Summary
dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker Feldman doctrine
Summary of this case from Brown v. Tex. Bd. of NursingOpinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-2315-M
March 20, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed February 19, 2002 Plaintiff did not timely file a response. Because the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of Plaintiff's claims, the Defendant's Motion is granted.
L.R. 7.1(e) provides that "[a] response and brief to an opposed motion must be filed within twenty days from the date the motion is filed." Defendant's Motion was filed on February 19, 2002. Any response to the Motion was thus due on or before March 11, 2002.
FACTUAL PREDICATE
Plaintiff Yvonne Evette Brown ("Brown") is a registered nurse who formerly operated a home health care agency in DeSoto, Texas. In June 1999, the Texas Board of Nursing Examiners ("Board") filed formal charges against her, alleging various violations of the Texas Nursing Practices Act. On June 16, 1999, Brown was notified of these charges by letter, and was directed to answer the allegations within twenty days and schedule an informal conference with an investigator by July 2, 1999. Brown allegedly did not receive this letter until July 2, 1999, and requested an informal conference shortly thereafter. This conference was scheduled for November 24, 1999, but Brown failed to attend.
Brown was charged with three violations of the Nursing Practice Act: (1) operating a branch facility in Houston, Texas, without a branch license from the Texas Department of Health; (2) refusing to allow a Texas Department of Health surveyor access to records; and (3) failing to respond to an administrative subpoena issued by the Board.
On December 9, 1999, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALT") of the State Office of Administrative Hearings. Brown, again, failed to appear and the ALJ recommended, in a Proposal for Decision, that a default judgment be entered against her, revoking her nursing license. Brown objected to this recommendation, claiming that she never received notice of the administrative hearing and that she believed this matter had been closed and resolved. The ALJ rejected the objections as untimely.
Under the Texas Administrative Code, objections to a proposal for decision must be filed within 15 days after the date of service of the proposal for decision. Brown was served with the proposal for decision by certified mail on February 7, 2000, but claims she did not receive it until February 23, 2000. Her objections, filed March 9, 2000, were considered untimely.
In March 2000, the Board notified Brown, by certified mail, that the Proposal for Decision would be considered by the full Board at its April 2000 meeting. Although Brown received the notification seven days before the meeting, she failed to appear. The Board adopted the Proposal for Decision and revoked Brown's registered nurse license.
On May 15, 2000, Brown filed for judicial review in state district court. On April 25, 2001, District Judge Catharina Haynes dismissed the case, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over Brown's claims because she did not timely file a motion for rehearing with the Board.
In July 2001, Brown appealed Judge Haynes' Order of Dismissal. On October 23, 2001, in a per curiam decision, the Dallas Court of Appeals dismissed Brown's appeal for want of prosecution. On October 19, 2001, while her appeal was pending, Brown filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Dallas Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of mandamus to prevent the district court from dismissing her suit. On October 23, 2001, the Dallas Court of Appeals declined to issue the writ, holding that Brown was not entitled to the relief sought. On November 19, and December 5, 2001, Brown filed motions for rehearing of both decisions of the Court of Appeals. Both motions were denied. She did not appeal to the Texas Supreme Court.
On November 16, 2001, Brown brought this action, seeking to dismiss the Board's action, retroactively reinstate her license, and award her costs.
ANALYSIS
No statute grants federal district courts jurisdiction to hear appeals from state court decisions. Title 28, Section 1257 of the United States Code provides that "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari . . . ." No parallel provision exists granting appellate review of state decisions to inferior federal courts. In what has become known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Supreme Court held that "federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, lack appellate jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state courts."
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 479 (1983); Rocker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
Two legal propositions control the disposition of this case: (1) federal district courts do not have jurisdiction over what are in effect appellate challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings; and (2) a general constitutional attack that is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment of reprimand cannot be properly heard in federal court. Here, Brown's claims are challenges to the constitutionality of the Board's practices as applied to her in the disciplinary proceeding rather than general attacks on the constitutionality of the Board's practices or disciplinary scheme. The Court is thus without jurisdiction to entertain them.
Id.
Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 710 F.2d 1075, 1077 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984).
In Musslewhite v. State Bar of Texas, an attorney suspended from practice for three years by the State Bar of Texas, who appealed his suspension to the United States Supreme Court, then brought suit in a federal district court. The district court characterized plaintiff's attacks on the State Bar action as particular to plaintiff rather than general constitutional attacks and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The Fifth Circuit upheld the decision, finding that federal courts may not properly sit in review of such state court decisions. As stated by the Fifth Circuit,
`the Texas scheme for disciplining [nurses] is fully capable of considering the constitutional arguments of [plaintiff] relating to specific procedures followed in [her] case.' To evaluate them would require review of the state court judgment. That, as Feldman instructed, we are without jurisdiction to do.
Musslewhite, 32 F.3d at 947 (quoting Bishop v. State Bar of Texas, 736 F.2d 292, 294 (5th Cir. 1984)). See also Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000) (under Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district court did not have jurisdiction to hear worker compensation claimant's action to enjoin state administrative hearing officer from enforcing state court order).
In this case, the Plaintiff is taking this action to challenge the same specific actions taken by the Board of Nursing Examiners as to her license which she unsuccessfully challenged in state court. Rooker Feldman prevents such a challenge. The Board's Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is therefore GRANTED.