Opinion
23-CV-6042 (LTS)
01-03-2024
TYRELL BROUGHTON, Plaintiff, v. TRUST BANK, Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action asserting that Defendant has violated his rights. By order dated July 24, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint but grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action, using the court's general complaint form, against Trust Bank. In response to the question on the form asking for the facts underlying this action, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated “multiple federal laws.” (ECF 1 ¶ III.)Plaintiff does not provide any facts relating to these alleged violations, but attached to the complaint are more than 60 pages of documents,including: (1) a $30,000 retail installment contract between Plaintiff and Pepmore Auto Sales in Queens, New York, for a used 2018 vehicle; (2) a November 15, 2022 letter from Plaintiff to Trust Bank asking that it “cease and desist all contact and communication” regarding the “collection of an alleged debt and all related matters,” and characterizing its communications to him as “Deceitful,” “Threatening,” “Causing emotional and physical duress,” “Illegal,” “Unlawful,” and “Malpractice”; (3) a December 8, 2022 letter from Trust Bank stating that it “appreciate[d] the opportunity to respond” to Plaintiff's letter, noting that Plaintiff had taken out a $30,000 automobile loan on which $24,824.74 remained due, and that a lien would remain on the vehicle until the balance was paid; (4) an April 8, 2023 letter from Trust Bank stating that it had investigated the dispute and determined that the balance remained due; and (5) monthly statements from Trust Bank to Plaintiff showing the loan balance. (Id. at 8-11, 2426, 33-34, 41-47.)
The Court quotes verbatim from the complaint. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise.
Plaintiff filed another complaint naming a different defendant, but which may be related to this one. See Broughton v. VW Credit Volkswagen, ECF 1:23-CV-4884, 1 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 9, 2023) (pending).
Also attached to the complaint are several documents written by Plaintiff, entitled “Affidavit[s] of Truth,” in which he cites to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). (Id. at 13-14, 18-22, 27-39.) Plaintiff alleges that the loan contract should be “null and void,” because finance charges “can only be paid when money is in hand and or money [is] direct deposited into a consumer's bank account,”' and that Trust Bank “leveraged” his “name, merit, and social security number” on the promissory note. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff seeks to void the contract and to have the lien removed from the vehicle. (Id. at 19.)
DISCUSSION
A. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
Furthermore, under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “A complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) if it is ‘so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”' Strunk v. U.S. House of Representatives, 68 Fed. App'x 233, 235 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)); see Prezzi v. Schelter, 469 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that complaint did not comply with Rule 8 because “it contained a labyrinthian prolixity of unrelated and vituperative charges that defied comprehension”). Rule 8 “does not demand that a complaint be a model of clarity or exhaustively present the facts alleged,” but it does require, “at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 Fed.Appx. 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “It is not the Court's job - nor the opposing party's - to decipher a complaint that is ‘so poorly composed as to be functionally illegible.'” Ghosh v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 21-CV-6139, 2023 WL 3612553, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2023) (quoting Avramham v. N.Y., No. 20-CV-4441, 2020 WL 4001628, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2020)). A complaint that fails to comply with Rule 8 may be dismissed. See Da Costa v. Marcucilli, 675 Fed. App'x 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (dismissing a complaint because it was convoluted, repetitive and difficult to understand); Anduze v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-519, 2021 WL 795472, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2021) (dismissing a complaint as incomprehensible because it was illegible and the legible portions were incomprehensible, such that “the [c]ourt is unable to properly evaluate the full nature and extent of [the] [p]laintiff's claims”); Barsella v. United States, 135 F.R.D. 64, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that the policy requiring courts to liberally construe pro se complaints “does not mandate that a court sustain every pro se complaint even if it is incoherent, rambling, and unreadable”).
Plaintiff's allegations do not comply with Rule 8 because he does not provide a short and plain statement giving Defendant fair notice of the claims he is asserting and the grounds on which they rest. From the attachments to the complaint, it appears that Plaintiff is seeking to bring claims against Defendant in connection with the car loan, but the complaint does not contain sufficient facts about what occurred or how Defendant allegedly violated Plaintiff's rights.
Plaintiff refers to the FDCPA, which applies to consumer debt “arising out of . . . transaction[s] . . . primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5); Polanco v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 930 F.Supp.2d 547, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he FDCPA is triggered when the obligation is a debt arising out of a consumer transaction.”). The FDCPA prohibits those who qualify as “debt collectors” from using deceptive and misleading practices, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, or engaging in “conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. The FDCPA defines a debt collector as: (1) a person whose principal purpose is to collect debts; (2) a person who regularly collects debts owed to another; or (3) a person who collects its own debts, using a name other than its own as if it were a debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
B. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to provide facts showing that he can state a claim against Defendant under the FDCPA, or any other claim falling within the Court's jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-6042 (LTS). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to issue judgment consistent with this order.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.
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