Hoover Motor Express Co., Inc. v. Railroad Public Utilities Commission, 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953). People's Bank of Van Leer v. Bryan, 55 Tenn. App. 166, 397 S.W.2d 400 [401]; Bayside Warehouse Co. v. Memphis, 63 Tenn. App. 268, 470 S.W.2d 375; Brown v. Tenn. Real Estate Comm., Tenn. App. 1972, 494 S.W.2d 506, cert. den. 414 U.S. 877, 94 S.Ct. 54, 38 L.Ed.2d 122."

Any additional evidence offered to the reviewing court is limited to the question of whether the agency exceeded its jurisdiction or acted fraudulently, illegally or arbitrarily. Hoover Motor Express Co., Inc. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commission, 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953) [;] People's Bank of Van Leer v. Bryan, 55 Tenn.App. 166, 397 S.W.2d 400 [401 (1965) ]; Bayside Warehouse Co. v. Memphis, 63 Tenn.App. 268, 470 S.W.2d 375 [ (1971) ]; Brown v. Tenn. Real Estate Comm., Tenn.App.1972, 494 S.W.2d 506 [ (1972) ], cert. den. 414 U.S. 877, 94 S.Ct. 54, 38 L.Ed.2d 122 [ (1973) ].”

Any additional evidence offered to the reviewing court is limited to the question of whether the agency exceeded its jurisdiction or acted fraudulently, illegally or arbitrarily. Hoover Motor Express Co., Inc. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commission, 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953) [;] People's Bank of Van Leer v. Bryan, 55 Tenn.App. 166, 397 S.W.2d 400 [401 (1965) ]; Bayside Warehouse Co. v. Memphis, 63 Tenn.App. 268, 470 S.W.2d 375 [ (1971) ]; Brown v. Tenn. Real Estate Comm., Tenn.App.1972, 494 S.W.2d 506 [ (1972) ], cert. den. 414 U.S. 877, 94 S.Ct. 54, 38 L.Ed.2d 122 [ (1973) ].”

Hoover Motor Express Co., Inc. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commission, 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953). People's Bank of Van Leer v. Bryan, 55 Tenn.App. 166, 397 S.W.2d 400 [401]; Bayside Warehouse Co. v. Memphis, 63 Tenn.App. 268, 470 S.W.2d 375; Brown v. Tenn. Real Estate Comm., Tenn.App. 1972, 494 S.W.2d 506, cert. den. 414 U.S. 877, 94 S.Ct. 54, 38 L.Ed.2d 122."In the trial court, under the common law writ, reversal or modification of the action of the Civil Service Board may be had only when the trial court finds that the Board has acted in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions or in excess of its own statutory authority; has followed unlawful procedure or been guilty of arbitrary or capricious action; or has acted without material evidence to support its decision.

Hoover Motor Express Co., Inc. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commission, 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953). People's [Peoples ] Bank of Van Leer v. Bryan, 55 Tenn.App. 166, 397 S.W.2d 400 [401 (1965) ]; Bayside Warehouse Co. v. Memphis, 63 Tenn.App. 268, 470 S.W.2d 375 [ (1971) ]; Brown v. Tenn. Real Estate Comm., Tenn.App.1972, 494 S.W.2d 506, cert. den. 414 U.S. 877, 94 S.Ct. 54, 38 L.Ed.2d 122 [ (1973) ]."In the trial court, under the common law writ, reversal or modification of the action of the Civil Service Board may be had only when the trial court finds that the Board has acted in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions or in excess of its own statutory authority; has followed unlawful procedure or been guilty of arbitrary or capricious action; or has acted without material evidence to support its decision.

Hoover Motor Express Co., Inc. v. Railroad Public Utilities Commission, 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953). People's Bank of Van Leer v. Bryan, 55 Tenn.App. 166, 397 S.W.2d 400 [401]; Bayside Warehouse Co. v. Memphis, 63 Tenn. App. 268, 470 S.W.2d 375; Brown v. Tenn. Real Estate Comm., Tenn.App. 1972, 494 S.W.2d 506, cert. den. 414 U.S. 877, 94 Sup. Ct. 54, 38 L. Ed. 2d 122."

Although a trial court reviewing an administrative decision pursuant to a common law writ of certiorari is generally limited to the evidence in the administrative record, the parties may introduce additional evidence before the court that a board or commission exceeded its jurisdiction or acted fraudulently, illegally, or arbitrarily. Brown v. Tenn. Real Estate Comm'n., 494 S.W.2d 506, 510-11 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1972). From the record we perceive that Mr. Jacks introduced this evidence in support of his selective enforcement claim that Millington sought to enforce its zoning ordinance solely against him because he had successfully sued the city.

This is the type of information which will not usually be revealed in the record of the administrative proceedings and is the type of information which a trial court may allow to be introduced in addition to the record. Hoover Motor Express., 195 Tenn. at 607; 261 S.W.2d at 239; Brown v. Tennessee Real Estate Comm'n., 494 S.W.2d 506, 510 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1972) (additional evidence introduced before a court reviewing an action of a board or commission is limited to the question of whether the board acted illegally, arbitrarily, fraudulently, or beyond its jurisdiction; evidence on the merits of the controversy is limited to the record). In South, this court treated the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss as a grant of summary judgment since the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings.

The standard of review for a common law writ is that a trial court should uphold an action of a civil service board unless the board has acted in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision, has acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily, or has acted without any material evidence to support its decision. Cochran v. Board of Administration of the City of Memphis, 1987 WL 14746 (Tenn. App. July 28, 1987); Brown v. Tennessee Real Estate Commission, 494 S.W.2d 506, 510 (Tenn. App. 1972). In his motion to amend the petition, filed some three and a half years after the original petition was filed, Petitioner sought to have the chancery court review his case on a de novo standard of review.

Where the court described the "unalienable" citizens' right to have questions touching his or her life, liberty, or property decided by the constitutional courts, it was in the context of a suit to review the essential legality of the proceedings before an inferior tribunal. See Brown v. Tennessee Real Estate Comm., 494 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn. App. 1972). The court did not say that the petitioner had the right to a trial of the assessments in the courts.