Opinion
No. 05-09-00436-CR
Opinion issued August 3, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F07-72982-H.
Before Justices MORRIS, MOSELEY, and LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Cedrick DeShun Brown of murder in connection with the death of Brandon Ratcliff. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1) (Vernon 2003). At punishment, Brown pleaded true to an enhancement paragraph for a prior felony, and the jury assessed punishment at ninety-nine years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. In two points of error, Brown contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a finding against him on the self-defense issue. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment. In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a fact finder's rejection of a defense, we look to whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and would have also found against the defendant on the issue of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). When an appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of a rejection of the defense, we review all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the fact finder's verdict of guilt was rationally justified. See Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We will set aside the verdict only if the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or the contrary evidence is so strong that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been met. See Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact finder's determination concerning what weight to be given to contradictory testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). "[A] person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force." Act of May 29, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3598, amended by Act of Mar. 20, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1, § 2, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 1 (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31 (Vernon Supp. 2009)). As relevant here, a person is justified in using deadly force against another if: (1) he would be justified in using force against the other under section 9.31; (2) if a reasonable person in the actor's position would not have retreated; and, (3) when and to the degree he reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. Act of May 16, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 235, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2141, 2141, amended by Act of Mar. 20, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1, § 2, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 1-2 (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.32(a)(1)-(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2009)). Because self-defense is a fact issue for the jury to decide, the credibility of the self-defense evidence is exclusively within the purview of the jury. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. Furthermore, the jury is free to accept or reject any of the evidence. Id. If self-defense is raised by the evidence, the State has the burden of persuasion in disproving self-defense. Id. A jury verdict of guilty is an implicit finding rejecting the defendant's self-defense theory. Id. There is evidence in the record that Ratcliff, his brother, and some friends went to an after-hours club called the Sankofa Arts Kafe around 5 a.m. on August 12, 2007. There was an altercation shortly after they arrived, and security at the club separated the patrons into two groups, releasing the first group and holding the second group in the club. Ratcliff was part of the second group, while Brown was part of the first. Upon releasing the second group from the club, the altercation continued, moving in front of a clinic. Punches were exchanged between Ratcliff's brother, Brown, and a number of other people. Then, a man appeared with an assault rifle and told them to back up. Ratcliff's group put their hands up and backed away. Brown grabbed the gun and, according to witnesses, said if the other man was not going to shoot, he was. As Ratcliff's group ran away, Brown opened fire, killing Ratcliff and injuring three others. Brown asserts he grabbed the rifle and fired because he saw someone with a gun, he believed the others were running to their cars to get guns, and it was necessary to protect himself against unlawful force. Brown contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient for the trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt against him on the self-defense issue because he reasonably believed deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself against Ratcliff's use of unlawful force and was thus justified. He asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the murder conviction. We disagree. Although Brown believed he saw someone else with a gun, there is no evidence from the record that he was threatened with a weapon by any of the victims. Furthermore, the record shows all of the victims were running away from Brown at the time of the shooting, and no one from Radcliff's group went to a car. See Act of May 16, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 235, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2141, 2141 (amended 2007). Resolution of fact issues is within the province of the jury. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914; see also Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 519-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). After considering all the evidence under the proper standards, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's implied finding against Brown on the issue of self-defense. We overrule Brown's two points of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
The record shows appellant is also known as "Sedric Lashun Brown."