Opinion
2012-11-9
Bobbie D. BROWN and Joseph Brown, Claimants–Appellants, v. CITY OF BUFFALO, Respondent–Respondent.
Lipsitz Green Scime Cambria LLP, Buffalo (John A. Collins of Counsel), for Claimants–Appellants. Timothy A. Ball, Corporation Counsel, Buffalo (David M. Lee of Counsel), for Respondent–Respondent.
Lipsitz Green Scime Cambria LLP, Buffalo (John A. Collins of Counsel), for Claimants–Appellants. Timothy A. Ball, Corporation Counsel, Buffalo (David M. Lee of Counsel), for Respondent–Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, FAHEY, CARNI, AND VALENTINO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Supreme Court properly denied claimants' application for leave to serve a late notice of claim ( seeGeneral Municipal Law § 50–e [5]; Santana v. Western Regional Off–Track Betting Corp., 2 A.D.3d 1304, 1304, 770 N.Y.S.2d 258,lv. denied2 N.Y.3d 704, 778 N.Y.S.2d 774, 811 N.E.2d 36). Bobbie D. Brown (claimant) allegedly suffered personal injuries when she drove off the roadway up an embankment at the dead end of Titus Avenue in respondent, City of Buffalo. Thirteen months after the accident, claimants sought leave to serve a late notice of claim that alleged that claimant's injuries resulted from respondent's negligence in failing to provide adequate lighting, signs, and/or guardrails at the dead end of Titus Avenue. Claimantsasserted that respondent had actual knowledge of the claim through its police response to the accident and the police accident report.
“It is well settled that key factors for the court to consider in determining an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim are whether the claimant[s] [have] demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the delay, whether [respondent] acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of its accrual or within a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice [respondent]” ( Le Mieux v. Alden High School, 1 A.D.3d 995, 996, 767 N.Y.S.2d 348). Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the application inasmuch as claimants failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the delay or that respondent had “ ‘actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim’ ” ( Folmar v. Lewiston–Porter Cent. School Dist., 85 A.D.3d 1644, 1645, 925 N.Y.S.2d 730).
Here, claimants asserted as an excuse for their failure to serve a timely notice of claim only that they were unaware of the notice of claim requirement. Thus, claimants did not establish a reasonable excuse for their delay ( see Le Mieux, 1 A.D.3d at 996, 767 N.Y.S.2d 348). With respect to actual knowledge, we note that, “for a [police] report to provide actual knowledge of the essential facts, one must be able to readily infer from that report that a potentially actionable wrong had been committed by the public corporation” ( Matter of Taylor v. County of Suffolk, 90 A.D.3d 769, 770, 934 N.Y.S.2d 348;see Matter of Devivo v. Town of Carmel, 68 A.D.3d 991, 992, 891 N.Y.S.2d 154). Here, however, claimants failed to demonstrate that respondent had “actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim” through the police accident report, which stated that claimant was injured after she failed to “realize” that the street came to a dead end ( Wencek v. County of Chautauqua, 132 A.D.2d 950, 951, 518 N.Y.S.2d 277;see Washington v. City of New York, 72 N.Y.2d 881, 883, 532 N.Y.S.2d 361, 528 N.E.2d 513;cf. Innes v. County of Genesee, 99 A.D.2d 642, 643, 472 N.Y.S.2d 223,affd.62 N.Y.2d 779, 477 N.Y.S.2d 326, 465 N.E.2d 1262). Furthermore, “[t]he fact that [respondent's Police Department] had knowledge of this incident, without more, cannot be considered actual knowledge of the claim against [respondent]” ( Matter of Mitchell v. Town of Greenburgh, 96 A.D.3d 852, 852–853, 946 N.Y.S.2d 220;see generally Williams v. Town of Irondequoit, 59 A.D.2d 1049, 1050, 399 N.Y.S.2d 807).
Finally, although we agree with claimants that respondent “failed to substantiate [its] conclusory assertions that [it was] substantially prejudiced by the [13–month] delay” ( Terrigino v. Village of Brockport, 88 A.D.3d 1288, 1288, 930 N.Y.S.2d 744 [internal quotation marks omitted] ), we nevertheless conclude that the court properly denied claimants' application inasmuch as they failed to present a reasonable excuse for the delay and respondent lacked timely knowledge of the facts constituting the claim ( see Santana, 2 A.D.3d at 1304–1305, 770 N.Y.S.2d 258).
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.