As was done in other jurisdictions, North Carolina extended the right to sue for this loss to married women. SeeBrown v. Brown , 121 N.C. 8, 27 S.E. 998 (1897) (extending this right to wives to sue for this loss). More recently, some jurisdictions have done an about-face and have abolished the right of individuals to sue for this loss altogether.

" Thus, its task was to determine the testator's intent as to who fell into the class of "lawfully begotten children." Booth v. Baker, 10 Haw. 543 (1896); Brown v. Brown, 11 Haw. 47 (1897); Rooke v. Queen's Hospital, 12 Haw. 375 (1900); Collins v. Hodgson, 36 Haw. 334 (1943); Knight v. Carter, 31 Haw. 535 (1930). The majority of this court seems to engage in the following line of reasoning:

e Lower Court, every favorable inference to the appellant which can be drawn from her testimony must be accepted as true. McCain v. Webb, 181 Miss. 664, 180 So. 748; New Orleans N.E. RR. Co. v. Webb, 181 Miss. 664, 180 So. 748; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Jefcoats, 164 Miss. 659, 143 So. 842; Strictland v. Harvey, 181 Miss. 606, 179 So. 345; Goodwin v. Misticos, 207 Miss. 361, 42 So.2d 397; Defour v. Continental Southern Lines, 219 Miss. 296, 68 So.2d 489; Cole v. Tullos, 228 Miss. 815, 90 So.2d 32; 53 Am. Jur., Trials, Secs. 340, 350. II. There was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the question of whether or not L.C. Walker participated in or ratified the fraud of his minor son, Bobby Gene Walker, when the latter acquired his driver's license in July, 1954, thereby making said L.C. Walker liable in accordance with the provisions and obvious intent and purpose of Section 8096, Code of 1942. Bispham v. Mahoney (Del.), 183 A. 315; Maust v. Maust (Minn.), 23 N.W.2d 537; Brown v. Brown (N.C.), 27 S.E. 998; Lake Shore M.S. Ry. Co. v. Benson (Ohio), 97 N.E. 417; State, Use of Rogers v. Newton, 191 Miss. 611, 3 So.2d 816; Houston v. Holmes, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So.2d 138; Carter v. Graves, 230 Miss. 463, 93 So.2d 177; Sec. 8096, Code 1942; 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Secs. 303, 404; 59 C.J., Statutes, Secs. 657.2, 665.7. III. Even if we assume that the appellees had no knowledge of their son's fraud in acquiring said driver's license, they were under a statutory duty to the traveling public to either refrain from allowing their son to continuously use the automobile, or if they chose to allow him the use of said automobile, then they were under a duty to require him to get a driver's license in the manner prescribed by law; and a breach of this statutory duty renders the appellees liable to appellant as a member of the traveling public.

' In Bachelor v. Norris, 166 N.C. 506, it is said: `The constitutionality of the statute authorizing a married woman to execute a valid conveyance of real property without the joinder of her husband, when she has been abandoned by her husband, has been sustained in several decisions of this Court. Hall v. Walker, 118 N.C. 377, 24 S.E. 6; Brown v. Brown, 121 N.C. 8, 27 S.E. 998; Finger v. Hunter, 130 N.C. 531, 41 S.E. 890.' See, also, Vandiford v. Humphrey, 139 N.C. 65." Pardon v. Paschal, 142 N.C. 538; Hancock v. Davis, 179 N.C. 282 (284); Whitten v. Peace, 188 N.C. 298 (302-3).

" In Bachelor v. Norris, 166 N.C. 506, it is said: "The constitutionality of the statute authorizing a married woman to execute a valid conveyance of real property without the joinder of her husband, when she has been abandoned by her husband, has been sustained in several decisions of this Court. Hall v. Walker, 118 N.C. 377, 24 S.E. 6; Brown v. Brown, 121 N.C. 8, 27 S.E. 998; Finger v. Hunter, 130 N.C. 531, 41 S.E. 890." See, also, Vandiford v. Humphrey, 139 N.C. 65, 51 S.E. 893, where it is held that a wife, abandoned by her husband, may convey her land, without his written assent, notwithstanding that at the date of the conveyance, sufficient time has not elapsed from the date of the abandonment for the commencement by her of an action for divorce on the ground of such abandonment.

Whatever may be the law in other jurisdictions, it is settled in this State by authoritative decisions of this Court, that a married woman, who has been abandoned by her husband, can maintain an action in her own name for a tort. Brown v. Brown, 121 N.C. 8, 27 S.E. 998. In that case it was held that a complaint in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had alienated the affections of her husband, and induced him to abandon her and to refuse to contribute anything to her support, was not demurrable on the ground that it appeared on the face of the complaint that there was a defect of parties for that plaintiff's husband had not been joined with her as a party plaintiff.

The very next section, Rev. 2117, provides that "Every woman whose husband shall abandon her or shall maliciously turn her out of doors shall be deemed a free trader . . . and shall have power to convey her personal estate and her real estate without the assent of her husband." This has been held valid in Vanderford v. Humphreys, 139 N.C. 65; Finger v. Hunter, 130, N.C. 531; Brown v. Brown, 121 N.C. 8; Hall v. Walker, 118 N.C. 377, all of (23) which have been cited and approved recently by Allen, J. Bachelor v. Norris, 166 N.C. 508. For a stronger reason, sec. 2116, authorizing the wife to convey when the husband is wholly unable by reason of mental incapacity, duly adjudged, to give his assent, is a valid exercise of the legislative power.

The constitutionality of the statute (Rev., sec. 2117) authorizing a married woman to execute a valid conveyance of real property without the joinder of her husband, when she has been abandoned by her husband, has been sustained in several decisions of this Court. ( Hall v. Walker, 118 N.C. 377; Brown v. Brown, 121 N.C. 8; Finger v. Hunter, 130 N.C. 531), and as the fact of abandonment has been found by the jury in favor of the defendant, the only question left open to the plaintiff on this branch of the case is whether there is evidence to support the verdict. There was evidence that the husband was in Virginia when the deed was executed; that the wife stated that he had nothing to do with the deed, and had left her and gone to Virginia; that both husband and wife stated they had separated; that the husband made no provision for his wife when he left for Virginia and she had to buy supplies on her own credit; that the husband said the Ashleys had moved to his house and he would not stay there with them, as it would cause trouble for (509) all; that the husband was frequently intoxicated, and he said his wife had numerous quarrels, and this has as much probative force as that held sufficient on an issue of abandonment in Vandiford v. Humphrey, 139 N.C. 65.

Section 1832 gives her the same full power without complying with those requirements in certain cases, and this was held constitutional. Hall v. Walker, 118 N.C. 377; Brown v. Brown, 121 N.C. 8, 38 L.R.A., 242. Section 1826 disables her to make certain contracts without the written assent of her husband, thus recognizing her full power to contract if not thus restrained. These and other sections all show that the restriction upon a married woman's power to contract is statutory, and the General Assembly, when it has moved at all, has gone in the direction of greater freedom to contract.

MONTGOMERY, J. The only question (raised by demurrer to the complaint) for decision when this case was here before ( 121 N.C. 8), was whether a married woman, abandoned by her husband, could maintain, without the joinder of her husband, an action in tort. The Court held that such an action could be maintained.