When therefore he was compelled to pay notes upon which he was only secondarily liable, he became entitled to subrogation to all of the security which the creditor held for their payment. Clayton v. Fort Worth State Bank (C.C.A. 5th) 4 F.2d 763, 765; Kyner v. Clark (C.C.A. 8th) 29 F.2d 545; Dater v. Anderson (C.C.A. 6th) 28 F.2d 944, 947; Brown v. Thompson, 99 W. Va. 56, 128 S.E. 309; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) vol. 3, §§ 1211 and 1212. The rule is thus well stated by Judge Walker of the Fifth Circuit in Clayton v. Fort Worth State Bank, supra: "Where, on a sale of mortgaged property, the buyer, as part of the consideration or price agreed on, obligates himself to pay the debt secured by such mortgage, as between the buyer and seller, the buyer becomes the principal debtor to the mortgage creditor, and the seller becomes the buyer's surety. If, while such relation exists between the seller and buyer, the former is compelled to pay off the mortgage debt, he is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee, and to have the property subjected to the payment of the amount of the mortgage debt. Henson v. Reed, 71 Tex. 728, 10 S.W. 522; Wood v. Smith, 51 Iowa 156, 50 N.W. 581; 37 Cyc. 465.

However, this general rule does not require the subrogee to pay the entire debt, so long as the entire debt has been paid by some other source. In Syllabus Point 3 of Brown v. Thompson, 99 W. Va. 56, 128 S.E. 309 (1925), this Court held that, "A surety who has paid a part of the debt of his principal is entitled to pro tanto subrogation upon satisfaction of the balance due the creditor." Thus, subrogation is permitted in West Virginia where the subrogee has paid part of the debt, and the creditor has received the balance from the principal debtor or from some other source.

Cason v. Westfall, supra. If the balance of the indebtedness owing to the prior creditor is discharged, subrogation of the person who theretofore paid part of the indebtedness will be recognized to the extent of his payment. Brown v. Thompson, 99 W. Va. 56, 128 S.E. 309; Restatement, Restitution § 162, Comment c. In this instance Republic Bank did not merely consent to pro tanto subrogation.

The rule against subrogation on part payment has disappeared. (60 C. J., at pp. 721, 722; 25 R. C. L. 1319; Piedmont Coal Co. v. Hustead, 294 Fed. 247, 32 A.L.R. 556; Brown v. Thompson, 99 W. Va. 56, 128 S.E. 309.) B. W, Davis, for Respondents.

See the annotated case of Obici v. Furcron, 160 Va. 351, 168 S.E. 340, 91 A.L.R. 848, and prior annotations cited at page 855. See also Brown v. Thompson, 99 W. Va. 56, 128 S.E. 309. Here, it is perfectly clear that the entire debt of Eugene Wallace was not paid off. So that under this rule, subrogation to the lien securing that debt could not be decreed.

However, "this general rule does not require the subrogee to pay the entire debt, so long as the entire debt has been paid by some other source." Ray v. Donohew , 177 W.Va. 441, 352 S.E.2d 729, 737 (1986) ; see Brown v. Thompson , 99 W.Va. 56, 128 S.E. 309, 311-12 (1925). It stands to reason that, when the entire debt has been paid, even if not completely out of funds supplied by the would-be subrogee, the rights of the original obligee against the debtor will not be endangered.