A plaintiff may not hold a municipality liable pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior (see Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658). In order to properly plead a 42 USC § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "[t]he conduct at issue [was] committed by a person acting under color of state law[,] and... deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States" (Cornejo v Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 [2d Cir] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "To hold a municipality liable under 42 USC § 1983 for the conduct of employees below the policymaking level, a plaintiff must show that the violation of his or her constitutional rights resulted from a municipal custom or policy" (Fludd v City of New York, 199 A.D.3d 894, 897; see Brown v City of New York, 192 A.D.3d 963, 965).
The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to such causes of action (seeBroughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 458, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 ; Ball v. Miller, 164 A.D.3d 728, 729, 83 N.Y.S.3d 169 ). Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the police officers had probable cause to arrest the decedent by submitting evidence that the police officers had observed both the decedent and his girlfriend enter the subway through the subway turnstile, but only one paid the fare (seePeople v. Williams, 192 A.D.3d 562, 563, 144 N.Y.S.3d 427 ; see alsoBrown v. City of New York, 192 A.D.3d 963, 967, 146 N.Y.S.3d 160 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to such causes of action (see Broughton v State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 458; Ball v Miller, 164 A.D.3d 728, 729). Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the police officers had probable cause to arrest the decedent by submitting evidence that the police officers had observed both the decedent and his girlfriend enter the subway through the subway turnstile, but only one paid the fare (see People v Williams, 192 A.D.3d 562, 563; see also Brown v City of New York, 192 A.D.3d 963, 967). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
. 2011 WL 4915165, at *10 (D. Conn. Oct. 17, 2011) (“When [the officer] made the split-second decision to fire two shots at [the suspect], he was confronted with an individual who he reasonably believed was emotionally distressed,. . . was not responding to his or the other Officer's instructions, and was proceeding uphill directly towards him, holding a shotgun with its barrel in his direction”); Brown v. City of New York, 192 A.D.3d 963, 966 (2021) (upholding grant of summary judgment on an excessive force claim where “The police officers consistently testified . . . that before the shooting, they had ordered the plaintiff to drop the knife and that instead, the plaintiff had advanced towards them.
Although the defendant submitted expert affirmations positing that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff fell within the standard of care and did not cause the conditions leading to the amputation of the plaintiff's toe, inasmuch as the procedure she conducted was a noninvasive debridement, the expert affirmations failed to address and were directly contradicted by the plaintiff's deposition testimony that the defendant was "digging" into the side of the plaintiff's toenail and caused it to bleed as a consequence of breaking the skin (see Martins v Fontanetta, 205 A.D.3d 798, 800). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the plaintiff's deposition testimony was internally consistent, as well as consistent with the other evidence in the record (see Brown v City of New York, 192 A.D.3d 963, 967).
Under 42 USC § 1983, a local governmental entity may be held liable for its own violations of a plaintiff's constitutional rights (see Holland v City of Poughkeepsie, 90 A.D.3d 841, 847). Here, the complaint/petition failed to state a cause of action alleging that the County defendants deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional rights with the Act's enactment, and therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the County defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the 42 USC § 1983 cause of action insofar as asserted against them (see Brown v City of New York, 192 A.D.3d 963; Sonne v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Suffern, 67 A.D.3d 192, 202).
ca, responded to a public park where decedent had been observed firing a sawed-off shotgun, plaintiffs appeal from an order that, inter alia, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint. Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs are not collaterally estopped from litigating the viability of their assault and battery causes of action by virtue of prior determinations in the federal action arising from the same incident (see Rose v City of Utica, 2018 WL 2041621, *5-12, 2018 U.S. Dist LEXIS 220803, *12-35 [ND NY, Apr. 19, 2018, No. 6:14-CV-01256 (BKS/TWD)], affd 777 Fed.Appx. 575 [2d Cir 2019], cert denied - U.S. -, 140 S.Ct. 1119 [2020]), we conclude that Supreme Court properly granted the motion insofar as it sought summary judgment dismissing those causes of action because defendants met their initial burden of establishing their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Brown v City of New York, 192 A.D.3d 963, 966-967 [2d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 902 [2022]). We reject plaintiffs' remaining contentions and otherwise affirm for reasons stated in the decision at Supreme Court.
ion, a finding that there was no probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest could support an inference of actual malice" ( Lundgren v. Margini, 30 A.D.3d 476, 477, 817 N.Y.S.2d 349 ; seeMartin v. City of Albany, 42 N.Y.2d 13, 396 N.Y.S.2d 612, 364 N.E.2d 1304 ). Furthermore, inasmuch as Detective Horch testified at his deposition that he could not recall who made the decision to arrest the plaintiff, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the alleged deprivation of certain constitutional rights was not caused by a policy statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the County's officers or pursuant to a practice so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law (seeTown of Orangetown v. Magee, 88 N.Y.2d 41, 53, 643 N.Y.S.2d 21, 665 N.E.2d 1061 ; Pendleton v. City of New York, 44 A.D.3d 733, 736, 843 N.Y.S.2d 648 ; Johnson v. Kings County Dist. Attorney's Off., 308 A.D.2d 278, 294–296, 763 N.Y.S.2d 635 ; cf. Brown v. City of New York, 192 A.D.3d 963, 965, 146 N.Y.S.3d 160 ). We have not considered the defendants’ remaining contentions, which were improperly raised for the first time either in their reply papers before the Supreme Court or on appeal (seeSmith v. County of Suffolk, 61 A.D.3d 743, 876 N.Y.S.2d 658 ).
"A person patronizes a person for prostitution when ... [h]e or she solicits or requests another person to engage in sexual conduct with him or her in return for a fee" (id. § 230.02[1][c]). Here, the defendants correctly contend that NYPD was not a proper defendant, as it is not an entity amenable to being sued under the New York City Charter (see New York City Charter § 396; Brown v. City of New York, 192 A.D.3d 963, 965, 146 N.Y.S.3d 160 ). However, contrary to the defendants’ contentions, the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action alleging false arrest or false imprisonment against the City and the individual defendants.
False arrest and false imprisonment are two different names for the same common-law tort (seeHolland v. City of Poughkeepsie, 90 A.D.3d 841, 844–845, 935 N.Y.S.2d 583 ). The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to causes of action alleging false arrest and false imprisonment (seeBrown v. City of New York, 192 A.D.3d 963, 146 N.Y.S.3d 160 ; Webster v. City of New York, 181 A.D.3d 756, 757, 117 N.Y.S.3d 860 ), including a cause of action asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to recover damages for the deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights under color of state law that is the federal-law equivalent of a state common-law false arrest cause of action (seeWilliams v. City of New York, 153 A.D.3d 1301, 1303, 62 N.Y.S.3d 401 ; Semmig v. Charlack, 143 A.D.3d 802, 803, 39 N.Y.S.3d 72 ). " ‘Probable cause does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been [committed] or is being committed by the suspected individual, and probable cause must be judged under the totality of the circumstances’ "