I may not, however, "ignore the plain language of the legislation [or] add words which the lawmakers did not see fit to include." Appeal of Astro Spectacular, Inc., 138 N.H. at 300 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 133 N.H. 442, 445 (1990)); see also St. Joseph Hosp. of Nashua, 141 N.H. at 11-12 ("Normally the expression of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of another." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
To interpret the statute as the respondent and the DOL urge would read the words "or the employer's insurance carrier" out of RSA 281-A:43, which we must not do. See Brown v. Brown, 133 N.H. 442, 445, 577 A.2d 1227 (1990) (explaining that language "cannot be read out of [a] statute"). Even if RSA 281-A:43 did not specifically refer to the insurance carrier, in order to adopt the proffered construction, we would have to read "employer" as excluding the insurance carrier, which would be contrary to the definition in RSA 281-A:2.
We have previously recognized that "[t]he language ‘in all respects’ cannot be read out of the statute or interpreted to encompass any less than the word ‘all’ requires." Brown v. Brown, 133 N.H. 442, 445, 577 A.2d 1227 (1990). However, RSA 651:5, X(a) provides two narrow exceptions to this "otherwise unequivocal language," id. —"upon conviction of any crime committed after the order of annulment has been entered, the prior conviction may be considered by the court in determining the sentence to be imposed, and may be counted toward habitual offender status under RSA 259:39."
We will neither ignore the plain language of the legislation nor add words which the lawmakers did not see fit to include. Brown v. Brown, 133 N.H. 442, 445 (1990). "The legislative intent is to be found not in what the legislature might have said, but rather in the meaning of what it did say."
"[C]ourts can neither ignore the plain language of the legislation nor add words which the lawmakers did not see fit to include." Brown v. Brown, 133 N.H. 442, 445, 577 A.2d 1227, 1229 (1990). "[T]he legislative intent is to be found not in what the legislature might have said, but rather in the meaning of what it did say."
" Id. (quotation omitted); see RSA 21:2 (1988). Courts "can neither ignore the plain language of the legislation nor add words which the lawmakers did not see fit to include." Brown v. Brown, 133 N.H. 442, 445, 577 A.2d 1227, 1229 (1990) (quotation omitted). "[T]he legislative intent is to be found not in what the legislature might have said, but rather in the meaning of what it did say.
We cannot add words to the statute that the lawmakers did not see fit to include. Brown v. Brown, 133 N.H. 442, 445, 577 A.2d 1227, 1229 (1990). We find the authority cited by the State to be unpersuasive.