Opinion
5:23-cv-00002-MAD-TWD
04-17-2023
CLARENCE BROWN, Plaintiff, v. JON E. BUDELMANN et al., Defendants.
CLARENCE BROWN Plaintiff, pro se
CLARENCE BROWN Plaintiff, pro se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Clerk has sent the Court a civil rights complaint filed by Clarence Brown (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff has also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 3.) For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff's IFP application for purposes of initial review and recommends dismissal of the complaint in its entirety and without leave to amend.
I. IFP APPLICATION
Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee for this action and seeks leave to proceed IFP. (Dkt. No. 3.) After reviewing Plaintiff's application, this Court finds he is financially eligible for IFP status. Therefore, Plaintiff's IFP application is granted for purposes of initial review.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action against Jon E. Budelmann, Jodi A. Danzig, and Christopher Valdina on January 4, 2023. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff lists the official positions for the Defendants as follows: Jon E. Budelmann as “Chief Assistant”; Jodi A. Danzig as “Attorney General”; and Christopher Valdina as “Assistant.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2.)
The Court takes judicial notice that Jon E. Budelmann was an Assistant District Attorney for Cayuga County from 1995 to 2007 and the District Attorney of Cayuga County from 2008 to 2021. He is currently a Cayuga County Surrogate Judge. Id. Jodi A. Danzig is an Assistant Attorney General at the New York Attorney General's Office. Christopher Valdina is the Chief Assistant District Attorney for Cayuga County.
Linkedin, Jon Budelmann, https://www.linkedin.com/in/jon-budelmann-30135a8 (last visited Apr. 14, 2023.)
OPENGOVNY, Jodi Ann Danzig, https://opengovny.com/attorney/2543387 (last visited Apr. 14, 2023); OpenPayrolls, Jodi A Danzig, https://openpayrolls.com/employee/jodi-a-danzig-9593 (last visited Apr. 14, 2023.)
Cayuga County New York, Staff Directory, https://www.cayugacounty.us/directory.aspx?eid=39 (last visited Apr. 14, 2023.)
Plaintiff was arrested in 2006 for burglary. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) At his trial, Plaintiff alleges evidence presented against him was “false” and “[p]hone logs were blacked out.” Id. Plaintiff further claims the government presented his immigration status incorrectly. Id. Allegedly, the government stated at the trial Plaintiff had previously been deported and had reentered the United States illegally. Id. Plaintiff disputes this assertion and claims Homeland Security does not have any record of his alleged illegal re-entry. Id. On May 12, 2008, Plaintiff was found guilty of two counts of Burglary in the Second Degree and one count of Promoting Prostitution in the Fourth Degree. (Dkt. No. 1 at 9.)
Additionally, during his trial, Defendants allegedly claimed Plaintiff's establishment, Brown's Bahamian Bar & Rest, did not have the requisite liquor license, making Plaintiff's transactions there illegal. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2, 16.)
Plaintiff lists his first cause of action as “I want my name cleared”; his second cause of action as “I need proof from the [District Attorney's] office of deportation including date and the time along with documentation of where I re-entered illegally”; and his third cause of action as “I believe the [District Attorney] tampered with evidence.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) He does not request any specific form of relief from the Court in the prayer for relief section of his complaint. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.)
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
A. Legal Standard
Under Section 1915(e), the Court must dismiss a complaint filed IFP if it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998).The Court must also dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest claims that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006).
Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all alterations, internal quotation marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted. See, e.g., Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (2d Cir. 2020).
A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding that “a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The statement of the claim must do more than present “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Id. It must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
B. Heck v. Humphrey Bars Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claims
When a claim under Section 1983 calls into question the validity of an underlying conviction, a district court must dismiss the claim, unless the conviction has been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (Heck's bar applies regardless of whether a plaintiff seeks damages or injunctive relief). The petitioner in Heck was an inmate with a direct appeal from his conviction pending, who brought a Section 1983 action for damages against state officials who, he claimed, acted unconstitutionally in arresting and prosecuting him. Drawing an analogy to the tort of malicious prosecution, the Supreme Court held that an inmate's Section 1983 claim for damages was unavailable because he could not demonstrate that the underlying criminal proceedings had terminated in his favor. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. In Heck, the Supreme Court enumerated four methods of demonstrating that a conviction has been invalidated: (1) the conviction was reversed on a direct appeal; (2) an executive order expunged the conviction; (3) a habeas corpus petition was issued by a federal court; or (4) an authorized state tribunal declared the conviction invalid. Id.
Here, all of Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims arise from Plaintiff's May 2008 prosecution and conviction in Cayuga County. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2, 9.) As is readily apparent, affording the pro se complaint a liberal construction, there is no allegation that Plaintiff's conviction has been invalidated. Indeed, Plaintiff asserts Defendants tampered with evidence, presented false evidence at trial, and requests his “name” to be “cleared.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) Because Plaintiff's success on his civil rights claims in this action would necessarily invalidate the conviction, which is not alleged to have been reversed or vacated, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are not cognizable under Heck. Thus, Heck's bar precludes their adjudication. See, e.g., Curtis v. Rockland Cty., No. 21-CV-04294, 2022 WL 16540705, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2022) (“A judgment in Plaintiff's favor on the unlawful search and seizure claim would clearly imply the invalidity of his conviction, and the claim is therefore barred by Heck v. Humphrey.”).
“Although ‘[Section] 1983 remains a possible remedy when there is no other federal avenue through which to bring a claim,' Chillemi v. Town of Southampton, 943 F.Supp.2d 365, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), Plaintiff has the opportunity to seek habeas relief once his constitutional claims are properly exhausted in state court.” Braithwaite v. Collins, No. 22-CV-0016, 2023 WL 2350030, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2023).
Moreover, the Second Circuit has made clear that, “when seeking compensatory damages for an allegedly unreasonable search while the underlying conviction still stands, a plaintiff may only recover for an injury other than the harm caused by the conviction and the imprisonment resulting therefrom.” Stegemann v. Rensselaer County Sheriff's Off., No. 20-CV-3316, 2021 WL 5492966, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 23, 2021) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7). Given that Plaintiff has not alleged any injury other than those related to his conviction, which he asserts resulted from the May 2008 trial, he cannot recover any damages or seek injunctive relief for these injuries unless and until his conviction is overturned. See, e.g., Curtis v. Rockland Cty., 2022 WL 16540705, at *5. Accordingly, at this juncture, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are not plausible, and the Court recommends dismissal of the complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1). See Arrington v. LoTempio, No. 22-CV-6141, 2023 WL 375098 at *3-4 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2023) (sua sponte dismissing plaintiff's illegal search and denial-of-fair-trial claims without prejudice pursuant to Heck, including related conspiracy claims, brought pursuant to Section 1983 and Bivens).
C. Prosecutorial Immunity
Although Heck bars Plaintiff's claims seeking to impose Section 1983 liability on Defendants, such claims are not plausible for the additional reason that prosecutors enjoy “absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for those prosecutorial activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 1987).
As noted, Defendants were all prosecutors at the time of Plaintiff's trial. Prosecutors are immune from civil suit for damages in their individual capacities for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather, are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 (“[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.”); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (absolute immunity is analyzed under a “functional approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, prosecutors are immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009).
In short, absolute prosecutorial immunity covers “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. This includes “the decision to bring charges against a defendant, presenting evidence to a grand jury, and the evaluation of evidence prior to trial.” Moye v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 316, 2012 WL 2569085, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2012) (quoting Johnson v. City of New York, No. 00 CIV 3626, 2000 WL 1335865, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2000)). Immunity even extends to “the falsification of evidence and the coercion of witnesses,” Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1980)), “the knowing use of perjured testimony,” “the deliberate withholding of exculpatory information,” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.34, the “making [of] false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings,” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 (1991), and “conspiring to present false evidence at a criminal trial,” Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994); see also see also Verbeek v. Teller, 158 F.Supp.2d 267, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting motion to dismiss claims against prosecutorial official because conspiracy allegation does not “negate her entitlement to absolute immunity”) (citing Dory, 25 F.3d at 83). Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Defendants be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b)(2).
WHEREFORE, for these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 3) is GRANTED for purposes of filing and any appeal, unless the trial court certifies in writing that the appeal is not taken in good faith, and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b)(1); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiff, along with a copy of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).
IT IS SO ORDERED.