Opinion
Civil Action 2:21-cv-329
09-02-2021
EBEN BROWN, Plaintiff, v. LISA V. CAULFIELD, RACHEL ELIZABETH NEWMAN, KANE REGIONAL CENTER GLENHAZEL and ALLEGHENY COUNTY JAIL. Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss the Complaint (ECF No. 4) filed by Plaintiff Eben Brown in accordance with the screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).
II. REPORT
The following background is based upon the facts alleged in the Complaint as well as information contained on the docket of Plaintiff's criminal case in state court, which is part of the public record and of which the Court may take judicial notice. The state court's docket is available to the public online at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us (last visited September 2, 2021.)
Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee confined at the Allegheny County Jail. The Commonwealth has charged him with one count of criminal homicide in a case pending before the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County at CP-02-CR-767-2019. According to the Complaint, Attorney Lisa V. Caulfield is a public defender who is representing Plaintiff in his state criminal proceeding and Assistant District Attorney Rachel E. Newman is the prosecuting attorney. (Compl., ECF No. 4 at pp. 2-8.) The state court's docket sheet indicates that Plaintiff's jury trial, which has been continued on several occasions, is currently scheduled to begin on November 9, 2021.
Plaintiff has filed a civil rights complaint (ECF No. 4) in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Complaint names as defendants Attorney Caulfield and ADA Newman and brings claims against them related to their alleged conduct in his state criminal case. The Complaint also names as defendants Allegheny County's Kane Regional Center-Glenhazel and the Allegheny County Jail and/or its “medical staff” and brings a distinct set of claims against these defendants for allegedly depriving him of medication.
Kane Regional Center-Glenhazel is operated by Allegheny County. See Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg'l Centers-Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 522 (3d Cir. 2009). In the caption of the Complaint, Plaintiff names only three defendants (1) Allegheny County Kane Regional Center-Glenhazel, (2) Attorney Caulfield, and (3) ADA Newman. However, in the section of the Complaint in which he listed the defendants, he also names the Allegheny County Jail and/or its medical staff. (Compl., ECF No. 4 at 1, 3.)
In light of Plaintiff's distinct claims against unrelated defendants, there is not one question of law or fact that is common to all defendants as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 and he has improperly joined Attorney Caulfield and ADA Newman in a civil action with the other defendants. However, although the Court could dismiss one set of defendants for improper joinder, the better course of action is for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Attorney Caulfield and ADA Newman with prejudice for the reasons discussed below.
Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that Attorney Caulfield selected a jury outside of his presence when his trial was scheduled for February 2020; failed to provide him with discovery; refused his directions to write a proposed jury instruction on the castle doctrine, subpoena Officer James Taylor and other police officers, and conduct a criminal background check of the victim; and, pursued a suppression motion when Plaintiff wanted “to go straight to trial.” (Compl., ECF No. 4 at pp. 5-8.) The Complaint asserts claims against Attorney Caulfield for violating Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and his right to due process. (Id. at p. 4).
Plaintiff also faults ADA Newman for participating in the jury selection in February 2020 when he was not present. Additionally, he alleges that ADA Newman suggested to him that he waive his right to a preliminary hearing and that, after Plaintiff did so, she presented him with a “written letter [that] there is no evidence to evaluate” his case but proposed that he plead guilty to manslaughter. Plaintiff further alleges that ADA Newman introduced at the suppression hearing a video that had been altered. (Id. at pp. 7-8.) The Complaint asserts claims against ADA Newman for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and denial of the right to a fair trial. (Id. at p. 4.)
Plaintiff's claims against Kane Regional Center-Glenhazel and the Allegheny County Jail and/or its “medical staff” concern what he describes as their “gross negligence” for failing to provide him with medication. (Id.) He alleges that for a two-week period in or around March 2020, “Allegheny County Jail medical staff and Kane Regional Center Glenhazel” refused to refill his prescription for Breo Ellipta and advised him that the “medication was on back order.” As a result, Plaintiff suffered chest pain and experienced breathing difficulties. Plaintiff further alleges that on March 10, 2020 an unidentified nurse refused to give him a breathing treatment via a nebulizer for his chest pain. (Id. at p. 9.)
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he has osteoarthritis in his hip and that an unidentified individual or individuals told him to buy medication to treat it in the commissary. Plaintiff was unable to do so because the commissary does not sell the strength of Tylenol he requires to manage his pain. As a result, Plaintiff claims, he suffered pain from October 21, 2020 until February 5, 2021. (Id. at p. 9.)
As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief in the form of an order that he receive “a fair trial, ” “a right to speedy trial, ” and renewal of his pain and asthma medication and supplies for his breathing machine. (Id. at p. 10.)
B. Standard of Review
Under the PLRA, courts are required to screen complaints where, as is the case here, a prisoner seeks redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, or prison conditions, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. These statutes require the Court to review the Complaint and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious; fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint under these statutes for failure to state a claim is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, “however inartfully pleaded, ” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant.
C. Discussion
“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state actors who violate an individual's rights under federal law.” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 380 (2012) (emphasis added). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (emphasis added).
Additionally, a plaintiff must plead a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). That is because, as stated in the text of § 1983 itself, only a person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected” another person to a civil rights violation can be held liable under § 1983. Thus, each defendant is liable only for his or her own conduct. See, e.g., id.; see also Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (rev'd sub. nom. on other grounds 575 U.S. 822 (2015)); C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (“To impose liability on the individual defendants, Plaintiffs must show that each one individually participated in the alleged constitutional violation or approved of it.”) (citing C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)). The doctrine of respondeat superior, which makes an employer automatically responsible for the wrongdoing of employees, does not apply to claims brought under § 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); see, e.g., Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
1. Claims Against Attorney Caulfield
The allegations in the Complaint do not support a § 1983 claim against Attorney Caulfield. That is because public defenders, like private attorneys, are not considered to have acted “under color of state law” for the purposes of a § 1983 claim. Polk County v. Dobson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (a lawyer, including a public defender, is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor “under color of state law” within the meaning of § 1983); Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Attorneys performing their traditional functions will not be considered state actors solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court.”); Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 148 (3d Cir. 1972) (a public defender's “client is a private individual, who, by reason of indigency, is unable to retain and compensate other counsel. Essentially he is state-paid private counsel, assigned the responsibility of protecting the interests and defending the rights of a client. It is settled in this circuit that a private attorney is not a state officer so as to bring his actions within the purview of § 1983.”); Anthony v. Burns, No. 1:20-cv-164, 2021 WL 1670131, *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2021) (“an attorney acting on behalf of his client is not a state actor for the purposes of a § 1983 claim.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1662835 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2021)).
Thus, the Complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim against Attorney Caulfield as she was not acting “under color of state law” by representing Plaintiff. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court dismiss the claims the Complaint brings against Attorney Caulfield. The dismissal should be with prejudice because Plaintiff cannot proceed with a § 1983 claim against Attorney Caulfield.
When dismissing a civil rights case for failure to state a claim, a court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend a deficient complaint, irrespective of whether it is requested, unless doing so would be “inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Alston v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).
2. Claims Against ADA Newman
Prosecutors such as ADA Newman are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” such as “initiating a prosecution and ... presenting the State's case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). “While the Supreme Court has extended the defense of absolute immunity to certain prosecutorial functions, it has not blanketed ‘the actions of a prosecutor ... merely because they are performed by a prosecutor.'” Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 159 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)). “Instead, courts must ‘focus upon the functional nature of the activities rather than [the prosecutor's] status' to determine whether absolute immunity is warranted.” Id. (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)).
The Court of Appeals recently explained:
[The] functional test separates advocacy from everything else, entitling a prosecutor to absolute immunity only for work “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” [Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991)]. (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. 984). In that regard, the Court has found, for instance, that prosecutors are immune from claims arising from their conduct in beginning a prosecution, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. 984, including “soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and probable cause hearings, ” Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1465 (3d Cir. 1992), presenting a state's case at trial, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. 984, and appearing before a judge to present evidence, Burns, 500 U.S. at 491-92, 111 S.Ct. 1934. See also Van de Kamp [v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344, 129 S.Ct. 855 (2009)] (finding prosecutors absolutely immune from claims arising from conduct “directly connected with the conduct of a trial” that “necessarily require[d] legal knowledge and the exercise of related discretion”).
By contrast, a prosecutor's “investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606 .Fogel, 957 F.3d at 159-60.
Here, taking the allegations in the Complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, the Court must conclude that absolute immunity should attach to the alleged acts that form the basis for Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against ADA Newman. Because her challenged conduct was performed as part of her prosecutorial function during the judicial phase of his criminal process, she is entitled to absolute immunity in her individual capacity from Plaintiff's claims against her.
To the extent Plaintiff is also suing ADA Newman in her official capacity, the Court should dismiss this claim as well. A suit against ADA Newman in her official capacity is a suit against the entity that employs her (i.e., the District Attorney's Office or, more specifically, Allegheny County). Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits ... ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'”) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)). Any such suit would require allegations that Plaintiff was injured by a custom or policy promulgated by or accepted in that institutional entity that gave ADA Newman the authority to act. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Plaintiff's allegations pertaining to ADA Newman do not implicate any alleged custom or policy promulgated by her employer. As such, although Plaintiff states in Complaint that he was suing ADA Newman in both her individual and official capacities, her alleged conduct does not implicate an official capacity claim.
The Allegheny County District Attorney's Office is not a legal entity capable of being sued and “[t]he proper defendant in a § 1983 claim asserted based upon the actions of a district attorney's office is the municipality of which the office is a subunit.” Brock v. Allegheny Cnty. Dist. Attorney Office, No. 12-cv-914, 2013 WL 3989452, *3 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (citing Reitz v. Cnty. of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 146, 148 (3d Cir. 1997) and Briggs v. Moore, 251 Fed.Appx. 77, 79 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Based upon the forgoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims against ADA Newman. The dismissal should be with prejudice because Plaintiff's claims against ADA Newman in her individual capacity are barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity and her alleged conduct does not implicate an official capacity claim.
3. Claims Against Kane Regional Center-Glenhazel, the Allegheny County Jail and/or the Jail's “Medical Staff”
Plaintiff claims that Kane Regional Center-Glenhazel and the Allegheny County Jail and/or its medical staff are liable to him for alleged “gross negligence.” (Compl., ECF No. 4 at p. 4.) If in fact Plaintiff is bringing only state-law claims of negligence against these defendants, the Court does not have jurisdiction over these claims because there is no diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and no other independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
Although the Court must construe Plaintiff's pro se filings liberally, and must “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it[, ]” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013), as currently pled the Complaint does not state a constitutional violation necessary to maintain a § 1983 claim against any named defendant related to the alleged failure to provide him adequate medical care. To state such a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts which, if true, could make (1) a subjective showing that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and (2) an objective showing that those needs were serious. See, e.g., Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “[C]laims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute ‘deliberate indifference.'” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of all alleged events in the Complaint, it is the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment, that governs any medical claims he brings under § 1983. However, courts apply the Eighth Amendment's deliberate indifference legal standard when evaluating the medical-care claims of pretrial detainees. Natale v. Camden Cnty Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003); Moore v. Luffey, 767 Fed.Appx. 335, 340 (3d Cir. 2019); Edwards v. Northampton County, 663 Fed.Appx. 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2016); Tapp v. Brazill, 645 Fed.Appx. 141, 145 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016); see also 1 Rights of Prisoners § 4:3 (5th ed.) (Westlaw, current through Sept. 2020).
To extent the Complaint asserts claims against Allegheny County Jail, it is well-settled that a jail or correctional facility “is not a ‘person' that is subject to suit under federal civil rights laws.” Regan v. Upper Darby Twp., No. 06-cv-1686, 2009 WL 650384, *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2009) (collecting cases); see also Levys v. Harper, No. 2:17-cv-761, 2018 WL 2745261, *3 (W.D. Pa. May 15, 2018) (plaintiff's claims against county jail must be dismissed because it is not a proper defendant in an action brought under § 1983), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2739850 (W.D. Pa. June 7, 2018). Therefore, any claims against the Allegheny County Jail should be dismissed with prejudice because it is not a proper defendant in this case.
Kane Regional Center-Glenhazel is operated by Allegheny County. A city or county government such as Allegheny County is a “person” for purposes of § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. To establish § 1983 liability against Allegheny County or one of its subunits, such as Kane Regional Center-Glenhazel, Plaintiff must prove that a municipal “policy or custom” is the “moving force” of the constitutional violation at issue. Id. at 694. Thus, to state a claim for liability in this case against Kane Regional Center-Glenhazel, Plaintiff must allege that its policies or customs or those of Allegheny County caused his constitutional violations. Id.; Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003); Carter v. John J. Kane Reg'l Centers-McKeesport, No. 2:09-cv-1593, 2011 WL 2470585, *4 (W.D. Pa. June 20, 2011). He “must identify [the] custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was” to satisfy the pleading standard. McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). Plaintiff did not satisfy this pleading standard. He does not allege that his constitutional rights were violated by a policy or custom of Kane Regional Center-Glenhazel or Allegheny County.
Additionally, as currently pled, the Complaint fails to allege that any individual on the medical staff of the Allegheny County Jail had the requisite personal involvement in a violation of his constitutional right. For example, there are no facts alleged in the Complaint from which it can be ascertained who refused to refill Plaintiff's prescription for Breo Ellipta or told him to buy medication from the commissary to treat his pain for osteoarthritis, or whose responsibility it was to ensure that either medication was in stock. If Plaintiff is unaware of an individual defendant's name, then he should have listed that individual as a John/Jane Doe in the Complaint.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the Allegheny County Jail with prejudice. It is further recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Kane Regional Center-Glenhazel and the medical staff of the Allegheny County Jail without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
It is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. The dismissal should be: (1) with prejudice with respect to the claims the Complaint asserts against Attorney Caulfield, ADA Newman and the Allegheny County Jail; and (2) without prejudice to Plaintiff filing an amended complaint to attempt to cure the pleading deficiencies identified herein with respect to the claims asserted against Kane Regional Center-Glenhazel and/or the appropriate individuals who were personally involved in the alleged misconduct at issue regarding his medical care.
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, Plaintiff is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).