See e.g., Harbin v. State, 478 So.2d 796, 798 (Miss. 1985); Brown v. State, 934 So.2d 1039, 1043(10) (Miss.Ct.App. 2006) citing Odom v. State, 767 So.2d 242, 246(13) (Miss.Ct.App. 2000). Whether "bodily injury" or "serious bodily injury" resulted is a question for the jury.
’ " See alsoFleming , 604 So.2d at 292 (holding that "serious bodily injury" occurred where the victim suffered a flesh wound to his arm requiring sutures and surgery, and a broken jaw ); Harbin v. State , 478 So.2d 796, 799 (Miss. 1985) (holding that the "uncontradicted physical facts ... overwhelmingly support[ed] a finding of aggravated assault"); Rickman , 150 So.3d at 986 (¶ 13) (holding that "serious bodily injury" occurred where the victim suffered permanent damage to his left pupil, a broken nose, and a fractured hip and pelvic bone); Brown v. State , 934 So.2d 1039, 1043 (¶ 12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming the trial court's refusal to grant a lesser-included-offense instruction on simple assault because the victim's injuries, which included a broken jaw, were so serious).¶ 16. As previously stated, Amber, like the victims in Bright , Fleming , Harbin , Rickman , and Brown , suffered multiple broken bones.
Shaw's uncontested testimony was that Halbert's injuries were serious. The injuries previously described unquestionably support this finding. See Brown v. State, 934 So.2d 1039, 1043 (¶¶ 11-12) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (severity of a broken jaw and the necessary treatment did not allow for a simple assault instruction). Had Ames presented testimony or any evidence that Halbert's injuries were not serious, then a simple assault instruction may have been warranted.
Johnson, 252 So. 3d at 601 (¶16); see also Brown v. State, 934 So.2d 1039, 1043 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming trial court's refusal of a lesser-included-offense instruction on simple assault because the victim's injury—a broken jaw—was "serious"). ¶21.
¶21. Brown argues that the State's amended indictment charging him as a habitual offender was "fatally defective" under Rule 14.1 of the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure. Whether an indictment is so flawed as to require reversal is a question of law. Brown v. State , 934 So. 2d 1039, 1043 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). Rule 14.1 states that prior convictions used for enhanced punishment must be identified in the indictment including:
All that this testimony showed was that Lee and Miller walked back into Lee's front yard at approximately the same time. Regardless, "any factual disputes are properly resolved by the jury [and] not by an appeals court." Brown v. State, 934 So.2d 1039, 1044 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App. 2006). "This Court does not have the task of re-weighing the facts in each case to, in effect, go behind the jury to detect whether the testimony and evidence they chose to believe was or was not the most credible."
As we have consistently held, the jury is charged with the responsibility of resolving factual disputes. Brown v. State, 934 So.2d 1039, 1044 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App. 2006). Furthermore, we cannot find that the jury's verdict was so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to amount to an unconscionable injustice.
Shaw's uncontested testimony was that Halbert's injuries were serious. The injuries previously described unquestionably support this finding. See Brown v. State, 934 So.2d 1039, 1043 (¶¶ 11-12) (Miss.Ct.App. 2006) (severity of a broken jaw and the necessary treatment did not allow for a simple assault instruction). Had Ames presented testimony or any evidence that Halbert's injuries were not serious, then a simple assault instruction may have been warranted.
¶ 10. Whether an indictment is so flawed as to require reversal is a question of law. Brown v. State, 934 So.2d 1039, 1043 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App. 2006). This Court on appeal reviews a question of law de novo.
The jury, rather than this Court, is charged with the responsibility of resolving factual disputes. Brown v. State, 934 So.2d 1039, 1044 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App. 2006) (citing McNeal v. State, 617 So.2d 999, 1009 (Miss. 1993)).