Opinion
NO. 2010-CA-000340-MR
05-02-2014
KENNETH BROUGHTON AND MARLENE BROUGHTON APPELLANTS v. CARTER COUNTY, KENTUCKY; AND BENJAMIN RICE APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Malenda S. Haynes Grayson, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Robert W. Miller Grayson, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM CARTER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00078
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: CLAYTON, MOORE, AND NICKELL, JUDGES. NICKELL, JUDGE: Kenneth and Marlene Broughton have appealed from the Carter Circuit Court's January 20, 2010, order affirming a ruling of the Carter County Fiscal Court. The trial court determined the Fiscal Court's finding that the roadway at issue extended to the property line of Benjamin Rice was supported by substantial evidence and was, therefore, not arbitrary. The Broughtons contend the Fiscal Court did not have substantial evidence supportive of its conclusion and the trial court erred in finding otherwise. Following a careful review, we affirm.
The Broughtons filed a complaint in the Carter Circuit Court on March 11, 2005, seeking a review of the March 8, 2005, decision of the Fiscal Court. That decision found a county roadway known as North Anglin Branch Road was 1.15 miles in length as measured from the centerline of State Route 1. At that length, the road would extend onto the Broughton property a substantial distance. The Broughtons and Rice are adjoining landowners, with Rice's land lying to the north of Broughton. North Anglin Branch Road is a gravel road leading north from State Route 1 that enters the southern boundary of the Broughton property near their home. The Broughtons alleged the road ended at their southern property line or possibly extended a short distance across the line but stopped well short of Rice's property. Because no written record existed of the proceedings which precipitated the Fiscal Court's decision, on July 8, 2008, the trial court ordered the Fiscal Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make written findings of fact and an appropriate order.
The evidentiary hearing was conducted on May 1, 2009. The Fiscal Court took testimony from several witnesses, was presented transcripts of several discovery depositions, and admitted multiple documents into evidence regarding the length of the road in question. The Fiscal Court was tasked with determining the length and resulting end point of the road. On July 19, 2009, the Fiscal Court rendered a three-page decision, finding in pertinent part that
having considered all testimony in the record, the Fiscal Court believes and determines that the proper length of that certain County Road referred to as North Anglin Branch, currently extends to the property line of that certain property previously owned by Walter Sullivan [now owned by Rice], as said (sic) forth in official records book 135[,] page 833, of the records of the Carter County Clerk's Office and hereby sets the length of said County Road as being to the property line of the property described in said deed.
The parties tendered briefs to the trial court supportive of their respective positions and discussing their beliefs regarding the appropriate standard of review. Based on the holding in Trimble Fiscal Court v. Snyder, 866 S.W.2d 124 (Ky. App. 1993), the trial court determined judicial review was limited to determination of whether the Fiscal Court acted arbitrarily and whether its decision was supported by substantial evidence. After reviewing the record before it, the trial court entered a ten-page order affirming the Fiscal Court. This appeal followed.
The Broughtons now argue the trial court erred in determining the Fiscal Court's decision was supported by substantial evidence. In essence, they claim no evidence was presented supporting the conclusion that North Anglin Branch Road had ever been dedicated or adopted as a county road, but even assuming the road in question had been adopted into the county road system, the Broughtons allege the Fiscal Court failed to follow appropriate statutory guidelines for modifying its length. Thus, they believe the Fiscal Court abused its discretion and the trial court erred in not so finding. We disagree.
The Fiscal Court was clearly acting in an adjudicatory fashion in reaching its conclusion regarding North Anglin Branch Road. No argument to the contrary is advanced. Thus, the trial court correctly applied the standard of review set forth in Snyder and looked only to see whether the Fiscal Court acted arbitrarily and whether its decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Our standard of review is the same as that of the trial court. Judicial review of an administrative action is limited to determining whether such action was arbitrary. Liquor Outlet, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 141 S.W.3d 378 (Ky. App. 2004); see also Bobinchuk v. Levitch, 380 S.W.2d 233 (Ky. 1964). Arbitrariness will be imputed to an administrative action if: (1) the agency acted outside the scope of its power; (2) the agency failed to afford procedural due process to the party affected by its decision; or (3) substantial evidence does not support the decision. Commonwealth Revenue Cabinet v. Liberty National Bank of Lexington, 858 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Ky. App. 1993) (citing American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964)). It is uncontroverted in the instant matter that the Fiscal Court acted within the scope of its authority and also that the Broughtons were afforded procedural due process. Therefore, the sole question is whether the Fiscal Court's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence supporting an administrative agency's decision has been described as evidence of relevant consequence and substance which would induce conviction in the minds of reasonable persons. Aubrey v. Office of the Attorney General, 994 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. App. 1998).
On appeal, the question of substantial evidence is impacted by the Broughton's failure to carry their burden of persuading the fact-finder that North Anglin Branch Road was, in the first instance, not a county road, and, in the second instance, did not extend to their northern property line.
Where a party with the burden of persuading the fact finder fails to do so, his burden on appeal is great. He must show that the evidence in his favor was so compelling as to mandate a finding in his favor. In other words, no reasonable person would not find in his favor. If the evidence presented is not so compelling, then the decision is not arbitrary. Landgrave v. Watson, Ky.App., 593 S.W.2d 875, 878 (1979); see also Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (1986).Snyder, 866 S.W.2d at 126. Therefore, the Broughtons must show the evidence compels a finding contrary to the decision of the Fiscal Court.
Based on our review of the record, we must conclude the testimony of Tommy Thompson, director of the Carter County 911 service; his reliance on county road plans, maps, maintenance lists, and other documentation; combined with the live and deposition testimony presented to the Fiscal Court by persons familiar with the history of North Anglin Branch Road indicating it extended beyond the Broughton's southerly property line onto and possibly through the former Sullivan farm, constituted substantial evidence supportive of the Fiscal Court's final determination. Although contrary evidence was introduced by the Broughtons, it cannot be said that this conflicting evidence was so compelling as to require a finding in their favor. Therefore, we are unable to conclude the trial court erred in determining the Fiscal Court's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Carter Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Malenda S. Haynes
Grayson, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Robert W. Miller
Grayson, Kentucky