Opinion
2 CA-CV 2023-0191
04-05-2024
Cole William Brouse, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Geraldine Ivonne Gomez-Reyna, Defendant/Appellant.
Geraldine Gomez, Tucson In Propria Persona
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. DV20230754 The Honorable M. June Harris, Judge Pro Tempore, The Honorable Gilbert Rosales Jr., Judge Pro Tempore
Geraldine Gomez, Tucson In Propria Persona
Chief Judge Vasquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eppich and Judge Gard concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
VASQUEZ, CHIEF JUDGE
¶1 Geraldine Gomez-Reyna appeals from a contested order of protection prohibiting her from contacting Cole Brouse. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's order. See Michaelson v. Garr, 234 Ariz. 542, n.1 (App. 2014). In May 2023, Brouse filed a petition for an order of protection, alleging Gomez-Reyna and her mother had attempted to abduct the parties' child. He maintained that Gomez-Reyna had threatened and harassed him and that her "unpredictable and erratic" behavior stemming from mental health and substance abuse issues had made him "fearful." After a same-day, ex-parte hearing, the court granted Brouse's petition, finding Gomez-Reyna had committed acts of domestic violence within the past year and there was reason to believe she would do so again. The order directed that the parties were to have no contact except through text messages to address "legal decision-making and parenting time issues" relating to their child. The order further stated, "All permitted communication shall be free of threats, profanity, insults, and attempts to reconcile."
¶3 Gomez-Reyna requested a hearing to contest the order, claiming the allegations against her were "100% false." After the contested hearing, the trial court affirmed the order of protection. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b).
Discussion
¶4 We review the issuance of an order of protection for an abuse of discretion. Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, ¶ 10 (App. 2014). "A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion or 'when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's decision, is devoid of competent evidence to support the decision.'" Id. (quoting Mahar v. Acuna, 230 Ariz. 530, ¶ 14 (App. 2012)).
¶5 Gomez-Reyna contends the order of protection was "granted improperly, too broad and too burdensome and . . . is no longer needed."She has waived review, however, because her opening brief fails to comply with Rule 13(a), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. It does not contain any section headings, id., a table of contents, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(1), a table of citations, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(2), or a statement of facts, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(5). But more critically, what we understand to be the section presenting her combined issues and arguments lacks "appropriate references to the portions of the record on which [she] relies" and citation to any legal authority. Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A). Despite Gomez-Reyna's status as a self-represented litigant, we hold her to the same standards as an attorney. See Higgins v. Higgins, 194 Ariz. 266, ¶ 12 (App. 1999). These deficiencies warrant waiver of appellate review. See Sholes v. Fernando, 228 Ariz. 455, n.5 (App. 2011) (waiving arguments that were "unsupported with citation to authority or the record").
Brouse did not file an answering brief. "When debatable issues exist and an appellee fails to file an answering brief, we may consider such failure a confession of reversible error." Savord, 235 Ariz. 256, ¶ 9. Here, there are no debatable issues.
¶6 Even if we were to overlook the deficiencies in Gomez-Reyna's opening brief, we could not conclude the trial court abused its discretion. See Noriega v. Town of Miami, 243 Ariz. 320, ¶ 27 (App. 2017) (waiver is discretionary). She provides no argument beyond conclusory statements that the "act of harassment" supporting the protective order was based on unfair accusations. Additionally, Gomez-Reyna has not provided a transcript of the contested hearing. Accordingly, we must presume that the record supports the court's ruling. See Varco, Inc. v. UNS Elec., Inc., 242 Ariz. 166, ¶ 3 (App. 2017) (presuming "missing transcript would support the [trial] court's ruling"). And in requesting that we "dissolve the protective order," Gomez-Reyna states that she and Brouse "have reconc[iled], talked thoroughly" and agreed "it is best to drop the protection order" for the benefit of their child. If true, this is in direct violation of the order, which prohibited "attempts to reconcile" during the parties' limited communication. In any event, the relief Gomez-Reyna requests would be better sought in the trial court. See Ariz. R. Protective Order P. 41(a) ("A plaintiff may request the dismissal of a protective order at any time during the term of the order.").
Disposition
¶7 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's order affirming the order of protection.