Opinion
41296.
ARGUED MAY 5, 1965.
DECIDED JUNE 25, 1965.
Action for damages; implied warranty. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge McKenzie.
Robert R. Tisdale, Thomas H. Antonion, for plaintiff in error.
Alston, Miller Gaines, John R. Crenshaw, L. T. Whitaker, contra.
The petition, claiming upon a manufacturer's implied warranty under Code Ann. § 96-307, since repealed, failed to state a cause of action because an express warranty alleged specifically disclaimed any implied warranties.
ARGUED MAY 5, 1965 — DECIDED JUNE 25, 1965.
William F. Brown filed suit against Chrysler Corporation and DeKalb Motor Company, Inc., seeking to recover damages because of alleged defects in an automobile manufactured by Chrysler Corporation and sold new by DeKalb Motor Company, Inc., to plaintiff. The action is based upon a claim of implied warranty. Annexed to the petition as an exhibit was an express warranty of plaintiff's car, which provided: "The Manufacturer warrants each new motor vehicle manufactured by it to be free from defects in material and workmanship under normal use and service [etc.] . . . this warranty being expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied and of all other obligations or liabilities on its part . . . Dealer extends the foregoing warranty to the Purchaser of the new Chrysler or Imperial sold to Purchaser hereunder as if the word `Dealer' were substituted for the word `Manufacturer' therein." Plaintiff excepts to the judgment of the trial court sustaining the general demurrer of Chrysler Corporation.
The only issue in this case is the applicability of an Act of 1957 (Ga. L. 1957, p. 405; Code Ann. § 96-307; repealed by Ga. L. 1962, pp. 156, 427) providing for a manufacturer's implied warranty to the ultimate consumer of personal property sold as new personal property.
Plaintiff contends that since the manufacturer's express warranty and the dealer's express warranty both incorporate the provision "this warranty being expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied and of all the other obligations or liabilities on its part," the two warranties cancel out each other and that the manufacturer's express warranty is therefore ineffective to exclude the implied warranty under the Act of 1957.
The argument is not persuasive.
A contract must be given a reasonable construction which will uphold and enforce the instrument, if possible, rather than a construction which would render it meaningless and ineffective or which would lead to an absurd result. See Code § 20-704 (4); Blanchard c. Realty Co. v. Fogel, 207 Ga. 602, 607, 609 ( 63 S.E.2d 382); Central Georgia c. Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 217 Ga. 171, 173 ( 121 S.E.2d 644). The proviso in question here clearly refers only to such other warranties as might be made by the same party.
The Act of 1957 expressly states that the implied warranty should attach "provided there is no express covenant of warranty and no agreement to the contrary." This statute, being in derogation of common law, must be strictly construed. Revlon, Inc. v. Murdock, 103 Ga. App. 842, 845 ( 120 S.E.2d 912). See Foster v. Vickery, 202 Ga. 55, 60 ( 42 S.E.2d 117) and citations. Here the manufacturer's express warranty of the subject matter of the sale and the express disclaimer of warranty were effective to preclude an implication of warranty under the provisions of the Act of 1957. See Diamond Alkali Co. v. Godwin, 100 Ga. App. 799, 800 (2) ( 112 S.E.2d 365).
Plaintiff's petition stated no cause of action. The trial court did not err in dismissing the petition on general demurrer.
Judgment affirmed. Frankum and Hall, JJ., concur.