In Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., our court of appeals took the opposite approach, declining to accord full faith and credit to a Navajo tribal statute governing automobile repossessions on the reservation. 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ct.App. 1977). The court rejected the analysis of Americana of Puerto Rico that the term territory in 28 U.S.C. § 1738 may be construed to encompass entities other than organized territories.

Therefore, I am willing to give unto the judicial decision of this tribal judge all due deference and respect, as I have heretofore set forth, but not out of any recognition that the "Sioux Nation" is an independent nation within the United States of America. The Constitution of the United States of America established but one nation. I wish to quote with approval language in Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 197-98, 571 P.2d 689, 694-95 (1977), for the reason that it is aligned more closely with my thought on the general subject of states and Indian tribes when addressing comity and full faith and credit: See Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 197-98, 571 P.2d 689, 694 n. 6 (1977).

Cohen, Handbook (1942 ed.) at 145 nn. 209-210; id. at 275 nn. 73-74 (same). But the 1982 revision of that work explained that the question whether 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 "includes Indian tribes has resulted in conflicting decisions of state courts," citing Jim v. CIT Financial Services Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975) (§ 1738 includes Indian tribes), In re Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976) (citing Jim), and Brown v. Babbitt Ford, 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ct.App. 1977) (§ 1738 does not include Indian tribes); that "[t]he Supreme Court construed the term territory in an earlier statute to include Indian tribes," and that "other federal decisions have reached the same conclusion," citing United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 103 (1856), and three Eighth Circuit cases circa 1984, including Standley v. Roberts. Handbook (1982 ed.) at 385 nn. 47-49.

(italics added.)]; see generally Note, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts (1985) 37 Stan.L.Rev. 1397; and compare with Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc. (1977) 117 Ariz. 192 [ 571 P.2d 689].)

It defines a state to mean any state, territory or possession of the United States. In Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (App. 1977), the court stated that for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the word "territory" used therein was not intended by Congress to include Indian reservations, but the court stated: However, the cardinal rule of any statutory interpretation is to attempt to ascertain the intent of the legislative body which enacted that statute.

State courts have reached varied results, citing either Mackey or Morgan as authority, depending on the outcome. Compare Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975) (citing Mackey and holding that tribes are entitled to full faith and credit) and In re Beuhl, 555 P.2d 1334 (Wash. 1976) (citing CIT and concluding that tribes are entitled to full faith and credit) with Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1977) (citing Morgan and holding that an Indian reservation is not a territory for purposes of full faith and credit). [4] In our view, the decisive factor in determining Congress's intent was the enactment of subsequent statutes which expressly extended full faith and credit to certain tribal proceedings: the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201- 2211 (1983) (extending full faith and credit for certain actions involving trust, restricted or controlled lands), the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. Section 1725(g) (1980) (requiring the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation and the State of Maine to "give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of each other"), and the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. (extending full faith and credit to tribal custody proceedings).

The issue of whether federal courts and the courts of the several states must extend full faith and credit to the judgment of a tribal court has been the subject of significant academic discussion and substantial dispute among the courts. See, e.g., Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ct.App. 1977) (Navajo Tribe is not a "territory" or possession within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1738); Sengstock v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 165 Wis.2d 86, 477 N.W.2d 310 (Ct.App. 1991) (Tribe not a "state" under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, but recognizing judgment enforceable under principles of comity); compare, Jim v. C.I.T. Financial Services Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975) (laws of Navajo Nation are entitled to full faith and credit under territorial provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1738); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 655 P.2d 895 (1982) (phrase "Territories and Possessions," as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1738, is broad enough to include Indian Tribes thereby affording judicial proceedings of Tribal Courts full faith and credit in "every court within the United States."). Wilson, in talismanic fashion, cites the court to those decisions wherein the court has either afforded full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of a tribal court or extended comity to the judgment of a tribal court.

In Oklahoma, where State courts are statutorily precluded from declaring the liability or nonliability of parties under policies of insurance for alleged tortious injuries, the federal district courts must consider principles of comity. To "give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another . . . jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and mutual respect," Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689, 695 (App. 1977), is a judicious exercise of discretion. It is stated in Pelican Production Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 1990):

The principle of comity is that "the courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and mutual respect." Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 695 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1977). The principle of comity applies among federal courts and requires federal courts of coordinate jurisdiction and equal rank to exercise care to avoid interference with each other's affairs.

State courts may recognize foreign divorces under the principal of comity, which applies when "the courts of one state or jurisdiction . . . give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and mutual respect." John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 762 (Alaska 1999) (quoting Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 695 (Ariz. 1977)). We have explained "that state courts should afford no comity to proceedings in which any litigant is denied due process."