Opinion
14-P-1942
02-29-2016
LAURENCE BROWN v. CHIEF OF POLICE OF BRIDGEWATER & another.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Plaintiff, Laurence Brown, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for certiorari in the Superior Court, in which he challenged the denial of his application to renew his Class A license to carry firearms (LTC). We affirm.
Background. In 2011, Brown, a resident of Bridgewater, applied for renewal of his LTC. Defendant Christopher Delmonte, police chief of the town of Bridgewater, denied the application in a letter dated September 27, 2011, finding Brown to be "an unsuitable person" to continue to hold his LTC. See G. L. c. 140, § 131(d). Brown timely sought judicial review of this decision in the District Court. See G. L. c. 140, § 131(f). After a hearing at which Delmonte appeared and answered questions under oath, a judge of the District Court affirmed the denial of Brown's application in a judgment entered on December 28, 2011. Brown then filed a timely petition in the Superior Court under G. L. c. 249, § 4, for certiorari review of the District Court judgment. In a memorandum of decision dated September 29, 2014, a Superior Court judge denied Brown's motion for judgment on the pleadings, in effect affirming the District Court judgment. A second Superior Court judge entered a judgment dismissing the action on the merits on November 5, 2014. Brown appeals.
Unsuitable person. On judicial review in the District Court, "[r]evocation of a license to carry firearms based on lack of suitability will be upheld unless the license holder demonstrates that revocation was 'arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.'" Firearms Rec. Bureau v. Simkin, 466 Mass. 168, 179 (2013) (Simkin), quoting from Chief of Police of Shelburne v. Moyer, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 543, 546 (1983). See Godfrey v. Chief of Police of Wellesley, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 46 (1993) (Godfrey). "On certiorari review, the Superior Court's role is to examine the record of the District Court and to 'correct substantial errors of law apparent on the record adversely affecting material rights.'" Simkin, supra at 180, quoting from Cambridge Hous. Authy. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 586, 587 (1979). Our review on appeal is governed by the same standard that applies in the Superior Court. See Simkin, supra at 180; Godfrey, supra at 47.
We affirm the dismissal of Brown's action in the nature of certiorari for the reasons given by the Superior Court judge in his detailed and thoughtful memorandum of September 29, 2014. "[A] person may be found unsuitable for a variety of reasons, including conduct that falls outside of the enumerated disqualifiers and conduct that falls short of criminal behavior." Simkin, supra at 180-181, and cases cited therein. As the Superior Court judge observed, "Delmonte testified that his decision was based on an examination of Brown's record, which included sealed records, dismissed charges, not guilty findings, and incidents that did not result in criminal charges." The decision was based on what appeared to Delmonte as "a pattern of escalating and concerning behaviors." Although Brown's brief offers innocent explanations for all of his questioned conduct, Delmonte had "reasonable ground[s]," supported by the record, for taking a different view. See ibid. Brown has not demonstrated that Delmonte's decision was arbitrary or capricious. Like the Superior Court judge, we discern no substantial error of law in the District Court judge's determination that the licensing authority had reasonable grounds to conclude that Brown was not a suitable person.
Second Amendment. The principal argument in Brown's appellate brief is that the Massachusetts licensing scheme violates the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as explained in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and made applicable to the States in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). As Brown is aware, the Supreme Judicial Court in Chief of Police of Worcester v. Holden, 470 Mass. 845 (2015), considered and rejected the same Second Amendment claims that he argues in his brief. We are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court; accordingly, we reject Brown's request that we "ignore" the Holden decision.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Trainor, Agnes & Massing, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk Entered: February 29, 2016.