Opinion
No. 18-1185-cv
03-22-2019
FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS: MICHAEL CONFUSIONE, Hegge & Confusione, LLC, Mullica Hill, NJ. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: BENJAMIN E. STOCKMAN (Brian J. Clark, on the brief), Venable LLP, New York, NY.
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 22nd day of March, two thousand nineteen. PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges, LEWIS A. KAPLAN, District Judge. FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS: MICHAEL CONFUSIONE, Hegge & Confusione, LLC, Mullica Hill, NJ. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: BENJAMIN E. STOCKMAN (Brian J. Clark, on the brief), Venable LLP, New York, NY.
Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (J. Paul Oetken, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
Keisha Brown, Ivette Francis, and Tammy Smith appeal from a judgment of the District Court (Oetken, J.) granting summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs-appellants' claims of race discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the New York City Human Rights Law. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
After reviewing the entire record, we affirm substantially for reasons stated by the District Court in its opinion and order dated March 26, 2018.
We believe that the District Court erred in excluding the plaintiffs' evidence of certain promotions of white employees on the ground that it was "time-barred." While it is true that the promotions would have been time-barred as "discrete discriminatory acts" that are actionable, the promotions may nevertheless serve as "evidence in support of a timely claim." See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). In Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 220 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113), we similarly explained that "promotion claims may not be based on discrete acts falling outside the limitations period," but that "evidence of . . . promotion denials [occurring at that time] may constitute relevant 'background evidence in support of a timely claim.'" The admission of that evidence does not change the outcome in this case, because the plaintiffs' claims nonetheless fail for other reasons, such as that the promoted employees were not similarly situated, as described by the District Court.
We have considered all the arguments raised by the plaintiffs-appellants on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court