First, this Court has made clear in its opinions that it regards the wrongful death act's "reasonable compensation" as falling within the general rubric of "damages", as is shown by the following cases, all involving the issue of awards for pain and suffering and all brought under the act. Covell v. Colburn (1944), 308 Mich. 240, 243: "From the testimony there was no basis for a finding of damages because of pain and suffering"; Baker v. Slack (1948), 319 Mich. 703, 707: "The statute under which this action is brought expressly permits damages for `pain and suffering'"; Weller v. Mancha (1958), 353 Mich. 189, 195, 196: "It is apparent that no consideration was given by the jury to the additional elements of the pain and suffering of the deceased and the future damages of the widow and minor child, and, therefore, the damages awarded to plaintiff were overwhelmingly against the evidence, and, under the evidence, grossly inadequate"; Brown v. Oestman (1961), 362 Mich. 614, 618, 619: "Finally, defendant claims there was no evidence that decedent sustained any pain and suffering between the time he was first struck and the time he lost consciousness after the last blow and that, therefore, the jury should not have been permitted to award damages therefor. * * * Plaintiff's proofs were adequate in this respect.
Michigan law has consistently recognized that evidence regarding damages that contribute to a total amount recoverable is admissible even if that evidence itself does not establish the complete amount of damages legally available. See, e.g., Miller, 410 Mich at 561 (holding that "the deceased's wage or salary income is almost always a significant factor in calculating the actual financial loss incurred by the survivors"); Brown v Oestman, 362 Mich 614, 618; 107 NW2d 837 (1961) (permitting evidence of the decedent's monthly earnings to prove loss of support and maintenance under the wrongful death act despite the fact that "[n]o attempt was made to prove how much of [the decedent's] earnings were expended for his family's support and maintenance"); Walker v McGraw, 279 Mich 97, 102-103; 271 NW 570 (1937) (upholding damages without deduction for the decedent's personal consumption upon evidence of the decedent's loss of earnings). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by striking Paranjpe.
In order to establish the fact of pain and suffering, it is sufficient to prove that blows were struck, blood flowed therefrom, and the victim was conscious thereafter. Brown v. Oestaman, 362 Mich. 614, 840, 107 N.W.2d 837 (1961) (citing Hanna v. McClave, 273 Mich. 571, 263 N.W. 742 (1935). The trier of fact has the authority to measure damages for pain and suffering. Kelly v. Builders Square, Inc., 465 Mich. 29, 34, 632 N.W.2d 912 (2001); Sagmani, supra, 2004 WL 243365 at *6.
Remote, contingent, or speculative damages cannot, of course, be considered. Woodyard v. Barnett, 335 Mich. 352, 56 N.W.2d 214 (1953); Brown v. Oestman, 362 Mich. 614, 107 N.W.2d 837 (1961); Canning v. Hannaford, 373 Mich. 41, 127 N.W.2d 851 (1964). The plaintiffs, Ernest A. and Annette R. Caron, seek an award for those expenses they will incur for the care of Monique at a specialized home to age 18, as well as expenses for medication, neurological treatments, and medical and dental care for the same period of time.
Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for past and future pain and suffering. Howell v. Lansing City Electric R. Co., supra; Brown v. Oestman, 362 Mich. 614, 107 N.W.2d 837 (1961).