Brown v. Kelly

247 Citing cases

  1. City of New York

    275 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)   Cited 35 times
    Holding that "individualized probable cause inquiries would dictate the course of litigation with respect to" two subclasses because the underlying arrests were "conducted by officers exercising individual discretion rather than following mass arrest orders"

    " The commonality and typicality requirements often ‘ tend to merge into one another, so that similar considerations animate [the] analysis' of both." Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 475 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Marisol A., 126 F.3d at 376); seeGen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982).

  2. Mendez v. Pizza on Stone, LLC

    11 Civ. 6316 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2012)   Cited 8 times
    Finding that plaintiffs' evidence on individual liability demonstrated, "[a]t most," that the defendant occasionally "communicated management policies on wages and hours to employees"

    only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Rule 23(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.; see Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 475 (2d Cir. 2010). What matters to class certification is not the raising of common 'questions' -- even in droves -- but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.

  3. Severin v. Project OHR, Inc.

    10 Civ. 9696 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 20, 2012)   Cited 26 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding that as putative plaintiffs in a class action were paid $136.95 for each shift totaling a potential 16 compensable hours, putative plaintiffs rate of compensation was $8.55 per hour which was greater than the applicable minimum wage rate

    the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Rule 23(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.; see Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 475 (2d Cir. 2010). What matters to class certification is not the raising of common 'questions' -- even in droves -- but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.

  4. Stinson v. City of New York

    282 F.R.D. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)   Cited 83 times
    Holding future harm ceased to be speculative because multiple summons had been issued without probable cause

    Defendants contend that, without some evidence linking the rates of dismissal with a judicial determination concerning the probable cause for the underlying issuance of the summonses, the Court would be required to engage in tens of thousands of individualized inquiries on the merits of each putative plaintiff's case in order to determine who is in the class. However, an argument similar to that raised by Defendants in the present action was addressed by the Second Circuit in Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467 (2d Cir.2010) and by this Court in Casale v. Kelly, 257 F.R.D. 396 (S.D.N.Y.2009). Although both Brown and Casale addressed the ascertainability of a class in the context of a Rule 23(b)(3) inquiry, the legal conclusions in these cases are equally applicable to class ascertainability in a Rule 23(a) context.

  5. FAD v. L'OREAL USA, INC.

    10 Civ. 5063 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 14, 2011)   Cited 4 times
    Finding no predominance where plaintiffs could not provide class-wide proof of causation and injury

    only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Rule 23(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.; see Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 475 (2d Cir. 2010). "What matters to class certification is not the raising of common `questions' — even in droves — but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate commonanswers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.

  6. Ryan v. Burwell

    Case No. 5:14-cv-00269 (D. Vt. Jan. 13, 2016)   Cited 1 times

    "The commonality requirement is met if there is a common question of law or fact shared by the class." Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 475 (2d Cir. 2010). Reciting common "questions" is not sufficient to establish commonality; instead the plaintiff must "demonstrate that the class members 'have suffered the same injury.'" Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)).

  7. Murphy v. Lajaunie

    No. 13-cv-6503 (RJS) (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 24, 2015)   Cited 10 times

    Although the Court considers the two requirements separately, commonality and typicality "'tend to merge into one another, so that similar considerations animate [the] analysis' of both." Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 475 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982) ("The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. Both serve as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.").

  8. Vaccariello v. XM Satellite Radio, Inc.

    295 F.R.D. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)   Cited 49 times
    Concluding that plaintiff could not satisfy the predominance requirement where plaintiff could not prove through common evidence that members of the proposed class were entitled to recover damages

    In addition to satisfying these four criteria, the moving party must demonstrate that the class is maintainable under one of Rule 23(b)'s three subsections. McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 222; Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 476 (2d Cir. 2010).

  9. United States v. City of New York

    276 F.R.D. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)   Cited 31 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that Wal-Mart did not disturb the district court's ability under Rule 23(c) to certify only those portions of a claim that satisfy Rule 23(b), even if other portions of the claim do not

    " The numerosity requirement provides that the class must be ‘ so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.’ " Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 475 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1)). " The commonality requirement is met if there is a common question of law or fact shared by the class."

  10. U.S. v. Vulcan Soc'y, Inc.

    07-CV-2067 (NGG) (RLM) (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 8, 2011)

    "The numerosity requirement provides that the class must be 'so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.'" Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 475 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1)). "The commonality requirement is met if there is a common question of law or fact shared by the class."