Opinion
Civil Action 2:22-cv-904
10-27-2022
SHAKOUR A. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. GEORGE LITTLE, et al., Defendants.
Christy Criswell Wiegand District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LISA PUPO LENIHAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that:
(1) Plaintiff's correspondence to the Court dated July 4, 2022, which was filed on July 19, 2022 as Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Emergency Transfer (ECF No. 4) be denied as moot to the extent Plaintiff is requesting injunctive relief against Defendants at SCI-Fayette and denied to the extent Plaintiff is seeking a transfer.
(2) Plaintiff's correspondence to the Court dated August 6, 2022, which was filed on September 13, 2022 as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Hearing to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 15) be denied as moot to the extent Plaintiff is requesting injunctive relief against Defendants at SCI-Fayette and denied without prejudice to the extent Plaintiff is seeking the appointment of counsel.
(3) Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed on October 21, 2022 (ECF No. 24) be denied to the extent Plaintiff is seeking preliminary injunctive relief against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, denied as premature to the extent he seeks the production of any discovery, granted to the extent Defendants have a duty to preserve relevant evidence and denied to the extent Plaintiff is requesting an order for Defendants to preserve evidence unrelated to his claims, and granted to the extent that Plaintiff requests to add certain claims to his complaint insofar as Plaintiff be permitted to file a second amended complaint to include all of his allegations in one complete complaint.
(4) Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order filed on October 24, 2022 (ECF No. 25) be denied to the extent Plaintiff is seeking preliminary injunctive relief against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
II. REPORT
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff, Shakour A. Brown, is a state prisoner who is currently in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and confined at SCI-Somerset. He was confined at SCI-Fayette at the time he initiated this action on June 17, 2022. Plaintiff's Complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was docketed on August 4, 2022, but he later filed an Amended Complaint that was docketed on September 9, 2022. See ECF Nos. 10, 14. Essentially, Plaintiff alleges that since he arrived at SCI-Fayette in March 2022, he has experienced instances of food contamination, excessive force, inhumane conditions of confinement, retaliation, harassment, and the confiscation of his property, as well as the denial of the right to participate in his religious activities and the denial of medical treatment. He also alleges that certain Defendants failed to act and/or protect him despite informing them of the aforementioned ongoing issues. It is noted that Plaintiff was recently transferred to SCI-Somerset on October 12, 2022, but he claims that “the intimidation [and] retaliation” is still continuing and his food is still being “altered with bodily fluids.” See ECF No. 24. Notably, he also states that before he was incarcerated at SCI-Fayette, he was incarcerated at SCI-Camp Hill where his food was also contaminated with bodily fluids on a daily basis. Id.
In the four pending motions before the Court, Plaintiff appears to specifically complain about the alleged contamination of his food, which he claims happens on a daily basis, as well as “harassment” and “retaliation” by prison officials. In his first motion, he requests that the Court order “the prison warden [at SCI-Fayette] to stop the abuse” that is causing him “mental torture and public ridicule.” (ECF No. 4.) In his second motion, he requests the issuance of a preliminary injunction and a hearing to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 15.) In his third motion, which he filed after he was transferred to SCI-Somerset, he requests that the Court order the Department of Corrections to stop contaminating his food with bodily fluids, release his medical records, preserve all records concerning him at SCI-Fayette, do a full lab testing of the substance that is being placed in his food, and transfer him to a prison out of state. He also appears to make a request to amend his complaint to include additional allegations. (ECF No. 24.) In his fourth motion, he requests that the Court order the Department of Corrections to stop contaminating his food, do a “blood test to determine the chemicals that [are] being placed in his food,” and order the kitchen at SCI-Somerset to serve him food that does not cause him aggravation and medical complication. (ECF No. 25.)
The Court ordered the Defendants to respond to the allegations made in the first two of Plaintiff's motions, the third and fourth motions being filed after the Court's Order. See ECF No. 18. Defendants filed their response on September 29, 2022. According to Defendants, Plaintiff has filed over fifty grievances since he arrived at SCI-Fayette in March of 2022, and a number of those grievances raised issues with the alleged contamination of his food trays. Plaintiff was advised that his claims were fully investigated and determined to be unsupported and unwarranted. In several instances, surveillance video was reviewed and no interference with Plaintiff's food trays was observed. Defendants request denial of Plaintiff's motions because Plaintiff has failed to establish the necessary predicates for the entry of preliminary injunctive relief. See ECF No. 19. The undersigned agrees.
B. Standard of Review
Motions for preliminary injunctive relief are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedureand are judged against exacting legal standards. To obtain a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, a movant “must satisfy the traditional four-factor test: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) granting relief will not result in even greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) the public interest favors such relief.” Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010). It is the movant's burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits. Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1992).
Pursuant to Rule 65(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(1). In contrast, a “court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney” if certain conditions are met. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1).
Preliminary injunctive relief “is not granted as a matter of right.” Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440,443 (3d Cir. 1982), see also Thomas v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 3:13-CV-2661, 2014 WL 3955105, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) (“An injunction is an ‘extraordinary remedy' that is never awarded as of right.”). Rather, the decision to grant or deny such relief is committed to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 1982).
Generally, preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that places precise burdens on the moving party, and “[t]he preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). “It has been well stated that upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937). Further, where the requested preliminary injunctive relief “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnet v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980). Mandatory injunctions should be used sparingly. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982).
For a party to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 65, he must demonstrate both a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted. Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998); Kershner, 670 F.2d at 443. “As these elements suggest, there must be ‘a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.'” Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)). “To establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, the moving party must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause of action.” Sutton v. Cerullo, 3:CV-10-1899, 2014 WL 3900235, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2014). To establish irreparable injury, “the moving party must establish that the harm is imminent and probable.” Stilp v. Contino, 629 F.Supp.2d 449, 466 (M.D. Pa. 2009). “The mere risk of injury is not sufficient to meet this standard.” Id. And the burden of showing irreparable injury “is not an easy burden” to meet. Moore v. Mann, 3:CV-13-2771, 2014 WL 3893903, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug 7, 2014). In assessing a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the court must also consider the harm to the defendants and whether granting the preliminary injunction will be in the public interest. New Jersey Retail Merchants Ass'n v. Sidamon-Eristoff 669 F.3d 374, 388 (3d Cir. 2012).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
C. Discussion
1. Contamination of food
With the above considerations in mind, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is warranted in this case. For the most part, Plaintiff requests preliminary injunctive relief in the form of an order prohibiting the contamination of his food and testing of the substance that he claims is being put into his food. In his motions, he has identified this substance as everything from bodily fluids, feces, urine, semen, and “substance in a medication form” that causes drowsiness, dizziness, disorientation, dry mouth, extreme side pains, constipation, and gas. He alleges that he has gone on numerous hunger strikes, and he claims that he has suffered severe mental distress and medical complications due to the contamination of his food.
First and foremost, it is noted that Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at SCI-Fayette, but his claims for injunctive relief in the first and second motions arise from his former incarceration at SCI-Fayette. It is well settled that a prisoner's request for injunctive relief against defendants at one prison becomes moot when the prisoner is transferred to another prison. See Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir. 1993); see also, e.g., Miller v. Hartwell, 834 Fed.Appx. 692, 694 (3d Cir. 2020); Marshall v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 499 Fed.Appx. 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2012). As such, to the extent they are requested against Defendants at SCI-Fayette, Plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief in these motions should be denied as moot.
In Plaintiff's third and fourth motions, he states that his food is still being contaminated with bodily fluids now that he is at SCI-Somerset, and he requests that the Court order the Department of Corrections to stop the contamination and perform a full lab test of the substance that is being placed in his food. While there is support for the proposition that prison officials may violate the Eighth Amendment by serving unsanitary, spoiled or contaminated food which presents an immediate danger to the health and well being of the inmates who consume it, see Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983), an inmate claiming an Eighth Amendment violation must prove “both an objective element - that the deprivation was sufficiently serious -and a subjective element - that a prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., deliberate indifference.” Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1996).
Although most of the Defendants named in this action are employees at SCI-Fayette, and any request for injunctive relief against them is now moot given that Plaintiff has been transferred to SCI-Somerset, Plaintiff has also named George Little, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections, as a Defendant in this action. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff's requests for preliminary injunctive relief are not moot, the undersigned will address them.
While the undersigned in no way diminishes Plaintiff's complaints, it is noted that Plaintiff admits he suffers from anxiety, panic attacks, phobias, and paranoia, see ECF No. 14, p.2, ECF No. 25, p.2, and he has alleged ongoing food contamination at the last three state correctional institutions at which he has been incarcerated, see ECF No. 24, p.1, ECF No. 25, p.6. Other than his pure speculation, there is no objective evidence that Plaintiff's meals were or are, in fact, contaminated or otherwise unsafe to eat when served to him. This Court is the recipient of numerous complaints filed by individuals incarcerated at both SCI-Fayette and SCI-Somerset and has not received any other similar complaints. While possible, it seems unlikely that each of the institutions housing Plaintiff are making an effort to contaminate his food, and only his food. He has thus not sustained his burden of proof to show a reasonable probability of success on the merits for the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief to the extent that he requests the Court to order the Department of Corrections to perform laboratory testing or any other relief in relation to his food.
2. Request for transfer
Plaintiff makes several requests in his motions to be transferred to a different prison or a prison out of state. “[T]he decision where to house inmates is at the core of prison administrators' expertise[,]” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002), and is among the “wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than the federal courts.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). Furthermore, “prisoners have no inherent constitutional right to placement in any particular prison, to any security classification, or to any particular housing assignment.” Jenkins v. Crayton, No. 12-1533, 2013 WL 3467191, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 10, 2013) (citing, among others, Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, (1976)). Simply put, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to choose his prison and he may not use a motion for preliminary injunction as a vehicle to choose his place of confinement or to direct a prison transfer. See Kelly v. Merrill, No. 1: 14 CV-2322, 2014 WL 7740025, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 438676 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2015) (“[S]uch requests, while often made, are rarely embraced by the courts. Instead, courts have routinely held that prisoner-plaintiffs are not entitled to use a motion for injunctive relief as a vehicle to compel prison officials to provide them with specific relief and services pending completion of their lawsuits. Thus, courts have rejected inmate requests for injunctions mandating specific treatment and conditions of confinement for prisoners.”). As such, Plaintiff's request for a transfer should also be denied.
3. Request for discovery
Plaintiff requests that the Court order Defendants to release his medical records dating back from the time he was initially incarcerated (October 7, 2015) until present day. Plaintiff will have the opportunity to request certain discovery from Defendants, including his medical records to the extent they are relevant to his claims, if this case survives the filing of a motion to dismiss. At this time, however, Plaintiff's request should be denied as premature.
4. Request to preserve evidence
Plaintiff also requests that the Court order Defendants to preserve all records concerning his incarceration at SCI-Fayette, including, but not limited to, pictures, videos, grievances, misconducts, incident reports, medical records and staff requests. It's been recognized that “[w]hile a litigant is under no duty to keep or retain every document in its possession, even in advance of litigation, it is under a duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, will likely be requested in reasonably foreseeable litigation.” Scott v. IBM Corp., 196 F.R.D. 233, 249 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2000). Thus, “[a] party which reasonably anticipates litigation has an affirmative duty to preserve relevant evidence.” Baliotis v. McNeil, 870 F.Supp. 1285, 1290 (M.D. Pa. 1994). Here, the Department of Corrections is no stranger to litigation and is well aware of its duty to preserve relevant evidence. Nevertheless, the Court should grant Plaintiff's request to the extent that it concerns the preservation of evidence relevant to the claims at issue in this case and deny it to the extent that it does not.
5. Request to add claims
Plaintiff appears to request that certain claims be “added” to his complaint concerning incidents that occurred in September and October of 2022. As a general rule, the Court does not authorize piecemeal amendment or gradual supplementation of the operative pleading over time, which is essentially what Plaintiff is attempting to do in his third motion. Allowing a plaintiff to file partial amendments or fragmented supplements to the operative pleading “presents an undue risk of piecemeal litigation that precludes orderly resolution of cognizable claims.” Uribe v. Taylor, No. 10-2615, 2011 WL 1670233, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2011) (denyingpro se plaintiff's motion seeking to provide the court with updated information, dismissing plaintiff's complaint, and granting leave to file an amended complaint “so that all of his allegations and claims can be presented in a single pleading.”) Moreover, “an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019). “Thus, the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading.” Id. And, while the court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, “liberal construction of a pro se amended complaint does not mean accumulating allegations from superseded pleadings.” Argentina v. Gillette, No. 19-1348, 2019 WL 2538020, at *1 n.3 (3d Cir. June 20, 2019). For all of these reasons, it is recommended that the Court allow Plaintiff a brief period of time to file a second amended complaint that includes all of his claims in one document. The instructions for filing a proper complaint can be found in the Court's Order dated August 5, 2022, at ECF No. 12.
6. Request for appointment of counsel
Finally, Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel. It is well-settled that “[i]ndigent civil litigants possess neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to appointed counsel.” Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498 (3d Cir. 2002). Yet, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) provides that the Court may request an attorney to represent an indigent litigant in a civil case. While the court has broad discretion to request an attorney to represent an indigent civil litigant, Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993), it may not require an unwilling attorney to accept an appointment in a civil case. Mallard v. U.S. District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989).
In the case of Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1196 (1994), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit identified standards to be considered by the district courts in exercising their discretion whether to “appoint”counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). The court recognized that there are significant practical restraints on the district court's ability to “appoint” counsel:
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) does not authorize the court to “appoint” counsel; it authorizes the court to “request” an attorney to represent a litigant unable to employ counsel. See Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989).
In 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 was amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134 (110 Stat. 1321) (enacted on April 26, 1996). Former section 1915(d) was amended and codified as section 1915(e).
the ever-growing number of prisoner civil rights actions filed each year in the federal courts; the lack of funding to pay appointed counsel; and the limited supply of competent lawyers who are willing to undertake such representation without compensation.6 F.3d at 157. The court also recognized that there are many cases in which district courts seek to appoint counsel but there is simply none willing to accept appointment. The court stated:
[T]he frequent unwillingness of lawyers to accept appointment in such cases is not only a function of the time pressures lawyers face in trying to earn a living in an increasingly competitive field, but also by circulating knowledge of the indignities that some lawyers have been subjected to by certain litigants, including verbal and written abuse, excessive demands and complaints, and malpractice suits. We trust the
district judges will be sensitive to such problems in making discretionary decisions in this area.Id. at 157, n.7. The court further recognized that volunteer lawyer time is extremely valuable and district courts should not request counsel under § 1915 indiscriminately:
[v]olunteer lawyer time is a precious commodity ....Because this resource is available in only limited quantity, every assignment of a volunteer lawyer to an undeserving client deprives society of a volunteer lawyer available for a deserving cause. We cannot afford that waste.Id. at 157. Finally, the court emphasized that “appointment” of counsel remains a matter of discretion and the decision must be made on a case-by-case basis.
The Court of Appeals in Tabron identified standards to be considered by the district courts in exercising their discretion whether to “appoint” counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (now subsection (e)). First, the Court must consider the merits of the plaintiff's claim. It should not appoint counsel unless it appears that the claim has some merit in fact and law. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155. Other factors a court should consider include the plaintiff's ability to present his or her case; the plaintiff's education, literacy, prior work experience, prior litigation experience, ability to understand English; restraints placed upon him or her by confinement; whether the claim is truly substantial; the difficulty or complexity of the legal issues; the degree to which factual investigation will be required and the ability of the indigent plaintiff to pursue such investigation; the extent to which prisoners and others suffering confinement may face problems in pursuing their claims; whether the claims are likely to require extensive discovery and compliance with complex discovery rules; whether the case is likely to turn on credibility determinations; whether the case will require testimony from expert witnesses; and whether an indigent plaintiff could retain counsel on his or her own behalf.
This case does not present complex issues of fact and the determinations involved are not likely to impact other prisoners. If the complaint survives any motions to dismiss, the Court will order Defendants to provide relevant discovery. At this early stage, it is not clear whether the claims will reach a jury. Should that occur, the Court can reconsider and try to find counsel to represent the plaintiff for trial purposes. The Court is sympathetic to the difficulty of finding counsel while incarcerated; however, this problem is presented in all of the multiple cases filed by prisoners proceeding on a pro se basis. There simply are not enough lawyers to handle the cases that are filed, at least at this early stage. The Court has numerous civil rights cases filed by incarcerated individuals and is aware of both the difficulties involves and also the fact that resources are available in the state correctional institutions to assist prisoners with their legal filings.
As a pro se litigant plaintiff will have the benefit of Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) and its progeny, which provides that courts must liberally construe pro se pleadings. Considering the severe shortage of attorneys with experience and knowledge in this area of the law, who are also willing to take these cases pro bono, it does not appear that this case merits a request by this Court for counsel to represent him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) at this point in the litigation. Should the case survive dispositive motions and appear ready to proceed to trial, the Court may reconsider this request. In fact, our Local Rules of Court, specifically LCvR 10(C),provide that “absent special circumstances, no motions for the appointment of counsel will be granted until after dispositive motions have been resolved.” As such, Plaintiff's request for the appointment of counsel should be denied without prejudice.
Local Rule 10 address pro se civil rights actions by incarcerated individuals.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, it is respectfully recommended that:
(1) Plaintiff's correspondence to the Court dated July 4, 2022, which was filed on July 19, 2022 as Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Emergency Transfer (ECF No. 4) be denied as moot to the extent Plaintiff is requesting injunctive relief against Defendants at SCI-Fayette and denied to the extent Plaintiff is seeking a transfer.
(2) Plaintiff's correspondence to the Court dated August 6, 2022, which was filed on September 13, 2022 as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Hearing to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 15) be denied as moot to the extent Plaintiff is requesting injunctive relief against Defendants at SCI-Fayette and denied without prejudice to the extent Plaintiff is seeking the appointment of counsel.
(3) Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed on October 21, 2022 (ECF No. 24) be denied to the extent Plaintiff is seeking preliminary injunctive relief against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, denied as premature to the extent he seeks the production of any discovery, granted to the extent Defendants have a duty to preserve relevant evidence and denied to the extent Plaintiff is requesting an order for Defendants to preserve evidence unrelated to his claims, and granted to the extent that Plaintiff requests to add certain claims to his complaint insofar as Plaintiff be permitted to file a second amended complaint to include all of his allegations in one complete document.
(4) Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order filed on October 24, 2022 (ECF No. 25) be denied to the extent Plaintiff is seeking preliminary injunctive relief against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)&(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written objections thereto. Plaintiff's failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.