Saylors v. State, 251 Ga. 735, 737 ( 309 SE2d 796) (1983). Accord Mize v. State, 277 Ga. 148, 149 ( 586 SE2d 648) (2003); Brown v. State, 277 Ga. 53, 54-55 ( 586 SE2d 323) (2003). In this regard, we note that defendants typically request charges on both self-defense and involuntary manslaughter, and then, if the trial court does not charge on both, contend on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to do so.

In this case, the jury was unlikely to apply the challenged instruction to the testimony of the alibi witness, as Campbell argues, given that the instruction referred only to the defendant's statement. See Brown v. State, 277 Ga. 53(3)(a), 586 S.E.2d 323 (2003) (concluding a reasonable juror could not have believed the challenged jury instruction referred to defendant's trial testimony rather than his pre-trial statement to police). Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury on how to determine the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicts in evidence and, further, that it should apply these general rules on credibility in deciding what weight to give Campbell's statement.

In this case, the jury was unlikely to apply the challenged instruction to the testimony of the alibi witness, as Campbell argues, given that the instruction referred only to the defendant's statement. See Brown v. State, 277 Ga. 53 (3) (a) (586 SE2d 323) (2003) (concluding a reasonable juror could not have believed the challenged jury instruction referred to defendant's trial testimony rather than his pre-trial statement to police). Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury on how to determine the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicts in evidence and, further, that it should apply these general rules on credibility in deciding what weight to give Campbell's statement.

However, it was for the factfinder to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, Mickens v. State, 277 Ga. 627, 629 ( 593 SE2d 350) (2004), just as the credibility of the witnesses was a matter within the province of the jury, which chose not to believe Mearidy's account of the crimes. See Brown v.State, 277 Ga. 53 (1) ( 586 SE2d 323) (2003). The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Mearidy guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all of the crimes for which he was convicted.

"[A] charge on involuntary manslaughter is not generally allowed where the defendant alleges self-defense. [Cit.]" Brown v. State, 277 Ga. 53, 54 (2) ( 586 SE2d 323) (2003). As for Finley's defense of accident, "[i]t is well established that `if (the victim's) death was truly accidental, a charge on involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act (is) not warranted as no crime would have occurred.

Because the evidence at trial did not reflect that appellant's use of the gun amounted to reckless conduct or another misdemeanor, a charge on involuntary manslaughter was not required. See Brown v. State, 277 Ga. 53 (2) ( 586 SE2d 323) (2003). We note that the trial court charged the jury on accident.

However, the credibility of the witnesses was a determination to be made by the jury, including whether the deals made by other gang members with the State rendered their testimony biased to a degree that left them less creditworthy. See generally Brown v. State, 277 Ga. 53 (1) ( 586 SE2d 323) (2003); State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637 (1) ( 571 SE2d 752) (2002). The evidence adduced was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of felony murder and the firearm possession charge.

Williams's own trial testimony was not that he pointed the pistol at the victim or anyone else, but rather that the pistol discharged accidentally when he stumbled back after regaining control of the weapon. Brown v. State, 277 Ga. 53, 55 (2) ( 586 SE2d 323) (2003). Inasmuch as a jury charge on involuntary manslaughter was not warranted, trial counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to request it. Glenn v. State, 279 Ga. 277, 278 (2) ( 612 SE2d 478) (2005).

Id.; Salyers v. State, 276 Ga. 568, 569 ( 580 SE2d 240) (2003).Brown v. State, 277 Ga. 53, 54-55 ( 586 SE2d 323) (2003). 4. Little also contends that the trial court erred by charging the jury on a method of committing aggravated assault that was not set forth in the indictment.

See OCGA § 24-3-53.Brown v. State, 277 Ga. 53, 55 (3) (a) ( 586 SE2d 323) (2003). See also McKenzie v. State, 293 Ga. App. 350, 352 (3) ( 667 SE2d 142) (2008); Ford v. State, 281 Ga. App. 114, 115-116 (2) ( 635 SE2d 391) (2006); York v. State, 242 Ga. App. 281, 291 (5) (c) ( 528 SE2d 823) (2000).