However, this is not correct as there is no intent expressed in Code Ann. § 69-310 (e) or any of the remaining portions of that statute (general powers granted all municipal governments) which express an intent that such statute be retrospective in its operation nor act as a ratification for prior acts of the plaintiff. Compare Hogg v. City of Rome, 189 Ga. 298 ( 6 S.E.2d 48); Brown v. City of Brunswick, 210 Ga. 738 ( 83 S.E.2d 12). 3. Although Code Ann. § 69-310 (e) failed to breathe life into the 1959 ordinance, it did confer upon the city the power to enter into an arrangement such as that which the 1959 ordinance purported to condone.

Subject to constitutional limitations, a legislature may, by curative statute, validate acts and proceedings of municipal corporations and, when done, the subsequent legislative sanction is the equivalent of original authority. 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations § 196; 16A C.J.S., Constitutional Law § 428; Sanford v. Major Dania, Inc., 43 So.2d 712 (Fla. 1949); North Gallatin Unit School Dist. No. 1 v. Wright, 20 Ill. App.2d 266, 156 N.E.2d 6; Brown v. City of Brunswick, 210 Ga. 738, 83 S.E.2d 12; Cf. Chenoweth v. Board of Co. Commr's, 79 Nev. 403, 385 P.2d 771. 2. Though Harris, Traverso and Riley seek to persuade us that the sewer use charge imposed upon them by Ordinance 1352 somehow violates Nev. Const. Art. 10, § 2, we find their argument to be without merit.