Brown v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the Port of New Orleans

Full title: FREDERICK H. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE…

Court: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Date published: May 8, 2014

567 F. App'x 263 (5th Cir. 2014)

Opinion

No. 13-31157

05-08-2014

FREDERICK H. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE PORT OF NEW ORLEANS, Defendant-Appellee

PER CURIAM

Summary Calendar

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:10-CV-4564

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:^*

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

Plaintiff Frederick H. Brown, proceeding pro se, timely appeals the district court's dismissal of his Title VII retaliatory termination claim.¹ Brown alleged that defendant Board of Commissions of the Port of New Orleans ("Port") unlawfully terminated him in retaliation for his filing of EEOC complaints.

1 By joint stipulation of the parties, all claims by plaintiff other than his claim of retaliatory termination under Title VII were dismissed with prejudice. R. 325.

On defendant's motion for summary judgment, the district court dismissed plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim. The parties agreed that there was no direct evidence of retaliatory termination, and the district court analyzed the claim under the McDonnell-Douglas ² burden shifting framework. Applying this framework,³ the district court held (i) that Brown failed to establish the prima facie case because he could not prove that a causal connection exists between his protected activity and his termination, and (ii) that Brown failed to offer any evidence that the Port's given reason for his termination is pretextual.

2 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

3 "To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) her participated in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) his employer took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003)).

On appeal, Brown argues that the district court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. He argues that his termination was the direct result of his filing in EEOC complaint three years prior, and he argues that Faragher ⁴ and Ellerth ⁵ provide for strict liability.

4 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).

5 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).

On de novo review, we agree with the district court. There is no record evidence to establish that a "causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action."⁶ Moreover, Brown's reliance on Faragher and Ellerth are misplaced; those cases apply to supervisor liability in Title VII harassment claims, not Title VII retaliation claims. Because Brown failed to establish the prima facie case under the McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting framework, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the Port.

6 McCoy, 492 F.3d at 557.
--------

We AFFIRM.