A person who signs a written instrument is presumed to know its contents and cannot claim that he did not read or understand the document. Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1992). Our law clearly provides that an owner is entitled to recover from a contractor where the contract between the parties provides that the general contractor will secure liability insurance naming the owner as an additional insured and the contractor fails to do so. Lopez v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 495 So.2d 375, 378 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writs denied, 498 So.2d 757, 758 (La. 1986); State v. Alexander Alexander, Inc., 477 So.2d 753, 757 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 478 So.2d 909 (La. 1985) and Ordonez v. W.T. Grant Company, 297 So.2d 780, 782 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1974).
Wilson v. Cost + Plus of Vivian, Inc., 375 So.2d 683, 685 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1979); Horton v. Mobley, 578 So.2d 977, 982 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1991). Duet v. Lucky, 621 So.2d 168, 173 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1993) (noting that absent evidence substantiating alleged mistake in intent, no reason exists to look beyond four corners of document); Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939, 941 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1992) (noting that "the language of the release is so broad and unambiguous it leaves little to be misunderstood"); Barnhill v. Consolidated Medical, Disability Life Trust, 569 So.2d 1115, 1117 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1990), writ denied, 572 So.2d 93 (La. 1991) (finding language of release so broad as to clearly cover liability sued upon); Shepherd v. Allstate Ins. Co., 562 So.2d 1099, 1102 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1990) (holding unambiguous release executed by literate, intelligent party could not be nullified absent vice of consent); Watkins v. Johns-Manville Corp., 458 So.2d 212, 215-16 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1984) (plain and unambiguous agreement is properly construed based solely on language of document); Succession of Teddlie, 385 So.2d 902, 905 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 393 So.2d 742 (La. 1980); see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Circle, Inc., 915 F.2d 986, 990 (5th Cir. 1990); Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1312 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that Louis
A person who signs a written instrument is presumed to know its contents and cannot claim that he did not read or understand the document. Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1992); Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So.2d 133 (La. 1983). Only two of the appellants testified at the hearing on the exceptions.
The Louisiana Civil Code expressly provides that a transaction or compromise between two or more parties, who by mutual consent adjust their differences to prevent or resolve a lawsuit, carries force equal to the authority of adjudicated disputes. La.C.C. art. 3071; Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1992). The subsequent discovery by a claimant that an injury was more serious than initially believed does not entitle the claimant to rescind the settlement and release agreement.
The mutual releases from "any and all causes of actions, claims, debts, demands, obligations, liabilities, benefits or costs, of whatever kind or character, known or unknown, in the past and up to the date of this agreement," within common usage, explicitly leaves nothing for misinterpretation or further clarification and is broad enough to include a relinquishment of Coleman's right to assert any claim for restrictive covenants. La.C.C. art. 2047; See Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1992). This conclusion is further buttressed by the inclusion of a separate, but similar, Release of Guarantors clause in the sale agreement.
He contends, therefore, that this transaction should be rescinded because there was error as to the subject matter of the dispute being settled. CNA argues that Mr. Dimitri is presumed to know the contents of the release he signed and that he cannot avoid its obligations by pretending that he did not read it, that it was not explained to him, or that he did not understand it. Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So.2d 133 (La. 1983); Myers v. Burger King Corp., 618 So.2d 1123 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1993); Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1992). Because the language of the release is clear and explicit, CNA argues that extrinsic evidence, beyond the four corners of the agreement, may not be considered in order to determine the parties' intent.
As a general rule, "a person who signs a written instrument is presumed to know its contents and cannot claim that he did not read or understand the document. Blount v. Smith Barney Shearson, 695 So. 2d 1001 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1997); Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1992); Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So.2d 133 (La. 1983). The Court agrees with the defendant that the Arbitration Agreement is valid and enforceable.
Further the terms of the mortgage contract clearly state that the onus is on the borrower to procure flood insurance. Under Louisiana law, one who signs a contract is presumed to know its terms. See Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So. 2d 133, 138 (La. 1983); Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So. 2d 939, 940-41 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 746 F. Supp. 627, 632-33 (E.D. La. 1990). Plaintiffs could not have justifiably relied on a representation by the Defendant to procure insurance.
The Louisiana Civil Code expressly provides that a transaction or compromise between two or more parties, who by mutual consent adjust their differences to prevent or resolve a lawsuit, carries force equal to the authority of adjudicated disputes. La.C.C. art. 3071; Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1992). The subsequent discovery by a claimant that an injury was more serious than initially believed does not entitle the claimant to rescind the settlement and release agreement.
The Louisiana Civil Code expressly provides that a transaction or compromise between two or more parties, who by mutual consent adjust their differences to prevent or resolve a lawsuit, carries force equal to the authority of adjudicated disputes. La.C.C. art. 3071; Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1992). The subsequent discovery by a claimant that an injury was more serious than initially believed does not entitle the claimant to rescind the settlement and release agreement.