Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 04-2328 SECTION: I/4.
April 21, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment, filed on behalf of plaintiff, Belinda Ambo Brown, seeking a partial judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability with respect to her complaint for damages filed against defendants, National Continental Insurance Company, Aces Transport, L.L.C. and Miguel A. Hernandez. Plaintiff, relying on La.Rev.Stat. § 32:81, argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to defendants' negligence and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to defendants' liability.
Rec. Doc. No. 33.
This case arises out of a two-vehicle collision which occurred in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana. Plaintiff alleges that on the morning of June 10, 2004, she was driving a Datsun pick-up truck proceeding east on Interstate 12 near Slidell, Louisiana. At the same time, a 1997 Freightliner tractor/trailor driven by defendant, Miguel A. Hernandez, owned by defendant, Aces Transport, L.L.C. and insured by defendant, National Continental Insurance Company, was proceeding in the same direction on I-12 behind plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Hernandez failed to slow the tractor/trailer in sufficient time and struck the rear of plaintiff's vehicle causing numerous personal injuries.
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
La.Rev.Stat. § 32:81 furnishes the standard of care required of motorists following other vehicles. Dolmo v. Williams, 753 So.2d 844, 846 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1999). That statute provides:
The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.
§ 32:81(A). Generally, a following motorist who strikes a preceding motorist from the rear is presumed to have breached the standard of conduct set forth in § 32:81 and the driver is, therefore, presumed negligent. Dolmo, 753 So.2d at 846. Section 32:81 requires that a driver "maintain a sufficient distance from a preceding vehicle to avoid a collision 'under circumstances which should be reasonably anticipated." Daigle v. Humphrey, 691 So.2d 260, 262 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Hadley v. Doe, 626 So.2d 747, 750 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1993)).
The presumption of negligence created by § 32:81 is a rebuttable presumption. See id. A following motorist may rebut the presumption of negligence and avoid liability by proving (1) that he had his vehicle under control, (2) that he closely observed the preceding vehicle, and (3) that he followed at a safe distance under the circumstances. Id. (citations omitted). A defendant may also avoid liability for a rear-end collision pursuant to the "sudden emergency doctrine," which permits a following driver to exonerate himself from fault by demonstrating "that the driver of the lead vehicle negligently created a hazard which he could not reasonably avoid." Id. (citing LeBlanc v. St. Landry Parish Police Jury, 647 So.2d 614, 617 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1994) and Hadley, 626 So.2d at 750) (additional citations omitted). In order to exculpate himself from liability pursuant to the "sudden emergency doctrine,"
the following motorist who collides with a preceding vehicle must show that he kept his vehicle under control, that he closely observed the forward vehicle, that he followed at a safe distance under the circumstances, and that the driver of the lead vehicle created a hazard which the following vehicle could not reasonably avoid. Webb v. Jordan, 540 So.2d 977 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1989); Chambers v. Graybiel, 25,840 (La.App. 2d Cir. 6/22/94), 639 So.2d 361, writ denied 94-1948 (La. 10/28/94), 644 So.2d 377; Ramirez v. Ware, 28,879 (La.App. 2d Cir. 9/25/96), 680 So.2d 1302.Traweek v. Jackson, 709 So.2d 867, 869 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1998).
Louisiana courts have found that a following motorist will not be presumed negligent for a rear-end collision if a defendant puts forth evidence that demonstrates that a preceding motorist negligently changed lanes. Daigle, 691 So.2d at 263. If a plaintiff's vehicle is struck from behind because of a negligent lane change, a plaintiff may not rely on the presumption of negligence which generally arises from a rear-end collision; the burden remains on the plaintiff to establish negligence. See id. (citing Anthony v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 227 So.2d 180, 183 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1969)).
Plaintiff argues that the record evidence establishes that defendant, Hernandez, breached the duty of care imposed by § 32:81 by following plaintiff too closely, failing to observe due caution at a reasonable rate of speed, and driving while in a tired condition. Although some of plaintiff's evidence supports her theory of the case, defendants have submitted conflicting evidence pertaining to the circumstances of the accident. For example, plaintiff testified that prior to being struck from behind, she entered the highway and remained in the right lane of travel at all times and that she did not slow down prior to being struck. In contrast, Hernandez testified that prior to the collision, he noticed plaintiff's truck traveling slowly in the left lane and that he then saw plaintiff abruptly switch lanes and slow down in front of him without any brake lights being activated. Hernandez testified that he locked his brakes in an attempt to avoid striking plaintiff's vehicle and that he was unable to move his vehicle to the left lane to avoid striking plaintiff because there was traffic in the left lane.
Upon review of the motion, the undisputed facts, defendants' opposition, the exhibits submitted by both parties and the law, the Court finds that defendants have submitted evidence that raises genuine issues of material fact and that plaintiff has not carried its burden of demonstrating that she is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law with respect to defendants' liability for the accident. Although plaintiff points to inconsistencies in Hernandez's testimony with respect to his account of the accident and vigorously disputes the inferences to be drawn from the record evidence, this Court must resolve any factual controversy in favor of the non-moving party when the non-moving party has brought forth evidence sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
Because there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute with respect to plaintiff's claim, the motion is DENIED.