Opinion
3:23-CV-00043-CDL-MSH
07-27-2023
FREDDIE DINO BROWN, Plaintiff, v. H PATRICK HAGGARD, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHEN HYLES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint (ECF No. 1), claiming Defendants Athens-Clarke County Superior Court Judge H. Patrick Haggard, the Athens-Clarke County District Attorney, an attorney with the Family Justice Clinic, and two Athens-Clarke County Police Officers violated his constitutional rights through various dealings with the Athens-Clarke County police and court system. Compl. 5-7, ECF No. 1. On June 16, 2023, Defendant Judge Haggard filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 13). For the reasons stated below, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant's motion be GRANTED, that Defendant Judge Haggard be dismissed from the case, and that the case proceed only as to the remaining defendants.
BACKGROUND
The Court received Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2) on April 13, 2023. In his complaint, which is difficult to follow and nearly incomprehensible, Plaintiff seems to allege a violation of various constitutional rights. These alleged violations stem from what Plaintiff describes as a false arrest by four Athens-Clarke County Police Officers, false testimony by the District Attorney, a wrongful temporary protective order (“TPO”) proceeding over which Judge Haggard presided, and presentation of prejudicial evidence by counsel for the Family Justice Clinic. Compl. 5, 7. It is unclear as to which Defendant(s) each allegation refers to specifically. However, what can be gleaned as relevant regarding actions by Judge Haggard is his role in upholding a TPO that Plaintiff asserts should have been dismissed. Id. at 6. He claims his wife went before Judge Haggard on two occasions to request the TPO be removed, and the request was wrongfully denied. Id. Plaintiff seeks money damages of $200,000 for pain and suffering, medical bills, and loss of income; as well as injunctive relief that will “clear his name and charges.” Id. at 5.
Defendant Judge Haggard filed his motion to dismiss on June 16, 2023, arguing 1) Plaintiff's claims against Judge Haggard in an individual capacity are barred by absolute judicial immunity; 2) Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Judge Haggard are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and 3) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief against Judge Haggard. Br. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 2-6, ECF No. 13-1. Because the Court agrees Judge Haggard is entitled to absolute judicial immunity, it recommends his motion to dismiss be granted and declines to address his other grounds.
DISCUSSION
A judge is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for acts taken while acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 350 (1978) and Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1085 (11th Cir. 1996) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). “Whether a judge's actions were made while acting in his judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge's chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.” Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1983)). This immunity applies even if the action taken was “in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority[.]” Stump, 435 U.S. at 350. Further, disagreement with the action taken by a judge does not justify depriving them of their immunity. Id. Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns only the “power to adjudicate the case,” and “the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (citations omitted).
Here, to determine whether Judge Haggard is entitled to judicial immunity, a two-prong test is applied. The first prong determines whether Judge Haggard was acting in his judicial capacity. Following the four-step analysis from Sibley, it is clear Judge Haggard was acting in his judicial capacity. 437 F.3d at 1070. First, Plaintiff's claims against Judge Haggard revolve around an adverse TPO action Judge Haggard presided over, which is clearly a normal judicial function of a superior court judge. Compl. 5-6.; O.C.G.A. § 156-8(1) (stating superior courts have the power “[t]o exercise original, exclusive, or concurrent jurisdiction, as the case may be, of all causes, both civil and criminal, granted to them by the Constitution and laws”). Second, the acts taken by Judge Haggard happened in open court. Compl. 6. Third, the controversy-dismissal of the TPO-was a case pending before Judge Haggard. Id. Fourth, Plaintiff's allegation against Judge Haggard arose out of his decision to not dismiss the TPO. Id. Each Sibley factor is satisfied, and it is clear Judge Haggard was acting in his judicial capacity during the events that gave rise to Plaintiff's complaint.
The second prong regards whether Judge Haggard acted without subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff does not allege Judge Haggard acted without subject matter jurisdiction, but even if he did, it is within Judge Haggard's purview as an Athens-Clarke County Superior Court Judge to preside over TPO hearings. See O.C.G.A. § 150-6-8. Further, it is clear from Plaintiff's complaint that he simply disagrees with an action taken by Judge Haggard, which does not deprive him of his absolute judicial immunity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 350. Thus, the Court finds Judge Haggard is entitled to absolute judicial immunity and Plaintiff's claim against him cannot proceed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, it is RECCOMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint against Judge Haggard be DISSMISSED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy hereof. Any objection should be no longer than TWENTY (20) PAGES in length. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. The District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECCOMENDED.