Thus, there was an error bearing on the principal cause of the compromise. However, in Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So. 2d 939, 940 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992), the plaintiff entered into a settlement with the defendant approximately one month after the accident. Later, Mr. Brown filed suit seeking damages for personal injury.
Id. “An individual who signs a written instrument is charged with the responsibility of having read it and is presumed to know and understand its contents.” Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939, 941 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1992). There appears to be no basis for setting aside the compromise.
Further the terms of the mortgage contract clearly state that the onus is on the borrower to procure flood insurance. Under Louisiana law, one who signs a contract is presumed to know its terms. See Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So. 2d 133, 138 (La. 1983); Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So. 2d 939, 940-41 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 746 F. Supp. 627, 632-33 (E.D. La. 1990). Plaintiffs could not have justifiably relied on a representation by the Defendant to procure insurance.
As a general rule, "a person who signs a written instrument is presumed to know its contents and cannot claim that he did not read or understand the document. Blount v. Smith Barney Shearson, 695 So. 2d 1001 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1997); Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1992); Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So.2d 133 (La. 1983). The Court agrees with the defendant that the Arbitration Agreement is valid and enforceable.
Wilson v. Cost + Plus of Vivian, Inc., 375 So.2d 683, 685 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1979); Horton v. Mobley, 578 So.2d 977, 982 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1991). Duet v. Lucky, 621 So.2d 168, 173 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1993) (noting that absent evidence substantiating alleged mistake in intent, no reason exists to look beyond four corners of document); Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939, 941 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1992) (noting that "the language of the release is so broad and unambiguous it leaves little to be misunderstood"); Barnhill v. Consolidated Medical, Disability Life Trust, 569 So.2d 1115, 1117 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1990), writ denied, 572 So.2d 93 (La. 1991) (finding language of release so broad as to clearly cover liability sued upon); Shepherd v. Allstate Ins. Co., 562 So.2d 1099, 1102 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1990) (holding unambiguous release executed by literate, intelligent party could not be nullified absent vice of consent); Watkins v. Johns-Manville Corp., 458 So.2d 212, 215-16 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1984) (plain and unambiguous agreement is properly construed based solely on language of document); Succession of Teddlie, 385 So.2d 902, 905 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 393 So.2d 742 (La. 1980); see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Circle, Inc., 915 F.2d 986, 990 (5th Cir. 1990); Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1312 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that Louis
Additionally, this Court has held that "[t]he Louisiana Civil Code expressly provides that a transaction or compromise between two or more parties, who by mutual consent adjust their differences to prevent or resolve a lawsuit, carries force equal to the authority of adjudicated disputes." Robbert v. Carroll , 97-0854, pp. 1-2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/10/97), 699 So. 2d 1103, 1104 (citing La. C.C. art. 3071 ; Brown v. Simoneaux , 593 So.2d 939 (La. App. 4 Cir.1992) ). La. C.C. art 3071 explicitly provides that a compromise between parties acts to "settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship." Furthermore, such compromise "precludes the parties from bringing a subsequent action based upon the matter that was compromised."
Having signed off on all of Mr. Hebert's reports, Mr. Harvey is legally presumed to have read and understood its contents. See , e.g ., Brown v. Simoneaux , 593 So.2d 939, 941 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992) ("[a]n individual who signs a written instrument is charged with the responsibility of having read it and is presumed to know and understand its contents"); Guimmo v. Albarado , 99-286, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/27/99), 739 So.2d 973, 976 ("when a party signs papers they are presumed to know the contents of those papers.").
" Robbert v. Carroll , 97-0854, pp. 1-2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/10/97), 699 So.2d 1103, 1104 (citing Brown v. Simoneaux , 593 So.2d 939 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992) ); See also , Penton v. Castellano , 49,843, p. 9 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/24/15), 169 So.3d 739, 746 (where the appellate court explained that the doctrine of res judicata applies to a compromise or settlement between parties and noted that "compromises have the legal efficacy of the thing adjudged."). In Oliver , the Supreme Court explained that the fact that claims were not actually litigated or adjudicated in a prior suit was irrelevant under "the 1991 amendment to La. R.S. 13:4231," as the test was "now whether the second action asserts a cause of action which arises out of the transaction or occurrence which was the subject matter of the prior action."
" Robbert v. Carroll, 97-0854, pp. 1-2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/10/97), 699 So.2d 1103, 1104 (citing Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992)); See also, Penton v. Castellano, 49,843, p. 9 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/24/15), 169 So.3d 739, 746 (where the appellate court explained that the doctrine of res judicata applies to a compromise or settlement between parties and noted that "compromises have the legal efficacy of the thing adjudged."). In Oliver, the Supreme Court explained that the fact that claims were not actually litigated or adjudicated in a prior suit was irrelevant under "the 1991 amendment to La. R.S. 13:4231," as the test was "now whether the second action asserts a cause of action which arises out of the transaction or occurrence which was the subject matter of the prior action."
These terms are unambiguous and leave nothing to be misunderstood. See Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992); Barnhill v. Consol. Med., Disability & Life Trust, 569 So.2d 1115 (La.App. 3d Cir.1990), writ denied,572 So.2d 93 (La.1991). This assignment of error is without merit.