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Brown v. State

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
Aug 22, 1967
232 A.2d 820 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967)

Summary

In Brown v. State, 1 Md. App. 664, 232 A.2d 820 (1967), we interpreted the predecessor to § 10-101 (Md. Code Ann. (1957), art. 35, § 59) as allowing the admission of both a money order and a "stop payment" attachment through the testimony of the store owner who cashed the money order.

Summary of this case from Beach v. State

Opinion

No. 277, Initial Term, 1967.

Decided August 22, 1967.

EVIDENCE — Proof By Written Record — Purpose Of Code (1957), Art. 35, § 59 — Applicability Of Section To Bank Records And To Criminal Cases — Money Order With "Stop Payment Order" Held Properly Admitted. Written records of business events, if made in the regular course of business, shall be admissible in evidence in proof of the event. Code (1957), Art. 35, § 59. p. 666

The purpose of Code (1957), Art. 35, § 59, is to put an end to narrowness in the use of the familiar rule of evidence that the person whose statement is received as testimony should speak from personal observation or knowledge, and to bring the rule of evidence nearer to the standards in responsible action outside of the courts. p. 666

Such section clearly applies to bank records made in the regular course of business. p. 666

The section is applicable to criminal cases. p. 666

There was no error in admitting into evidence, at appellant's trial for obtaining money by false pretenses, a stolen money order with an attachment thereto stating there was a "stop payment order" on it. p. 666

Decided August 22, 1967.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Prince George's County (BOWIE, J.).

Howard Davis Brown, Jr., was convicted in a non-jury trial of obtaining money by false pretenses, and, from the judgment entered thereon, he appeals.

Affirmed.

The cause was submitted to ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH, and THOMPSON, JJ., and PRETTYMAN, J., Associate Judge of the First Judicial Circuit, specially assigned.

John J. Mitchell for appellant.

Dickee M. Howard, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, Arthur A. Marshall, Jr., State's Attorney for Prince George's County, and Benjamin Wolman, Assistant State's Attorney for Prince George's County, on the brief, for appellee.


Howard Davis Brown, Jr., was convicted on October 3, 1966, in a non-jury trial in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County of obtaining money by false pretenses, and sentenced to two years in the Maryland House of Correction. From that conviction he appeals to this court, contending that the trial judge erred in admitting into evidence a money order with an attachment stating there was a "stop payment order" on it.

At the trial, Leo Fischer, president of a supermarket in Prince George's County, testified that he had approved for payment a money order sold by Suitland Beverages, payable to James Biggs, which had been presented to him by appellant and which was subsequently exchanged for valuables. The money order, which had been stolen, was deposited with the corporation's bank and later returned by the drawee bank with an attachment showing the "stop payment." Fischer identified both the money order and the attachment, and the court received the exhibit in evidence over appellant's objection.

Under these circumstances, it is clear that Article 35, § 59 of the Annotated Code of Maryland dealing with proof by written record is controlling. This Section provides that written records of business events, if made in the regular course of business, shall be admissible in evidence in proof of the event. In Bethlehem — Sparrows Point Shipyard v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375, 381, the Court of Appeals declared the purpose of the Act to be "to put an end to narrowness in the use of the familiar rule of evidence that the person whose statement is received as testimony should speak from personal observation or knowledge, and to bring the rule of evidence nearer to the standards in responsible action outside of the courts." The Act clearly applies to bank records made in the regular course of business, In The Matter Of Lombard, 242 Md. 202, and it is clear that the stop payment attachment to the returned money order is such a bank record. The rule is clearly applicable to criminal cases. Lauder v. State, 233 Md. 142. We hold that the trial judge committed no error in admitting the money order and attachment into evidence.

Judgment affirmed.


Summaries of

Brown v. State

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
Aug 22, 1967
232 A.2d 820 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967)

In Brown v. State, 1 Md. App. 664, 232 A.2d 820 (1967), we interpreted the predecessor to § 10-101 (Md. Code Ann. (1957), art. 35, § 59) as allowing the admission of both a money order and a "stop payment" attachment through the testimony of the store owner who cashed the money order.

Summary of this case from Beach v. State
Case details for

Brown v. State

Case Details

Full title:HOWARD DAVIS BROWN, JR. v . STATE OF MARYLAND

Court:Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Date published: Aug 22, 1967

Citations

232 A.2d 820 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967)
232 A.2d 820

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