Opinion
3:23-CV-00043-CDL-MSH
09-28-2023
FREDDIE DINO BROWN, Plaintiff, v. H. PATRICK HAGGARD, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHEN HYLES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Freddie Dino Brown filed a pro se complaint (ECF No. 1), claiming, in relevant part, Defendants Athens-Clarke County District Attorney Zaine Thistle, Athens-Clarke County Police Officers Ger Xiong and Gregory Slaney, and Family Justice Clinic attorney Christine Scartz violated his constitutional rights through various dealings with the Athens-Clarke County police and court system. Compl. 5-7, ECF No. 1. On August 2, 2023, Thistle, Xiong, and Slaney filed a motion to dismiss Brown's complaint (ECF No. 28). On August 9, 2023, Scartz filed a motion to dismiss Brown's complaint (ECF No. 30).
Thistle's brief in support of his motion to dismiss spells his name Thistle, rather than “Thisle” which appears on the Court's docket. Br. in Supp. of Thistle Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 28. In her brief, Scartz states that the Court's docket incorrectly lists her as “Scantz,” but the correct spelling is Scartz. Br. in Supp. of Scartz Mot. to Dismiss 1 n.1, ECF No. 30-1. The Clerk is DIRECTED to modify the docket to reflect the correct spelling of the names of these Defendants.
For the following reasons, the Court recommends that Defendants' motions be granted, and that Brown's complaint be dismissed.
On July 27, 2023, this Court recommended that Judge H. Patrick Haggard-the only other Defendant in this matter-be dismissed from this action. R. & R. 1, ECF No. 25.
BACKGROUND
The Court received Brown's complaint (ECF No. 1) and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) on April 13, 2023. In his complaint, which is difficult to follow and nearly incomprehensible, Brown seems to allege a violation of various constitutional rights. These alleged violations, in relevant part, stem from what he describes as a false arrest by four Athens-Clarke County police officers, false testimony by the District Attorney, and presentation of prejudicial evidence by counsel for the Family Justice Clinic. Compl. 5-7. It is unclear as to which Defendant(s) each allegation refers to specifically. Brown does not link any of his allegations to Xiong or Slaney. Brown does appear, however, to allege that the District Attorney-presumably Thistle-gave false testimony. Id. at 5. Brown also alleges that Scartz violated his rights by “showing off” his “criminal back[ground] just to try to make [him] guilty.” Id. at 7. Brown seeks money damages of $200,000 for pain and suffering, medical bills, loss of income, as well as injunctive relief that will “clear [his] name and charges.” Id. at 5.
Thistle, Xiong, and Slaney filed their motion to dismiss arguing 1) Brown's claim against Thistle is barred by absolute immunity; 2) Xiong and Slaney are entitled to qualified immunity; and 3) to the extent Brown asserts any state-law claims, those claims are barred by Xiong and Slaney's state-level official immunity. Br. in Supp. of Thistle, Xiong, and Slaney Mot. to Dismiss 4-9, ECF No. 28. Scartz filed a motion to dismiss arguing 1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes the Court from exercising jurisdiction over Brown's claim against her; 2) Brown failed to state a § 1983 claim against her; 3) qualified immunity bars Brown's individual-capacity claim against her; and 4) the Eleventh Amendment and the text of § 1983 bar Brown's official-capacity claim against her. Br. in Supp. of Scartz Mot. to Dismiss 2-8, ECF No. 30-1. Because the Court agrees that Thistle is entitled to dismissal based on absolute immunity, Xiong and Slaney are entitled to dismissal based on qualified immunity, and Brown has failed to state a claim against Scartz, the Court declines to address Defendants' other arguments.
DISCUSSION
1. Defendant Thistle
“A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for all actions he takes while performing his function as an advocate for the government.” Rowe v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). “The prosecutorial function includes the initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecution, and all appearances before the court, including examining witnesses and presenting evidence.” Id. (first citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976); and then citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991)). Even if a prosecutor knowingly proffers “perjured testimony and fabricated exhibits at trial, he is entitled to absolute immunity from liability for doing so.” Id. at 1279-80.
Here, Brown alleges only that the District Attorney presented false testimony. Compl. 5. While it is true that a prosecutor is only entitled to immunity for his conduct during the “judicial phase” of a case, see Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1285 (11th Cir. 1999), Brown has presented no evidence which suggests that Thistle's alleged acts were committed outside the judicial phase of any purported prosecution. As a result, the Court recommends that Thistle's motion to dismiss be granted based on absolute immunity.
2. Defendants Xiong and Slaney
“[Q]ualified immunity completely protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suit in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The purpose of qualified immunity is to allow officials to carry out discretionary duties without the chilling fear of personal liability or harrassive litigation, protecting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“In order to receive qualified immunity, an official must first establish that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). To make that determination “a court must ask whether the act complained of, if done for a proper purpose, would be within, or reasonably related to, the outer perimeter of an official's discretionary duties.” Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998). Once the defendant shows that he was acting within his discretionary authority, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish that qualified immunity does not apply. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003) abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). To meet this burden, Brown must show “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Xiong and Slaney assert they were acting within their discretionary authority when they allegedly arrested Brown. Br. in Supp. of Xiong and Slaney Mot. to Dismiss 6. Brown has not rebutted this assertion. Thus, the Court assumes that Xiong and Slaney were acting within their discretionary authority. As a result, the burden shifts to Brown to show Xiong and Slaney violated his constitutional rights. In his complaint, however, Brown has not connected any of his allegations to either Xiong or Slaney. Critically, Brown has not asserted that Xiong and Slaney were present when he was allegedly arrested. Accordingly, the Court finds that Brown has not carried his burden to show Xiong and Slaney violated his constitutional rights, and it recommends that their motion to dismiss be granted based on qualified immunity.
3. Defendant Scartz
A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot “merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (second alteration in original). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for relief under §1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
Here, Brown alleges in conclusory fashion that Scartz violated his rights by showing his criminal background in an effort to make him guilty. Compl. 7. While factual allegations are considered true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, allegations like those made by Brown-that Scartz violated his rights-are legal conclusions “couched as a factual allegation.” Mack v. Miles, 795 Fed.Appx. 682, 684 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). As a result, the Court finds that Brown has failed to state a claim against Scartz, and it recommends that her motion to dismiss be granted on that ground.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants Thistle, Xiong, and Slaney, and Defendant Scartz's Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 28, 30) be GRANTED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy hereof. Any objection should be no longer than TWENTY (20) PAGES in length. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. The District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECCOMENDED.