Brown v. Brown

7 Citing cases

  1. Fuller Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company

    Civil No. 00-530-B (D.N.H. Aug. 6, 2001)   Cited 6 times
    Dismissing ADDCA claim that suggested manufacturer "strongly encouraged or persuaded" dealer to purchase a new dealership site, as dealer did not allege that manufacturer threatened to penalize or sanction dealer if it failed to relocate

    I may not, however, "ignore the plain language of the legislation [or] add words which the lawmakers did not see fit to include." Appeal of Astro Spectacular, Inc., 138 N.H. at 300 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 133 N.H. 442, 445 (1990)); see also St. Joseph Hosp. of Nashua, 141 N.H. at 11-12 ("Normally the expression of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of another." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

  2. In re Vasquez

    175 N.H. 450 (N.H. 2022)   Cited 2 times
    Vacating state administrative finding that Matosantos had failed to prove it procured New Hampshire workers' compensation coverage under RSA 281-A:5 and remanding for further proceedings

    To interpret the statute as the respondent and the DOL urge would read the words "or the employer's insurance carrier" out of RSA 281-A:43, which we must not do. See Brown v. Brown, 133 N.H. 442, 445, 577 A.2d 1227 (1990) (explaining that language "cannot be read out of [a] statute"). Even if RSA 281-A:43 did not specifically refer to the insurance carrier, in order to adopt the proffered construction, we would have to read "employer" as excluding the insurance carrier, which would be contrary to the definition in RSA 281-A:2.

  3. Wolfgram v. New Hampshire Dep't of Safety

    169 N.H. 32 (N.H. 2016)   Cited 9 times
    Rejecting construction that "would undermine the purpose of the annulment statute and lead to an unjust result"

    We have previously recognized that "[t]he language ‘in all respects’ cannot be read out of the statute or interpreted to encompass any less than the word ‘all’ requires." Brown v. Brown, 133 N.H. 442, 445, 577 A.2d 1227 (1990). However, RSA 651:5, X(a) provides two narrow exceptions to this "otherwise unequivocal language," id. —"upon conviction of any crime committed after the order of annulment has been entered, the prior conviction may be considered by the court in determining the sentence to be imposed, and may be counted toward habitual offender status under RSA 259:39."

  4. Kelton v. Hollis Ranch

    155 N.H. 666 (N.H. 2007)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that the CPA does not impose strict liability

    We will neither ignore the plain language of the legislation nor add words which the lawmakers did not see fit to include. Brown v. Brown, 133 N.H. 442, 445 (1990). "The legislative intent is to be found not in what the legislature might have said, but rather in the meaning of what it did say."

  5. State v. Cobb

    143 N.H. 638 (N.H. 1999)   Cited 41 times
    Finding that the use of “any” in the statute demonstrated that the legislature intended the unit of prosecution to be each separate image

    "[C]ourts can neither ignore the plain language of the legislation nor add words which the lawmakers did not see fit to include." Brown v. Brown, 133 N.H. 442, 445, 577 A.2d 1227, 1229 (1990). "[T]he legislative intent is to be found not in what the legislature might have said, but rather in the meaning of what it did say."

  6. Appeal of Astro Spectacular

    138 N.H. 298 (N.H. 1994)   Cited 39 times
    Stating that, when interpreting a statute, the court "can neither ignore the plain language of the legislation nor add words which the lawmakers did not see fit to include"

    " Id. (quotation omitted); see RSA 21:2 (1988). Courts "can neither ignore the plain language of the legislation nor add words which the lawmakers did not see fit to include." Brown v. Brown, 133 N.H. 442, 445, 577 A.2d 1227, 1229 (1990) (quotation omitted). "[T]he legislative intent is to be found not in what the legislature might have said, but rather in the meaning of what it did say.

  7. Appeal of Pritchard

    627 A.2d 102 (N.H. 1993)   Cited 8 times

    We cannot add words to the statute that the lawmakers did not see fit to include. Brown v. Brown, 133 N.H. 442, 445, 577 A.2d 1227, 1229 (1990). We find the authority cited by the State to be unpersuasive.