Opinion
Civil Action 4:23-CV-0878
05-16-2024
EUGENE M. BROWN, Plaintiff v. DETECTIVE TYSON HAVENS, Defendant
MUNLEY, D.J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
WILLIAM I. ARBUCKLE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. INTRODUCTION
Eugene Brown (“Plaintiff”) initiated this civil rights case on May 30, 2023, (Doc. 1), alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment right when he was subjected to excessive force in the back of a police car. For the reasons explained below it will be recommended that this case be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for Plaintiff's failure to prosecute his case.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We begin by discussing the procedural history of this case and then discuss the allegations of Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. 13).
A. Procedural History
On May 30, 2023, Plaintiff initiated this pro se civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case. (Doc. 1). As Defendant, Plaintiff named Lycoming County Narcotics Enforcement Unit Detective Tyson Havens (“Defendant”). Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. 7), and the Court screened Plaintiff's Complaint and found that it failed to state a claim (Doc. 8). The Court explained that while Plaintiff's Complaint had sufficient facts to state a claim, the Complaint did not have a cognizable request for relief. Id. The Court gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Id.
On July 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 9). The Court screened Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and again found that it failed to state a claim. (Doc. 10). The Court explained that while the Amended Complaint now asked for a cognizable form of relief, $100,000, the Amended Complaint did not include the specific facts about what Defendant Havens did that Plaintiff had included in his original Complaint. Id. The Court again gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Id.
On August 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed what the Court construed as a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 11). As with Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, his Second Amended Complaint, (Doc. 11), did not include the facts Plaintiff included in his original Complaint. Thus, while Plaintiff stated a cognizable form of relief, he again failed to allege adequate facts. In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff stated “[d]ue to address changes paperwork might take longer so I ask courts to have some patince [sic].” (Doc. 11). The Court interpreted this as a request for more time to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 12). The Court then issued an order giving Plaintiff leave to file a comprehensive third amended complaint. Id.
On November 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. 13). On November 3, 2023, the Court issued an Order directing the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of the Third Amended Complaint on Defendant. (Doc. 14). On January 2, 2024, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment (Doc. 20), and a Statement of Facts (Doc. 21). On January 16, 2024, Defendant filed a Brief in Support. (Doc. 24).
On January 17, 2024, the Court issued a Briefing Order giving Plaintiff until February 6, 2024, to file a responsive statement of facts and brief in opposition. (Doc. 25). That Order warned Plaintiff that failure to file a brief in opposition may result in the dismissal of his case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. Id. On January 29, 2024, the copy of that Order was returned to the Court as undeliverable. (Doc. 26). The Clerk of Court was able to learn, despite Plaintiff's failure to update his address with the Court, that Plaintiff had been transferred to a different prison and resent the Order to Plaintiff at his new address. Id. Plaintiff did not file either a brief in opposition or a responsive statement of facts.
On February 12, 2024, the Court issued a second Briefing Order giving Plaintiff until March 12, 2024, to file a brief in support and responsive statement of material facts. (Doc. 27). That Order again warned Plaintiff that failure to file a brief in opposition may result in the dismissal of his case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. Id. Plaintiff did not file a brief in opposition or a responsive statement of facts.
On March 27, 2024, the Court issued a third Briefing Order giving Plaintiff until on or before April 19, 2024, to file a brief in opposition and responsive statement of material facts. (Doc. 28). That Order again warned Plaintiff that failure to file a brief in opposition may result in the dismissal of his case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. Id. Plaintiff still has not filed either a brief in opposition or a responsive statement of facts.
B. Allegations of the Third Amended Complaint
Plaintiff's statement of his claim in his Third Amended Complaint reads in its entirety:
1. On February 3, 2023 at the magistrates office (Judge Whiteman) The officer: stopped the car and attempted to take my seat belt off. I was handcuffed in the back of the squad car. When the officer got in the car to take the seat belt off he spit in, and licked my face intentionally. The spit was assault and battery, battery mainly because the defendant deliberately and and [sic] offensively touched me in a way that I did not permit. For the sake of the claim it was excessive force governed by the Fourth Amendment. I was handcuffed in the back and I could not protect myself from the assault. I was violated, and from that violation I suffer emotional distress and mental anguish, the fact that the officer did that to me while I was handcuffed made the encounter cruel and unusual punishment from the unconstitutional conditions of the confinement. I still feel shame and embarrassment to this day, and the emotional anguish does not subside because of time.(Doc. 13, p. 4). In the relief section of his Third Amended Complaint Plaintiff writes, “punitive damages claim for a settement [sic] ¶ 100,000.00.” Id.
III. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 41(B) LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute or comply with a court order, stating that: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” A court's authority to dismiss extends past granting a motion by the defendant. In fact, “[u]nder Rule 41(b), a district court has authority to dismiss an action sua sponte if a litigant fails to prosecute or to comply with a court order.” “The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in the courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); Price v. Williams, No. 1:08-CV-583, 2019 WL 1620287, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2019) (citing Woods v. Malinowski, No. 17-17, 2018 WL 3999660, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 18, 2018), report and recommendation adopted as modified, 2018 WL 3997344 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2018)).
Qadr v. Overmyer, 642 Fed.Appx. 100, 102 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curium) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)); see also Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that a court can dismiss a case sua sponte under Rule 41(b)).
Id.
Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute or comply with a court order rest in the sound discretion of the Court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. That discretion, while broad, is governed by the following factors, commonly referred to as Poulis factors:
Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
Id. (citing Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984)).
“In balancing the Poulis factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation' to determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff's case.” Consistent with this view, it is well-settled that “no single Poulis factor is dispositive,” and that “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.”
Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
The first Poulis factor requires that the Court consider the party's personal responsibility. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this case. His status, however, does not excuse compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and does not excuse Plaintiff from his obligation to abide by Orders of the Court. The sole responsibility for meeting those obligations in this case is Plaintiff's. Plaintiff has not met his obligations in this case because he did not properly respond to Defendant's Motion and did not respond to the Orders directing him to do so. Accordingly, we find that the first factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
Cannon v. Moore, No. 1:19-CV-1700, 2022 WL 2932218, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 2022) (finding that a pro se litigant was responsible for failing to comply with the Court's rules and orders), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2918898 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2022).
The second Poulis factor requires that the Court consider whether Plaintiff's conduct has resulted in any prejudice to Defendants. In this context, examples of prejudice are “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Prejudice for purposes of the Poulis analysis, however, does not mean irremediable harm. “[T]he burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy is sufficiently prejudicial.” Plaintiff's failure to comply with court rules and respond to court orders frustrates and delays the resolution of this action. Moving forward, Plaintiff's failure to litigate would prejudice Defendant who cannot not seek a timely resolution of the case where Plaintiff fails to timely respond. Accordingly, we find that the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1984).
Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. Feb. 28, 2003).
Id.
The third Poulis factor requires the Court to consider whether Plaintiff has exhibited a history of dilatoriness over the life of this case. “[C]onduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient to demonstrate a ‘history of dilatoriness.'”“Extensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response to interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” On the whole, Plaintiff does not have a history of dilatoriness over the life of this case. We find the third factor weighs against dismissal.
Adams, 29 F.3d at 875 (“a party's problematic acts must be evaluated in light of its behavior over the life of the case.”).
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 261.
Adams, 29 F.3d at 874.
The fourth Poulis factor requires the Court to consider whether Plaintiff's conduct was willful or in bad faith. In this context, “[w]illfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior.” Plaintiff's failure to comply with multiple Court orders “demonstrate[] a willful disregard for procedural rules and court directives.” The Court has issued three Briefing Orders and Plaintiff has had over 104 days to respond to Defendant's Motion and has failed to do so. Further, Plaintiff has previously demonstrated his ability to communicate with the Court and knows how to seek more time to respond to a Court Order. See Doc. 11. Plaintiff's subsequent failure to respond to the Court in any way when he clearly knows how to contact the Court suggests his failure to respond is a deliberate choice. Further, all three Briefing Orders requiring Plaintiff to respond warned Plaintiff that failure to file a brief in opposition may lead to his case being dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docs. 25, 27, 28). Based on all this information, we infer that Plaintiff's failure to respond was a deliberate choice. Accordingly, we find that the fourth factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
Id. at 875.
Gilyard v. Dauphin Cnty. Work Release, No. 10-1657, 2010 WL 5060236, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2010).
The fifth Poulis factor requires the Court to consider the effectiveness of alternate sanctions. Dismissal is a sanction of last resort, and it is incumbent upon a court to explore the effectiveness of lesser sanctions before ordering dismissal. In general, “sanctions less than dismissal [are] ineffective when a litigant, such as [Plaintiff], is proceeding pro se. ” Further, Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this case. Therefore, it is unlikely that monetary sanctions would be effective. Finally, Plaintiff's failure to respond to the Court's prior Orders leads to an inference that further orders would not be effective. Accordingly, we find that the fifth factor weighs in favor of dismissal because no other sanction would be effective.
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.
See Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011); Emerson, 296 F.3d 184; Nowland v. Lucas, No. 1:10-CV-1863, 2012 WL 10559, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2012) (“This case presents such a situation where the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability of the court to utilize lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion.”).
The sixth and final Poulis factor requires the Court to consider the meritoriousness of the claim. A claim is deemed “meritorious” for the purposes of the Poulis analysis when the allegations of the complaint, if established at trial, would support recovery. To evaluate this factor, a court uses the standard for a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Due to the procedural posture of the case and Plaintiff's failure to respond to Defendant's Motion and to Court Orders, the Court has not yet had occasion to analyze the merits of the Motion to Dismiss section of Defendant's Motion. Thus, the Court “cannot say as a matter of law whether [Plaintiff's] complaint has merit.”However, Defendant has “presented summary judgment arguments which since they are not rebutted appear to be meritorious.” Accordingly, the Court finds this factor is, at best for Plaintiff, neutral.
Id. at 870.
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263.
Dorsey v. Marsh, No. 1:23-CV-01390, 2023 WL 8259259, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2023).
Id.
Fowler v. Tennis, No. 3:09-CV-01726, 2011 WL 1988418, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 2, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 1990555 (M.D. Pa. May 23, 2011).
Again, “no single Poulis factor is dispositive,” and “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.” Upon balancing the Poulis factors as they apply to this case, the Court finds those factors weigh in favor of dismissal of this action for lack of prosecution. Therefore, it will be recommended this case be dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373).
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that:
(1) This case be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
(2) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment (Doc. 20) be DEEMED MOOT; and
(3) The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the
Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.