Opinion
Civil Action 22-904
06-29-2023
SHAKOUR A. BROWN Plaintiff, v. GEORGE LITTLE, ERIC ARMEL, TINA WALKER, CARL WALKER, FRANK LEWIS, DEBRA HAWKINBERRY, LISA DUNCAN, M. KEN, C.O. 1 COSTELLO, C.O. 1 KIRKLAND, C.O. 1 WILLIAMS, C.O. 1 KNEPPER, C.O. 1 CAVALIER, C.O. 1 SKROBECH, C.O. 1 HALKIAS, LT. TYNER, LT. DISALVO, LT. FISHER, LT. DONGELLI, C.O. 1 LEDKADA, SGT. REGINA, DR. SAAVEDRA, Defendants.
Wiegand, District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ECF Nos. 34 & 41
LISA PUPO LENIHAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Dr. Saavedra (ECF No. 34) be granted. Dr. Saavedra should be terminated as a party defendant.
It is also recommended that the Correction Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Little, Armel and Tina Walker (ECF No. 41) be granted in part and denied in part. It should be granted as to Armel and Tina Walker and denied as to Little. Defendants Armel and Tina Walker should be terminated as party defendants.
II. REPORT
A. Relevant Factual Allegations
Plaintiff, Shakour A. Brown, is a state prisoner currently in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and confined at SCI-Benner. He was confined at SCI Fayette at the time he initiated this action on June 17, 2022. ECF No. 1. He later filed an Amended Complaint that was docketed on September 9, 2022. See ECF Nos. 10, 14. Plaintiff alleges that since he arrived at SCI-Fayette in March 2022, he has experienced instances of food contamination, excessive force, inhumane conditions of confinement, retaliation, harassment, and the confiscation of his property, as well as the denial of the right to participate in his religious activities and the denial of medical treatment. He also alleges that certain Defendants failed to act and/or protect him despite informing them of these ongoing issues. He alleges that the harassment and retaliation are a result of civil proceedings filed while at his prior facility, SCI Camp Hill. ECF No. 59 at. 1. Plaintiff states that he is naming all Defendants in their individual capacities. ECF No. 54 at 1.
Plaintiff was transferred to SCI Somerset on October 12, 2022, but he claims that the intimidation and retaliation continued after the transfer. ECF No. 59 at 3. He also states that all his legal materials have been destroyed by SCI Somerset officials. ECF No. 54. He alleges that two commissary bags shipped from SCI Fayette were not delivered to SCI Somerset. ECF No. 59 at 3 & ECF No. 60. He also states he continues to be harassed and retaliated against after his transfer to SCI Benner. ECF No. 59 at 4.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that around March 21,2022, while at SCI Fayette, he began observing contamination (bodily fluids) inside his meals. He alerted “all proper authorities” that his food was being tampered with. ECF No. 14 at 2. On March 25, 2022, he requested to “speak with psyche.” Id. He was sprayed with OC spray. He complied with orders to exit his cell. He was placed in leg restrains and handcuffs and then assaulted by corrections officers. He alleges that he suffers from serious mental health disorders including anxiety, panic attacks, phobia, and paranoia. Id.
In early April 2022, Plaintiff began to experience constant guard brutality and harassment. He submitted grievances and PREAs for sexual harassment and threats from officials.
On April 17, 2022, while Plaintiff was having a mental health crisis, instead of providing access to mental health care, a corrections officer ordered OC spray to be administered into his cell. Id. at 3. On April 18, 2022, he was escorted from a psychiatric observation cell and placed in a freezing cold camera cell with no bedding or clothing, completely nude. Id.
Plaintiff alleges he is on medication for his “illnesses” and that on August 10, 2022, he was assaulted again by corrections officers and was rushed to an outside hospital emergency room, tested for broken bones and given eight (8) stitches above the left eyebrow. Id. at 4.
In his responsive brief, Plaintiff states that he was involved in numerous planned and unplanned uses for force where his dreadlocks were torn from his head by corrections officers and his face smashed against the floor, resulting in a visit to an outside emergency room. ECF No. 59 at 2. He also describes an incident where he was escorted to Xray by several officials because he had no feeling in his hands due to excessively tight restraints. When he asked an official “to release his tense grip,” the guard began beating him, sending him via life flight to the emergency room. Id. at 2-3.
Liberally construing the pro se Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, he attempts to make out a claim for violations of his First Amendment rights to practice his religion and for retaliation. He also alleges violations of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation and violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In addition, he alleges an Eighth Amendment violation for use of excessive force, failure to protect, and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Finally, he attempts to state a claim for supervisory liability/failure to train.
B. Legal Standards
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Although “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18 (3d Cir. 2013).Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).
In a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), after the pleadings are closed, the court will only grant the motion after viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, where the moving party has clearly established that no material issues of fact remain and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Williams v. Allstate Ins. Co., 595 F.Supp.2d 532, 537 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1988)). The difference between a Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) is purely procedural and there is “no material difference in the applicable legal standards.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004).
When considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
The Court also recognizes that in a civil rights action, a court must give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend a deficient complaint, regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so, when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
C. Analysis
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct in the complaint was committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law and that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). Section 1983 does not create rights; it simply provides a remedy for violations of those rights created by the United States Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).
1. Defendant Dr. Saavedra's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 34)
Dr. Saavedra moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. The Amended Complaint contains only one allegation against this Defendant. When alleging that his food was being tampered with, Plaintiff alleges that he advised Dr. Saavedra and others regarding the tampering, but they “failed to protect or resolve” the problem. ECF No. 14 at 3, ¶ 28.
Dr. Saavedra, a psychiatrist, would have had no involvement or authority to deal with the issue of food tampering. Plaintiff alleges no other facts against him, and Plaintiff's other constitutional claims appear to have no relevance to Dr. Saavedra. Therefore, Dr. Saavedra's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim should be granted. Any attempt to amend would be futile as a matter of law.
For each constitutional violation alleged by Plaintiff, Dr. Saavedra advances arguments as to why Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to each constitutional provision. Because Plaintiff has alleged a single factual allegation against Dr. Saavedra, the Court need not engage in an analysis of each alleged constitutional violation because they have no relationship to the factual allegations directed against Dr. Saavedra.
Further, because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Dr. Saavedra, the Court need not discuss the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Dr. Saavedra should be dismissed as a party defendant from this civil action.
2. Corrections Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 41)
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to Defendants Little, Armel and Tina Walker because all claims against them rely on their supervisory capacities, rather than their personal involvement or acquiescence in the alleged wrongs.
The Corrections Defendants filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint on December 27, 2022. ECF No. 40.
Defendant Little is the Secretary of Corrections. Defendant Armel is the Superintendent at the SCI Fayette. Defendant Tina Walker is the Deputy Superintendent at SCI Fayette. As to these Defendants, Plaintiff alleges the following: 1) After advising a captain of the harassment and retaliation on May 19, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a “request” to Tina Walker and Armel; 2) Plaintiff contacted Defendant Little who has final authority over dietary and staff who has “substantially failed at providing training and addressing his subordinates of [sic] the abuse and consequently allows his subordinates to abuse [their] authority[;]” and 3) “Little has recklessly failed to consider training in the disparity between inmates that suffer from serious mental illnesses, and those to whom [sic] just have behavioral issues.” ECF No. 14 ¶¶ 33-35.
Plaintiff's first allegation sounds in respondeat superior liability. “A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is a required element; a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims). Vicarious liability has no place in § 1983 jurisprudence, and therefore, a plaintiff must plead that each government-official defendant, through the official's own actions, violated the constitution. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Personal involvement may be shown “through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode, 825 F.2d at 1207. And as noted by Defendants, Plaintiff's “request” to Tina Walker and Armel will not constitute their personal involvement in the alleged wrongs for purposes of § 1983 liability. See Pearson v Williams, Civil No. 1:CV-13-1988, 2015 WL 1061585, at *6 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (“[P]articipation in the after-the-fact review of a grievance or other administrative remedy is not enough to establish personal involvement.”) (collecting cases). The claims against Tina Walker and Armel should be dismissed with prejudice. Any attempt to amend would be futile as a matter of law.
Plaintiff's remaining allegations in contacting Defendant Little about the alleged abuse from corrections officers and his alleged failure to train in the disparity between inmates that suffer from serious mental illness and those with mere behavioral issues, however, merits discussion. In order to state a failure to train claim, a plaintiff must allege that the failure to train amounts to “deliberate indifference” to the rights of those with whom employees come into contact. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The failure to train employees ordinarily rises to deliberate indifference only when the failure has caused a pattern of violations. Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000). It is possible, however, to state a failure to train claim in the absence of a pattern of violations, where the need for training is “so obvious” that the failure to do so could be characterized as deliberate indifference. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2011). In addition, the “identified deficiency in training must be closely related to the ultimate injury.” Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391).
Here, in his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14) and his responsive brief (ECF No. 59), Plaintiff alleges that he notified Defendant Little, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, of the repeated abuse he encountered at the hands of corrections officers. As Secretary for the Department of Corrections, Little is responsible for the development of policy within the Commonwealth Department of Corrections. See, e.g., Policy Statement, Inmate Abuse DC-ADM 001 (April 4, 2022). Plaintiff repeatedly alleges that he suffers from mental illness and his allegations further suggest that he was being treated by psychiatrists and taking medication for his mental illness. Liberally construing the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff suggests that based upon the repeated physical abuse he sustained at the hands of corrections officers and his reports of the same to high-ranking DOC officials, Little has failed to implement training for corrections officers as to how to respond to mentally ill inmates who exhibit behaviors consistent with their mental illness, as opposed to those who “just have behavioral issues.” ECF No. 14 ¶¶ 34-35. Even in the absence of notice to Defendant Little, the need for such training is so obvious that the failure to provide such training could be characterized as deliberate indifference. Although a close question, Plaintiff has alleged enough plausible facts to allow this claim to move into discovery.
Therefore, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 41) be granted as to Armel and Tina Walker and denied as to Secretary Little.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons below, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment/Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Dr. Saavedra (ECF No. 34) be granted. It is therefore recommended that Dr. Saavedra be terminated as a party defendant.
It is also recommended that the Correction Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Little, Armel and Tina Walker (ECF No. 41) be granted in part and denied in part. It should be granted as to Armel and Tina Walker and denied as to Little. Defendants Armel and Tina Walker should be terminated as party defendants.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.