Moreover, the number of dogs in a yard may be limited by local ordinance, while the dog park in this case had no limits on the number of dogs permitted. Defendant and the dissent argue that we should construe the deed restriction in light of the applicable zoning ordinances, citing Brown v Hojnacki, 270 Mich 557, 560-561; 259 NW 152 (1935). However, we later said that Brown confirmed the rule that " ambiguous restrictions may be interpreted in the light of a general plan."

Further, we are not persuaded by the case cited by the dissent in support of its proposition that whether an activity constitutes a "business" depends on the type of neighborhood to which the covenant applies. The dissent cites Brown v. Hojnacki, 270 Mich. 557, 561; 259 N.W. 152 (1935), in which this Court concluded that it was "too plain for argument" that the activity at issue there, a massage parlor, constituted a "business house of any kind," and thereby violated a covenant prohibiting the latter. In reaching this conclusion, the Court nonetheless asserted that it was appropriate to consider the "`location and character of the entire tract of land.'"

Despite the rules of application pertaining to construction of a restrictive covenant, they must not be applied in a manner to defeat the plain and obvious purposes of the contractual instrument or restriction. Brown v Hojnacki, 270 Mich. 557, 560; 259 N.W. 152 (1935).

The appellant is not charged with estoppel. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 174 Miss. 643, 165 So. 414; Moore v. Stevens, 90 Fla. 879, 106 So. 901, 43 A.L.R. 1127; Alderson v. Cutting, 163 Cal. 503, 126 P. 157; Brown v. Hojnacki, 270 Mich. 557, 259 N.W. 152, 97 A.L.R. 624; Brown v. Huber, 80 Ohio St. 183, 88 N.E. 322, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 705; Lattiner v. Livermore, 72 N.Y. 174; Merrymount Co. v. Edwardes (Mass.), 160 N.E. 821, 57 A.L.R. 409; Morrow v. Hasselman, 69 N.Y. Equity 617, 61 A. 369; Sayles v. Hall, 210 Mass. 281, 96 N.E. 712, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 625, Ann. Cas 1912d 475; Schadt v. Brill, 173 Mich. 647, 139 N.W. 878, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 726; 26 C.J.S. 566, Sec. 169. J.F. Galloway, Gardner Gardner, and Oscar Backstrom, all of Gulfport, for appellee, on the merits.

"construed in connection with the surrounding circumstances, which the parties are supposed to have had in mind at the time they made it, the location and character of the entire tract of land, the purpose of the restriction, whether it was for the sole benefit of the grantor or for the benefit of the grantee and subsequent purchasers, and whether it was in pursuance of a general building plan for the development and improvement of the property." [ Brown v Hojnacki, 270 Mich. 557, 560-561; 259 N.W. 152 (1935), quoting Library Neighborhood Ass'n v Goosen, 229 Mich. 89; 201 N.W. 219 (1924).] Inasmuch as the clear and uncontradicted intent of the drafter was to provide an unobstructed view of the lake for all the residents, the restriction must be interpreted to accomplish that purpose.

Jones v. Beiber, 251 Iowa 969, 971, 972, 103 N.W.2d 364, 365; Maher v. Park Homes, Inc., 258 Iowa 1291, 1296, 1297, 142 N.W.2d 430, 434. See also Albrecht v. State Highway Commission (Mo.), 363 S.W.2d 643, 645, and citations; Bove v. Giebel, 169 Ohio St. 325, 159 N.E.2d 425, 428, and citations; Wickwire v. Church, 142 N.J. Eq. 174, 59 A.2d 416, 419, and citations; Palermo v. Allen, 91 Ariz. 57, 369 P.2d 906, and citations; Brown v. Hojnacki, 270 Mich. 557, 259 N.W. 152, 153; 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants, Conditions, etc., § 187; 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 163a. The majority, however, erroneously concludes that, because the words "street" and "lot" are not synonymous, the covenant herein precludes the use of a lot for a street even though not expressly stated as such. This conclusion is in conflict with the rule recognized in Division I of the majority opinion, which they fail to apply.

". . . . . should not be applied in such a way as to defeat the plain and obvious purposes of a contractual instrument or restriction."Brown, et al. v. Hojnacki et al. (Ct.), 259 N.W. 152, 97 A.L.R. 621. "If we were to consider only the precise language of the covenant, we might agree with the contention of the defendant, but, under the circumstances of this case, the rights of the parties are not to be determined by a literal interpretation of the restriction.

The restrictive covenant itself does not expressly forbid any particular kind of use of the property, only sets out requirements for the erection of residences should they be built. Does this affirmative requirement amount, in effect, to a negative requirement that none other than residences be built? As the restriction is poorly worded, it is open to construction to ascertain the intent of the subdivider; in this case, more particularly, whether or not he had a general plan of restriction for the subdivision which involved its restriction to single residential use only. To the effect that ambiguous restrictions may be interpreted in the light of a general plan, see Library Neighborhood Association v. Goosen, 229 Mich. 89; Signaigo v. Begun, 234 Mich. 246; Bunce v. Jones, 238 Mich. 337; Holderness v. Central States Finance Corp., 241 Mich. 604; Brown v. Hojnacki, 270 Mich. 557 (97 ALR 621); West Bloomfield Co. v. Haddock, 326 Mich. 601; Ardmore Association v. Bankle, 329 Mich. 573. It will serve no useful purpose to review all of the many building restriction cases which have come before this Court.

It is the general rule that restrictions will be construed strictly against those claiming to enforce them and all doubts resolved in favor of the free use of the property. Brown v. Hojnacki, 270 Mich. 557 (97 A.L.R. 621). In Moore v. Kimball, 291 Mich. 455, we said: "Where the language of the restriction is clear, the parties will be confined to the language which they employed."

"It is the general rule that restrictions will be construed strictly against those claiming to enforce them and all doubts resolved in favor of the free use of the property. Casterton v. Plotkin, 188 Mich. 333; Brown v. Hojnacki, 270 Mich. 557 (97 A.L.R. 621)." Moore v. Kimball, 291 Mich. 455.