Opinion
Civ. No. DKC 99-1550.
October 1999
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution are (1) a motion to transfer venue to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida by Defendant Denny's Inc. ("Denny's"), and (2) a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, motion to transfer to the same district, by Defendant Huntington Restaurant Group ("Huntington"). The matter is fully briefed and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that now follow, the court shall GRANT Defendants' motion to transfer.
Background
Plaintiffs are a group of thirty-one African-Americans, primarily children, all residents of Maryland. Denny's is a California corporation with its principal place of business in South Carolina. Huntington is a Texas corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona.
It should be noted that Plaintiffs named Huntington as a defendant in their complaint under the belief that Huntington was the franchisee-owner of the Ocoee, Florida Denny's at the time of the incident. However, Huntington and Denny's Inc. have since stated that the actual franchisee-owner of that location is Golden Management, a Florida Corporation. The court has no reason to believe that the analysis set forth in this memorandum would be any different if Golden Management were a defendant.
The incident giving rise to this action took place on the evening of April 29, 1998, at the Denny's Restaurant in Ocoee, Florida. The complaint alleges that Denny's employees required Plaintiffs, a group of customers, to wait excessive periods of time for service, refused service to some Plaintiffs, and provided poor service to others, including being rude and serving the wrong beverages in dirty glasses. Plaintiffs claim that the actions were both intentional racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and a violation of the consent decree entered by this court in Dyson v. Denny's, Inc., et al., No. 93-DKC-1503 (D. Md. 1994).
Motion to Transfer Venue
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the court may, "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, . . . transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." The transfer decision rests within the "broad discretion" of the trial judge. King v. Johnson Wax Assocs., 565 F. Supp. 711, 719 (D. Md. 1983). Section 1404(a) "was designed to `allo[w] easy change of venue within a unified federal system.'" Id. at 719 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981)).
This court has established a set of considerations for the court to look at in order to determine the appropriate outcome of a motion to transfer, including: (1) the plaintiff's initial choice of forum, (2) relative ease of access to sources of proof, (3) availability of witnesses, and (4) local interest in having localized controversies settled at home. See Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. Madison Three, Inc., 23 F. Supp.2d 617, 622 n. 4 (D. Md. 1998). As always, the plaintiff's initial choice of forum favors the plaintiff. See Akers v. Norfolk W. Ry. Co., 378 F.2d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1967) ("Of course, we recognize the primary right of the plaintiff to choose his forum, a selection not easily to be overthrown."). However, in this case, the remaining factors slightly favor Defendants. The witnesses and proof necessary to try this case are more likely to be found in Florida. While the court recognizes the financial hardship for Plaintiffs to travel to Florida, the remaining witnesses — employees and other patrons in the restaurant — are more likely to reside in Florida, where the incident occurred. Furthermore, Florida courts have a significant interest in resolving disputes arising in Florida. See Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 853 F. Supp. 174, 176 (D. Md. 1994) ("Where, as here, the Defendant resides in another district, the claims giving rise to litigation arose in that other district, and most if not all the witnesses to the alleged misconduct reside or work in the other district, courts routinely order transfer.").
Although this court might be reluctant to order a transfer based upon these factors alone, the absence of certain jurisdiction over one of the defendants is dispositive. Jurisdiction over Huntington is unlikely in Maryland. Huntington has not owned property in this state, advertised here, or conducted business here. Affidavit of Richard P. Beattie. The necessary contacts with the state of Maryland in order to satisfy due process are absent. See Harry Jeanette Weinberg Found. Inc. v. ANB Inv. Management Trust Co., 966 F. Supp. 389, 391 (D. Md. 1997) ("[T]he Fourth Circuit has made it clear that due process requires that a defendant's contacts with the forum state be tantamount to physical presence there."). Plaintiffs' argument with respect to personal jurisdiction over Defendant Huntington is that the consent decree in Dyson somehow provided a benefit to Huntington which, in turn, brought Huntington within the scope of Maryland jurisdiction. However, Huntington was not a party to the Dyson case, and, even if the decree indirectly affects Huntington as a Denny's franchisee, surely this single tenuous connection to Maryland does not constitute the "purposeful activities" necessary to satisfy due process. See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Mid Allegheny Corp., 831 F.2d 522, 525 (4th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiffs rely upon Arcata Graphics Corp. v. Murrays Jewelers Distribs., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 469 (W.D.N.Y. 1974) on this point, but that case is distinct from the instant one. In Arcata, the defendant purposefully entered into a contract with a New York corporation through a representative organization. In contrast, Denny's did not act at the request of Huntington to enter into the Dyson decree in a Maryland court.
It is undisputed that venue and personal jurisdiction over any necessary Defendants are proper in Florida. The court need not resolve the question of jurisdiction in Maryland in order to grant a transfer:
In my judgment, there is no reason to inject such a question into the case unnecessarily. It would not be in the interest of any of the parties or any of the witnesses to litigate this case in Maryland, only to have a ruling upholding the assertion of jurisdiction over [Defendant] reversed on appeal. Nor would that course further the general public interest in sound and efficient administration of justice. . . .Joseph P. Coleman Assocs., Ltd. v. Colonial Metals, 887 F. Supp. 116, 120 (D. Md. 1995); see also Weinberg Found., 966 F. Supp. at 392 (where jurisdiction is uncertain, transfer is an appropriate remedy); McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513, 534 (D. Md. 1977) ("While transfer . . . undoubtedly will cause plaintiff some minimal hardship, this inconvenience is outweighed by the substantial advantage of having the case tried by a court whose jurisdiction is certain.").
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this court shall GRANT the motion to transfer. A separate order will be entered.
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count II will be transferred for resolution, along with the case file, to the Middle District of Florida.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, IT IS this ___ day of October, 1999, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' Motions to Transfer this matter to the Middle District of Florida BE, and the same hereby IS, GRANTED;
2. The clerk is hereby directed to cause the case file to be transferred to the clerk for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida;
3. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss this matter for lack of personal jurisdiction is MOOT in light of the court's Order transferring this matter; and
4. The clerk is directed to mail a copy of this Order and the accompanying Memorandum Opinion to counsel for the parties.