Opinion
533052
09-16-2021
In the Matter of Rohan BROWN, Appellant, v. BOARD OF PAROLE – NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, Respondent.
Rohan Brown, Woodbourne, appellant pro se. Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Frank Brady of counsel), for respondent.
Rohan Brown, Woodbourne, appellant pro se.
Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Frank Brady of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Lynch, Aarons and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Schick, J.), entered February 24, 2021 in Sullivan County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent denying petitioner's request for parole release. In 1998, petitioner, acting in concert with two codefendants, argued with an individual over the sale of drugs, resulting in petitioner stabbing that person, who later died from his injuries. Petitioner was apprehended approximately four years later in Kentucky and, following a jury trial, was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to 18 years to life in prison.
In January 2020, petitioner made his initial appearance before respondent. At the conclusion of the hearing, respondent denied petitioner's request for parole release and ordered him held for 20 months. Following an unsuccessful administrative appeal, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Following joinder of issue, Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and this appeal by petitioner ensued.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the record demonstrates that respondent appropriately considered the statutory requirements set forth in Executive Law § 259–i and adequately set forth its reasoning for denying petitioner's request for parole release. The record, including the hearing transcript and the Board's decision, reflects that respondent considered the seriousness of the instant offense, the statements made by the victim's mother at sentencing, petitioner's remorse for his actions, his disciplinary violations, his participation in and completion of institutional programs, his academic achievements and accomplishments while incarcerated, his plans and familial support upon release, the deportation order against him and the mixed results from his COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument (see Executive Law § 259–i[2][c][A] ; see also Matter of Jones v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 175 A.D.3d 1652, 1652, 108 N.Y.S.3d 505 [2019] ; Matter of Payne v. Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1577, 1577–1578, 104 N.Y.S.3d 383 [2019] ). Although respondent placed particular emphasis on petitioner's criminal conduct and the nature of the offense, there is no requirement that respondent give equal weight to or specifically discuss each statutory factor it considered in making its determination (see Matter of Schendel v. Stanford, 185 A.D.3d 1365, 1366, 126 N.Y.S.3d 428 [2020] ; Matter of Tafari v. Cuomo, 170 A.D.3d 1351, 1352, 94 N.Y.S.3d 458 [2019], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 907, 2019 WL 2441507 [2019] ). Furthermore, although a deportation order was issued against petitioner, "this was simply another factor for respondent to consider and did not guarantee petitioner's release" ( Matter of Rodriguez v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 168 A.D.3d 1342, 1343, 92 N.Y.S.3d 482 [2019] ; see Matter of Espinal v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 1817, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 [2019] ).
We are also unpersuaded by petitioner's contention that respondent relied on inaccurate information regarding his disciplinary history. The record reflects that, in discussing his disciplinary history, petitioner informed respondent that a tier III disciplinary violation reflected in his disciplinary history was subject to a pending administrative appeal. The fact that such disciplinary determination was administratively reversed after the parole hearing does not warrant annulment of respondent's determination, especially given petitioner's other disciplinary violations (see Matter of McCaskell v. Evans, 108 A.D.3d 926, 927 n., 969 N.Y.S.2d 603 [2013] ; Matter of McAllister v. New York State Div. of Parole, 78 A.D.3d 1413, 1414–1415, 910 N.Y.S.2d 600 [2010], lv denied 16 N.Y.3d 707, 2011 WL 1120291 [2011] ). Given that the discretionary determination resulted from respondent's appropriate consideration of relevant statutory factors, and as its determination does not evince "irrationality bordering on impropriety" ( Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501 [2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), further judicial review is precluded (see Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 1393, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 [2017] ; Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 [2016] ). We have reviewed petitioner's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Lynch, Aarons and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.