state correctional facility while performing assigned duties shall be presented to, heard, and determined by the legislature." Minn. Stat. § 3.738, subd. 1. The procedure established in that statute is "exclusive of all other legal, equitable, and statutory remedies." Id., subd. 3. Brown argues section 3.738 is inapplicable because it applies only to injuries that occur on correctional-facility premises. That argument is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, which requires only that the inmate be "performing assigned duties," and not that he be working onsite. According to Brown's complaint, he was working on a project with ICWC and was unloading equipment when the injury occurred. Because Brown's claim arises from an injury he suffered while he was performing assigned duties as an inmate of a state correctional facility, his exclusive remedy is with the legislature, and the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.

9. Brown cites Davis v. State Department of Corrections, in which this court held that Minn. Stat. § 3.738 "provides the exclusive remedy for injuries an inmate sustains while performing his or her assigned duties at a correctional facility." 500 N.W.2d 134, 134 (Minn.App. 1993) (emphasis added), rev. denied (Minn. July 15, 1993). When discussing the state's reason for implementing the statute, this court stated, "Unrestricted liability for acts or omissions occurring on detention facility premises could have a severe economic impact on the political subdivisions operating such facilities." Id. at 136 (emphasis added). But whether an injury must occur on the premises of a correctional facility was not at issue in Davis; instead, the inmate contended that Minn. Stat. § 3.738 did not apply because his injury was caused by an assault unrelated to his assigned duties. Id. at 135. "Obiter dictum is a comment made in passing in a judicial opinion that is unnecessary to the decision; such a comment may be disregarded and not given precedential status." State v. Chauvin, 955 N.W.2d 684, 692 (Minn.App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 10, 2021). Any suggestion by this court in Davis that the injury must occur onsite is nonbinding obiter dictum.

10. In sum, Minn. Stat. § 3.738 establishes that Brown's exclusive remedy is with the legislature. Thus, the district court correctly determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim, and the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brown's motion to vacate the judgment dismissing his complaint.

11. Brown also challenges the district court's denial of his motion to compel the disclosure of Thompson's last known address. We review the district court's decisions on discovery-related motions for an abuse of discretion. EOP-Nicollet Mall, L.L.C. v. County of Hennepin, 723 N.W.2d 270, 274-75 (Minn. 2006). Brown requested the address so he could serve Thompson with the summons and complaint. Because the complaint has been dismissed, service is unnecessary. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to compel.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The district court's order is affirmed.

2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.


Summaries of

Brown v. Thompson

Court of Appeals of Minnesota
Jan 25, 2022
No. A21-0840 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2022)
Case details for

Brown v. Thompson

Case Details

Full title:Jacob Brown, Appellant, v. CO2 Officer Ed Thompson, et al., Respondents.

Court:Court of Appeals of Minnesota

Date published: Jan 25, 2022

Citations

No. A21-0840 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2022)