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Brown v. Brown

Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jun 21, 1994
Record No. 2439-93-1 (Va. Ct. App. Jun. 21, 1994)

Opinion

Record No. 2439-93-1

Decided: June 21, 1994

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY, G. Duane Holloway, Judge

Affirmed.

(Edward L. Chambers, Jr.; Smiley and Chambers, on brief), for appellant.

No brief for appellee.

Present: Judges Barrow, Koontz and Bray


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.


William B. Brown, Jr. (husband) appeals the decision of the circuit court awarding spousal support to Wayna L. Brown (wife). Upon reviewing the record and husband's brief, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.

Husband raises the following issue on appeal: whether the language in the final divorce decree referring the matter to the district court was sufficient to retain jurisdiction to award spousal support after entry of the final decree.

A court may make a reservation in its decree of the right to receive spousal support. Taylor v. Taylor, 14 Va. App. 642, 649, 418 S.E.2d 900, 904 (1992). However, " 'the reservation must be clear and explicit.' " See Poliquin v. Poliquin, 12 Va. App. 676, 681, 406 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1991) (citation omitted).

The rationale underlying this rule is straightforward. A reservation of jurisdiction should not be uncertain or left in doubt. It is in the interest of the litigants and courts that when the parties have been heard fully, litigation should terminate, and if a litigant claims a right to a modification of spousal support in the future, such reservation of jurisdiction should be abundantly clear.

Dixon v. Pugh, 244 Va. 539, 542, 423 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1992).

Wife was properly served with husband's Bill of Complaint, but made no appearances or filings in the matter. Wife did not seek spousal support or a reservation of the court's jurisdiction to award such relief. Nevertheless, the August 28, 1991 decree a vinculo matrimonii expressly:

ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECREED that this matter be referred to the Juvenile Domestic Relations General District Court for the County of York for matters pertaining to custody, child support, spousal support and visitation;

And there being nothing further to be done in this matter, it is ORDERED stricken from the docket of this Court and filed among the ended causes.

The trial court found that the explicit referral to the district court "was sufficient to reserve jurisdiction on the issue of spousal support."

We agree that the provision in the final decree transferring the specified matters to the district court distinguishes the decree from those orders found insufficient to reserve jurisdiction. See, e.g., Brinn v. Brinn, 147 Va. 277, 288-89, 137 S.E. 503, 506 (1927) ("with leave reserved to the parties . . . to make application to the court for such further orders as are authorized by law" not specific reservation of jurisdiction); Perry v. Perry, 202 Va. 849, 853, 120 S.E.2d 385, 388 (1961) ("leave to either party to have the [cause] reinstated for good cause shown" not specific reservation of jurisdiction). While the decree "referred" rather than "transferred" such matters to the district court, the intent to reserve these issues for future adjudication was sufficiently clear to permit wife's later assertion of a claim to spousal support.

Accordingly, as the decision of the trial court is not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it, that decision is affirmed.

Affirmed.


Summaries of

Brown v. Brown

Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jun 21, 1994
Record No. 2439-93-1 (Va. Ct. App. Jun. 21, 1994)
Case details for

Brown v. Brown

Case Details

Full title:WILLIAM B. BROWN, JR. v. WAYNA L. BROWN

Court:Court of Appeals of Virginia

Date published: Jun 21, 1994

Citations

Record No. 2439-93-1 (Va. Ct. App. Jun. 21, 1994)