Brown v. Farmers Automobile Ins. Ass'n

4 Citing cases

  1. Haines v. United Sec. Ins. Co.

    602 P.2d 901 (Colo. App. 1979)   Cited 9 times
    Finding policy exclusion unambiguously precluded coverage for discharge of raw sewage

    Thus, because the cause of the flooding here resulted from outside forces causing the water to back up through the system, the exclusion controls. See Brown v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association, 106 Ill. App.2d 360, 245 N.E.2d 260 (1969) (abstract opinion); Jackson v. American Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 299 F. Supp. 151 (M.D.N.C. 1968), aff'd, 410 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1969). Hence, the rule in Koncilja does not apply.

  2. Hallsted v. Conv. Center

    23 Wn. App. 349 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 16 times
    Holding water-damage exclusionary clause as unambiguous as applied to backup of raw sewage

    Jackson v. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 151 (M.D.N.C. 1968), aff'd 410 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1969) is identical in facts and nearly identical in policy language. See also Brown v. Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 106 Ill. App.2d 360, 245 N.E.2d 260 (1969); Dallas Handbag Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). It is unfortunate that the latter possibility is what occurred here, but we cannot emasculate the clear and unambiguous meaning of a contract to extend coverage.

  3. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin v. Elam

    289 N.E.2d 699 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)   Cited 18 times

    "The primary object in the construction of an insurance policy is to ascertain the intention of the parties as expressed in the language of the contract. Nationwide Insurance v. Erven, 87 Ill. App.2d 432, 231 N.E.2d 112; Brown v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association, 106 Ill. App.2d 360, 245 N.E.2d 260. If the words of the policy are clear and unambiguous the court without consideration of extrinsic matters to the contract should give effect to the plain and obvious import of the language used unless such construction would lead to unreasonable or absurd consequences. Mid-Central Mutual Casualty Company v. Spanjer, 101 Ill. App.2d 468, 243 N.E.2d 452; Allstate Insurance Company v. Conglis, 33 Ill. App.2d 370, 179 N.E.2d 434.

  4. Olipra v. Zambelli

    274 N.E.2d 877 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971)   Cited 12 times

    • 1, 2 The primary object in the construction of an insurance policy is to ascertain the intention of the parties as expressed in the language of the contract. ( Nationwide Insurance Company v. Ervin, 87 Ill. App.2d 432, 231 N.E.2d 112, Brown v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association, 106 Ill. App.2d 360, 245 N.E.2d 260.) If the words of the policy are clear and unambiguous the court without consideration of matters extrinsic to the contract should give effect to the plain and obvious import of the language used unless such construction would lead to unreasonable or absurd consequences. ( Mid-Central Mutual Casualty Company v. Spanjer, 101 Ill. App.2d 468, 243 N.E.2d 452, Allstate Insurance Company v. Conglis, 33 Ill. App.2d 370, 179 N.E.2d 434). On the other hand if the terms and provision of a policy and ambiguous and uncertain, the court, in determining the significance to be given to the ambiguous and uncertain portions, should consider the purpose sought to be accomplished, the situation of the parties, the subject matter of the contract and the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the policy. ( Pierce v. Standard Accident Insurance Company, 70 Ill. App.2d 224, 216 N.E.2d 818, Clark Company v. Fidelity Casualty Company of New York, 220 Ill. App. 576.)