Opinion
No. 2 CA-CV 2017-0155
05-30-2018
QUIRINA BROWN, A SINGLE PERSON; QUIRINA BROWN FOR MINOR CHILD MIA TALAMANTE; CYNTHIA ALVAREZ AND CARLOS ALVAREZ, AS HUSBAND AND WIFE, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. JOSE RECINOS AND DORA RECINOS, AS HUSBAND AND WIFE; SUNNYSIDE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendants/Appellees.
COUNSEL The Reyna Law Firm P.C., Tucson By Ron Reyna Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Udall Law Firm LLP, Tucson By Thomas A. Langan Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. C20165011
The Honorable Jeffrey T. Bergin, Judge
REVERSED AND REMANDED
COUNSEL The Reyna Law Firm P.C., Tucson
By Ron Reyna
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Udall Law Firm LLP, Tucson
By Thomas A. Langan
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Espinosa concurred. EPPICH, Judge:
¶1 Quirina Brown, in her personal capacity and as representative for minor child Mia Talamante, Cynthia Alvarez, and Carlos Alvarez, appeal the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Jose Recinos, Dora Recinos, and Sunnyside Unified School District (collectively, "Sunnyside"). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the order and remand the case for further proceedings.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered." Timmons v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc., 234 Ariz. 569, ¶ 2 (App. 2014). In October 2015, Brown, Talamante, and Cynthia Alvarez, were in an automobile accident involving a Sunnyside school bus. Within 180 days of the accident, through counsel, the three filed a notice of claim with Sunnyside pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-821.01. The notice included a brief description of the facts surrounding the accident, which indicated Brown's car was "struck in the rear by a Sunnyside School District bus driven by Jose Luis Recinos," while stopped at a stop sign. The notice alleged Brown and her two passengers had each suffered injuries as a result of the accident and set forth the potential legal bases of their claim: negligence, strict liability, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The notice also set forth the following information:
Mia Talamante has completed medical treatment for her accident injuries. She will settle this matter for the sum of $5,000.00 (five thousand dollars).
Quirina Brown is treating for her accident injuries. She will settle this matter for the sum of $100,000.00 (one hundred thousand dollars).
Cynthia Al[]varez is treating for her accident injuries. She will settle this matter for the sum of $250,000.00 (two hundred and fifty thousand dollars).
¶3 In October 2016, the appellants filed a civil complaint in superior court. In March 2017, Sunnyside filed an answer to the complaint, alleging the case should be dismissed pursuant to § 12-821.01. In April 2017, Sunnyside filed a motion for summary judgment citing § 12-821.01(A), and arguing that the appellants' notice of claim had failed to provide any facts to support the amount for which their claim could be settled. In response, the appellants argued that their notice was sufficient and that Sunnyside had waived any challenge to the notice of claim. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, concluding the appellants had failed to present any facts to support the amount for which their claim could be settled. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(A)(1).
The appellants' notice of appeal was premature, as it was filed after the trial court's unsigned written ruling, but before the court issued a final, appealable judgment. We are able to determine that the court's written ruling formed the basis of the court's final judgment. See McCleary v. Tripodi, 243 Ariz. 197, ¶ 19 (App. 2017). Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 9(c), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., we consider the appellants' notice of appeal to have been filed on the date the court entered its final judgment. See id.
Discussion
¶4 The appellants first challenge the trial court's determination that their notice of claim was legally inadequate. We review the court's order granting summary judgment de novo to determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court properly applied the law. See Eller Media Co. v. City of Tucson, 198 Ariz. 127, ¶ 4 (App. 2000). Section 12-821.01 authorizes civil claims against public entities, public schools, and public employees. To comply with the requirements of § 12-821.01, a claimant must file a notice of claim which contains "a specific amount for which the claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount." § 12-821.01(A).
¶5 Our supreme court has determined that "a claimant complies with the supporting-facts requirements of § 12-821.01.A by providing the factual foundation that the claimant regards as adequate to permit the public entity to evaluate the specific amount claimed." Backus v. State, 220 Ariz. 101, ¶ 23 (2009). This "standard does not require a claimant to provide an exhaustive list of facts" and we do not scrutinize the claimant's description of facts to determine whether they are sufficient. Id. ¶ 23. Our supreme court has also recognized that liability for public entities should be the rule, rather than the exception. Id. ¶¶ 9, 20.
¶6 Sunnyside argues that the appellants "failed to provide any facts to evaluate their settlement demands." We agree it would have been difficult for Sunnyside to evaluate the appellants' claim based solely on the meager facts provided in the notice of claim. In light of our supreme court's decision in Backus, however, the appellants' notice of claim complied with the supporting facts requirement of § 12-821.01. The notice of claim stated that Talamante had already completed treatment and that Brown and Alvarez were still receiving treatment. Although the notice did not detail precisely how the ongoing treatment for Brown and Alvarez would have resulted in a combined total of $350,000 in damages, the amount claimed must be viewed with the uncertainty associated with ongoing medical treatment. See Jones v. Cochise County, 218 Ariz. 372, ¶ 19 (App. 2008) (supporting facts requirement must be viewed in light of inherent uncertainty of future damages). Additionally, the nature of the legal claims and factual detail in the notice provided some guidance for Sunnyside to evaluate the amount the appellants claimed, as a negligence claim arising from a car accident can generally be understood to involve property damage, personal injury, or both. Cf. Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 220 Ariz. 214, ¶ 49 (App. 2008) (subjective nature of damages in invasion of privacy claim provided factual support for amount claimed). The notice also identified all of the relevant dates and parties involved in the accident. While not required to, Sunnyside could have used the facts provided and "tak[en] steps to obtain additional information." Backus, 220 Ariz. 101, ¶ 28. Thus, the notice of claim satisfied the statutory purpose of § 12-821.01: for Sunnyside to be able to investigate and assess its liability, permit the possibility of settlement prior to litigation, and assist Sunnyside in financial planning and budgeting. See Backus, 220 Ariz. 101, ¶ 10.
The standard in Backus is low. See Backus, 220 Ariz. 101, ¶ 23. Even so, in our view, the appellants' notice of claim in this case provides the absolute minimum of factual support that would meet the Backus standard.
¶7 Sunnyside further notes that the appellants had factual information in their possession to support the amount claimed, but did not disclose it. While our supreme court has noted that it is generally in the claimant's best interest to provide robust factual detail in order to reach a favorable settlement, and that "a claimant has no valid reason to withhold facts," in order to comply with § 12-821.01, a claimant must only provide the facts that he or she determines are necessary for the entity to evaluate the claim. Backus, 220 Ariz. 101, ¶¶ 23, 25-27. Therefore, the appellants' failure to include all of the facts available to them was not necessarily fatal to their claim.
¶8 The appellants argued that they had provided the facts that they determined were necessary for Sunnyside to evaluate the claim, both to the trial court and on appeal. Given the appellants' subjective belief that their notice was adequate, as well as the facts they had provided in their notice, the notice of claim complied with the supporting-facts requirement of § 12-821.01. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Sunnyside's motion for summary judgment.
Because the trial court erred by concluding the notice of claim did not comply with § 12-821.01, we need not address the appellants' argument that Sunnyside waived this issue by its conduct. --------
Disposition
¶9 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this decision.