Opinion
Civil No. 3:CV-05-0967.
May 19, 2005
MEMORANDUM
James Alterique Brown, ("Brown"), a federal inmate housed at the Federal Correctional Institution at Schuylkill, filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the validity of a 2001 conviction in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. (Doc. 1). The petition has been given preliminary consideration, as it is the duty of the Court to screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would be placed on respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer. Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970). For the reasons outlined below, it is appropriate to dismiss the petition at this preliminary stage of the proceedings.
The Clerk must promptly forward the petition to a judge under the court's assignment procedure, and the judge must promptly examine it. If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner. R. GOVERNING § 2254 CASES R.4 (applicable to petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the discretion of the court. Id. at R.1(b).
I. Background.
On July 6, 2000, Brown was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey of possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and for failure to appear in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1) and (2). (Doc. 1). On February 21, 2001, Brown was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of six months on the firearms conviction and thirty-two months on the failure to appear conviction.
Brown did not file a direct appeal. However, he did file a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. His motion was denied on May 29, 2003. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability. A subsequent FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 60(b) motion was denied by the district court. Brown represents that his request for a certificate of appealability of the denial of his 60(b) motion is presently pending before the Third Circuit.
He also represents that his "further attempt to file a `second or successive' 2255 petition based on the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004); and United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) was denied on March 4, 2005." (Doc. 1, Memorandum, p. 3).
He files this petition pursuant to Section 2241 claiming that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain his Section 2241 petition because § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention and sentence. Essentially, Brown contends that he is actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted based upon application of new or recent Supreme Court decisions.
II. Discussion.
Challenges to the legality of federal convictions or sentences that are allegedly in violation of the Constitution may generally be brought only in the district of sentencing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2002) ( citing Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342 (1974)); see In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997). Claims may not be raised in a § 2241 petition except in unusual situations where the remedy by motion under § 2255 would be inadequate or ineffective. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251-52. Importantly, § 2255 is not "inadequate or ineffective" merely because the sentencing court has previously denied relief. See id. at 251. Nor do legislative limitations, such as statutes of limitation or gatekeeping provisions, placed on § 2255 proceedings render the remedy inadequate or ineffective so as to authorize pursuit of a habeas corpus petition in this court. United States v. Brooks, 230 F.3d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 2000); Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251; Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997).
Section 2255 prohibits an individual from filing a second or subsequent petition unless based on "newly discovered evidence" or a "new rule of constitutional law." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. One circumstance in which the Third Circuit has recognized the inadequacy of § 2255 is when, following the denial of an initial petition in the sentencing court, the Supreme Court announces a new statutory interpretation that renders the conduct of which the petitioner was convicted non-criminal. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 249. Because a new rule of statutory interpretation falls within neither the "newly discovered evidence" or "new rule of constitutional law" exceptions, a petitioner is barred from seeking relief under § 2255, even though he is now imprisoned for conduct that is no longer criminal. This exception is necessary to avoid the "complete miscarriage of justice" that might otherwise result. Id. at 250-51 ( quoting Davis, 417 U.S. 346-47)). In this limited circumstance, § 2241 serves as an avenue of relief. Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 249-52.
However, § 2241 is not available to Brown. Generally, the Supreme Court does not apply new rules of constitutional procedure to cases that have become final before the rule was announced. See Schriro v. Summerlin, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2523 (2004). Every Court of Appeals to have addressed the issue thus far has concluded that the Supreme Court decisions upon which Brown relies do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844 (10th Cir. Mar. 8, 2005); Bey v. United States, 399 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2005); Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 2005); Varela v. United States, 400 F.3d 864 (11th Cir. Feb. 17, 2005); Green v. United States, 397 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2005) ( per curiam); McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2005). This prohibition applies here. Browns conviction became final in 2001. The case law was handed down well after that date. As such, he is not entitled to relief.
Further, § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because Brown is unable to meet the gatekeeping requirements established for filing a second petition for relief. See Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. Notably, he indicates that his attempt to file a second or successive petition based upon Blakely and Booker was unsuccessful. To allow him to file a habeas petition in the district of confinement asserting similar claims raised in a previous unsuccessful § 2255 action would obliterate congressional attempts to promote finality in federal criminal cases.
AND NOW, to wit, this 19th day of May 2005, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Brown's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) is GRANTED for the purpose of filing the action only;
2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED;
3. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case and NOTIFY THE PETITIONER.