" That announcement of the necessary elements of a cause of action has been cited and followed in numerous decisions, including the following: Houston T. C. Ry. Co. v. Hill, 63 Tex. 381, 51 Am.Rep. 642; Savage v. H. C. Burks Co., Tex. Civ. App. 270 S.W. 244; Brown Cracker Candy Co. v. Jensen, Tex. Civ. App. 32 S.W.2d 227; San Jacinto Life Ins. Co. v. Boyd, Tex. Civ. App. 214 S.W. 482; Danciger v. Smith, Tex. Civ. App. 229 S.W. 909; Brooks Supply Co. v. Senter Bros. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 245 S.W. 101; Union Trust Estate v. Orr, Tex. Civ. App. 3 S.W.2d 472. In 33 Tex.Jur. p. 453, sect. 37, this is said:

Whatever distinctions are maintained in substantive standards of strict rather than negligence liability because of the relative sureness of identifying the manufacturer with the harmful consequence and the harm causing quality of the product, none will exist as to privity. If privity is not needed for one, it will not be required for the other. E.g., Athens Canning Co. v. Ballard, Tex.Civ.App., 1963, 365 S.W.2d 369; Charles Pfizer Co. v. Branch, Tex. Civ.App., 1963, 365 S.W.2d 832; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fort Worth v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 1936, 97 S.W.2d 761; Brown Cracker Candy Co. v. Jensen, Tex.Civ.App., 1930, 32 S.W.2d 227; Dunn v. Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Tex. Civ.App., 1935, 84 S.W.2d 545; Jax Beer Co. v. Schaeffer, Tex.Civ.App., 1943, 173 S.W.2d 285, error ref'd, w.m.; Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, Tex.Civ.App., 1959, 328 S.W.2d 821; Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1961, 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d 918; Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 1920, 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382, 17 A.L.R. 649; and cases cited in Jacob E. Decker Sons v. Capps, 1942, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828, 142 A.L.R. 1479. Courts are on the go, but whether too far, too fast depends on the point of view. Privity even in so-called tort "warranty" situations is becoming less important, and negligence is frequently supplanted by some form of strict liability.

It is not to be presumed that the legislature so intended. Thus, in Brown Cracker Candy Co. v. Jensen, (Tex.) 32 S.W.2d 227, it was held, construing a venue statute which permitted certain suits to be brought in any county in which the cause of action, or a part thereof, arose, that, while the cause of action therein involved did not accrue in favor of plaintiff until there was a union of the right of the plaintiff and its infringement by the defendant, "arose" referred to every fact which had arisen and inhered in the cause of action. Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa 451, 123 N.W. 202, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 898, in which the action was upon a promissory note, the point involved was whether or not the action was barred by the Michigan statute of limitation (six years), or was governed by that of Iowa (ten years).

Since the defendant manufactured the product known as Cervalet or summer sausage, and placed the same on the market, wrapped and sealed in cellophane packages, and sold same to a retailer, knowing that it would ultimately be sold for food to a consumer, the defendant impliedly warranted to the purchaser and the members of his family that said product was a pure and wholesome food, and upon a breach of said warranty the defendant became liable to such parties for damages. Brown Cracker Candy Co. v. Jensen, 32 S.W.2d 227; Blackwell v. General Motors Co. 54 S.W.2d 251; Houston T.C. Ry. Co. v. Rider, 62 Tex. 267. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDER delivered the opinion of the Court.

On the question of the implied warranty of the retailer engaged in selling food to the general public in unbroken packages. Kress Co. v. Ferguson, 60 S.W.2d 817; Brown Cracker Candy Co. v. Jensen, 32 S.W.2d 227; Wintz v. Morrison, 17 Tex. 372. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Kirby, King Overshiner, of Abilene, for plaintiff in error. Where dealer sold plaintiff a can of corn, bearing dealer's own label as distributor without disclosing the name of the canner and said can contained food poison, and plaintiff was injured by eating said corn, plaintiff had the right to sue for damages for negligence of the dealer in placing said corn on the market for sale, even though the unwholesome condition was originated by the negligence of the canner, or manufacturer. Dunn v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 84 S.W.2d 545; Brown Cracker Candy Co. v. Jensen, 32 S.W.2d 227; Texas Drug Co. v. Caldwell, 237 S.W. 968; S. H. Kress Co. v. Ferguson, 60 S.W.2d 817. Touchstone, Wight, Gormley Price, of Dallas, for defendant in error.

Moreover, as we view the record, the appellees proved appellant (defendant) breached its warranty, and that the malfunction of the ice cream maker subjected appellees to business losses in Henderson County. That part of their action, at least, arose in Henderson County, the county in which the suit was brought. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. Carsey, 3 S.W.2d 930 (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1928, n.w.h.); Brown Cracker Candy Co. v. Jensen, 32 S.W.2d 227 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1930, n.w.h.); Teague Brick Sales Company v. Dewey, 355 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1962, n.w.h.); Lambert Corporation v. Martin, 369 S.W.2d 703 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1963, writ dism.); Josey Miller Company v. Wilson, 384 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1964, n.w.h.). The pleadings and evidence support the trial court's findings, conclusions, and order overruling appellant's plea of privilege.

If appellee established by a preponderance of the evidence that it in fact had a 'cause of action' for anticipatory breach of contract, there would be no difficulty in concluding that Nacogdoches County is the proper county for suit. A 'cause of action' within the meaning of Exception 23 of Article 1995, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Rev.Civ.St. of Texas, consists not only of the genesis of the right, but of a breach of that right. United States Pipe Foundry Co. v. City of Waco, Tex.Civ.App., 100 S.W.2d 1099, affirmed 130 Tex. 126, 108 S.W.2d 432, 1937, cert. den., 302 U.S. 749, 58 S.Ct. 266, 82 L.Ed. 579; Transit Grain Commission Co. v. Snapp, 148 S.W.2d 233, (Tex.Civ.App.) 1941, no writ; Brown Cracker Candy Co. v. Jensen, 32 S.W.2d 227, (Tex.Civ.App.) 1930, no writ; Ohio Oil Co. v. Varner, 150 S.W.2d 185, (Tex.Civ.App.) 1941, no writ; Panther Oil Grease Mfg. Co. v. Schumaker, 166 S.W.2d 205, (Tex.Civ.App.) 1942, no writ. It follows that if appellee established the existence of the 'cause of action' as alleged against appellant, suit could properly be maintained in Nacogdoches County upon proof that the contract was either made or breached there. In Early-Foster Co. v. A. P. Moore's Sons, 230 S.W. 787, (Tex.Civ.App.) 1921, no writ, it was held that a 'cause of action' within the meaning of the Exception of the venue statute permitting suits against private corporations in any county in which the cause of action, or a part thereof, arose, consists of the contract and its breach.

That part of his action, at least, arose in the county of the suit. Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W. 655; Teague Brick Sales Co. v. Dewey, Tex.Civ.App., 355 S.W.2d 249; Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. Jensen, Tex.Civ.App., 32 S.W.2d 227, 232; Texas Portland Cement Co. v. Carsey, Tex.Civ.App., 3 S.W.2d 930. Defendant also insists that the contract is in violation of the Statute of Frauds.

"A cause of action consists not alone of the genesis of the right but of the breach of the right, and in order to maintain the suit in some county other than that in which the corporation's principal place of business is located, it is necessary and only necessary that some part of the primary right, or some part of the transaction relating to the breach of that right, must have occurred in the county where the suit is filed." For similar definitions also see the following cases: Brown Cracker Candy Co. v. Jensen, Tex.Civ.App., 32 S.W.2d 227; Hoffer Oil Corporation v. Brian, Tex.Civ.App., 38 S.W.2d 596; San Jacinto Life Ins. Co. v. Boyd, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W. 482. Before there can exist a 'part of a cause of action' there must first exist a cause of action.