Bross v. City of Detroit

20 Citing cases

  1. Howard v. White

    447 Mich. 395 (Mich. 1994)   Cited 21 times
    In Howard, supra, our Supreme Court defined an exception to the WDCA's exclusive remedy provision, the "dual-persona doctrine," that allows an injured employee to recover both worker's compensation benefits and traditional tort remedies in this type of situation.

    We agree with the dissent that this is not an appropriate case for application of the dual-capacity doctrine. A claim similar to that of the current plaintiffs was rejected by this Court in Bross v Detroit, 262 Mich. 447, 450; 247 N.W. 714 (1933), where a police officer attempted to bring suit for injuries suffered in a collision with a city-owned streetcar. Recent decisions are in accord.

  2. Walker v. City & County of S. F.

    97 Cal.App.2d 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)   Cited 20 times
    In Walker, a firefighter was killed when his fire truck collided with a streetcar operated by a municipal streetcar employee.

    This, also, was before Michigan had workmen's compensation. Respondent cites Bross v. City of Detroit (1933), 262 Mich. 447 [ 247 N.W. 714], a case on all fours with the present one, where the plaintiff fireman was injured in a collision between the hook and ladder on which he was riding and a municipally owned streetcar. The same court which had held in the Coots case that a fireman could sue the city held, because of the workmen's compensation law, that he could not do so.

  3. Cassani v. Detroit

    402 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 5 times
    In Cassani v Detroit, 156 Mich. App. 573; 402 N.W.2d 1 (1985), an officer was severely injured by a wire cable strung between two metal poles on a city-owned lot, across which the officer was pursuing an escaping felon.

    See, e.g., Jansen v. Harmon, 164 N.W.2d 323 (Iowa, 1969), and Royster v. Montanez, 134 Cal.App.3d 362; 184 Cal.Rptr. 560 (1982), where those courts held that injury in the course of employment due to hazards on the employer's property did not confer the employer with a separate legal status even where the property on which the injury occurred was not used by the employer as a workplace in the course of its business. See also Holody v. Detroit, 117 Mich. App. 76; 323 N.W.2d 599 (1982), lv den 417 Mich. 931 (1983) (Detroit police officer on duty injured in collision with a fire truck running a stop sign not entitled to an action in tort against the city), and Bross v. Detroit, 262 Mich. 447; 247 N.W. 714 (1933) (Detroit police officer on duty injured in collision with city-owned street car operated on proprietary basis by city held not entitled to action in tort against the city). We find Fletcher v. Harafajee, 100 Mich. App. 400; 299 N.W.2d 53 (1980), lv den 411 Mich. 971 (1981), cited by plaintiff, distinguishable because the injuries which the plaintiff was allowed to recover for in tort did not occur during the course of employment.

  4. Holody v. City of Detroit

    117 Mich. App. 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 16 times
    Explaining that MCL 418.827 bars an employee from bringing common-law causes of action against co-employees, i.e., persons who work for the same employer regardless whether they work in the same job or same department

    Having elected to be bound by the statute, he is not entitled to a remedy which it has abolished." Bross v Detroit, 262 Mich. 447, 449; 247 N.W. 714 (1933). On the authority of Bross, we hold that Mr. Holody's receipt of benefits under the Detroit City Charter did not give him the right to sue his employer in tort.

  5. Martz v. Consumers Power Co.

    101 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Mich. 1951)   Cited 1 times
    In Martz v. Consumers Power Co. (ED Mich, 1951), 101 F. Supp. 853, the city paid pension benefits to the widow of an employee who had died in the course of his employment.

    The provisions of a city charter clearly cannot vitiate rights bestowed by an act of the Michigan legislature; the City of Birmingham has no power through its charter to create an exception to the Michigan Death Act. In coming to this conclusion, I have not overlooked Bross v. City of Detroit, 262 Mich. 447, 247 N.W. 714, urged upon the court by the defendant. In that case the defendant was not a third party wrongdoer but the plaintiff's employer.

  6. Singhas v. New Mexico State Highway Dept

    124 N.M. 42 (N.M. 1997)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that a spouse may not bring an action for loss of consortium against the employer under the Act

    Section 52-1-3(D). See, e.g., Berger v. U.G.I. Corp., 285 Pa. Super. 374, 427 A.2d 1161 (1981); Bross v. City of Detroit, 262 Mich. 447, 247 N.W. 714 (1933); De Guiseppe v. City of New York, 188 Misc. 897, 66 N.Y.S.2d 866, (Sup.Ct. 1946), aff'd, 273 A.2d 1010, 79 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1948); Henning v. General Motors Assembly Div., 143 Wis.2d 1, 419 N.W.2d 551 (1988); Holody v. City of Detroit, 117 Mich. App. 76, 323 N.W.2d 599 (1982); Holt v. City of Boston, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 175, 507 N.E.2d 766 (1987); Jones v. Kaiser Indus. Corp., 43 Cal.3d 552, 237 Cal.Rptr. 568, 737 P.2d 771 (1987); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 353 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1962); Pulliam v. Richmond County Board of Comm'rs, 184 Ga. App. 403, 361 S.E.2d 544 (1987); Sutmire v. Andrews, 108 Pa.Cmwlth. 90, 529 A.2d 68 (1987); Thompson v. Lewis County, 92 Wn.2d 204, 595 P.2d 541 (1979); Walker v. City County of San Francisco, 97 Cal.App.2d 901, 219 P.2d 487 (1950); Wright v. Moore, 380 So.2d 172, 173 n. 1 (La.Ct.App. 1979).

  7. Spencer v. Seattle

    104 Wn. 2d 30 (Wash. 1985)   Cited 7 times
    Emphasizing that Washington courts have consistently recognized and reinforced the exclusive remedy provisions of the Industrial Insurance Act

    State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979); Walker v. City Cy. of San Francisco, 97 Cal.App.2d 901, 219 P.2d 487 (1950); State v. Coffman, 446 N.E.2d 611 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 353 S.W.2d 373 (Ky.Ct.App. 1962); Wright v. Moore, 380 So.2d 172 (La.Ct.App. 1979), cert.denied, 382 So.2d 164 (La. 1980); Bross v. Detroit, 262 Mich. 447, 247 N.W. 714 (1933); Holody v. Detroit, 117 Mich. App. 76, 323 N.W.2d 599 (1982); De Giuseppe v. New York, 188 Misc. 897, 66 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1946), aff'd, 273 A.D. 1010, 79 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1948); Linzee v. State, 122 Misc.2d 207, 470 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1983); Freese v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 4 Ohio St.3d 5, 445 N.E.2d 1110 (1983); Berger v. U.G.I. Corp., 285 Pa. Super. 374, 427 A.2d 1161 (1981). (One Wisconsin case held the State was liable to an employee, national guardsman, but the court found the State had a separate duty under the statutes to act as an insurer and to pay judgments of national guardsmen performing in good faith.

  8. Freese v. Consolidated Rail Corp.

    4 Ohio St. 3d 5 (Ohio 1983)   Cited 28 times
    In Freese, a motorcycle policeman was injured while on duty when one of the wheels of the motorcycle he was operating caught in a depression adjacent to a railroad track, causing his motorcycle to overturn.

    doctrine of dual capacity did not apply, and the appellate court affirmed. Some additional cases based upon claims by government employees brought against the government employer wherein the courts have rejected the doctrine of dual capacity are as follows: Berger v. U.G.I. Corp. (1981), 285 Pa. Super. 374, 427 A.2d 1161, allegation that death of a city fireman in a gas explosion was caused by the city water and sewer department's negligent installation of a water main too close to a gas line; Wright v. Moore (La.App. 1979), 380 So.2d 172, claim against the state by a nurse employed by the state health department alleging that she had been injured through the negligence of a state transportation department employee: Walker v. San Francisco (1950), 97 Cal.App.2d 901, 219 P.2d 487, action by widow of a city fireman for wrongful death caused by a collision with a municipal streetcar; Osborne v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1962), 353 S.W.2d 373, state highway employee struck by a state police car; Bross v. Detroit (1933), 262 Mich. 447, 247 N.W. 714, fireman injured in a collision with a city trolley. We find the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy as reached in these cited cases to be proper and applicable to the instant case.

  9. Jansen v. Harmon

    164 N.W.2d 323 (Iowa 1969)   Cited 32 times
    In Jansen v. Harmon (Iowa 1969), 164 N.W.2d 323, the employer was both the operator of a business and the owner of an apartment building.

    Though the premises were located at some distance from the brewery, they were owned and controlled by defendant, and it was defendant's own negligent conduct — the improper maintenance of an elevator — that occasioned the injury. Nevertheless, it was held that the employee could not resort to an action at law, since the employer's exclusive liability was under the Workmen's Compensation Law. In Bross v. City of Detroit, 262 Mich. 447, 247 N.W. 714, 715, plaintiff fireman was injured in a collision between the hook and ladder on which he was riding and a municipally owned street car. In affirming a judgment based on a directed verdict the court said:

  10. Currier Lumber Co. v. Van Every

    312 Mich. 375 (Mich. 1945)   Cited 6 times
    In Van Every, plaintiff, as principal contractor, paid compensation to the injured employee of defendant, plaintiff's subcontractor, who was not subject to the workmen's compensation act. Plaintiff sued defendant as indemnitor, in an action at law.

    The situations are not parallel, however, as defendant, as the employer, cannot be considered as a third party as to his employee within the meaning of said section 8454. See Bross v. City of Detroit, 262 Mich. 447. Moreover, defendant's liability under section 8416 arises independently of any negligent act performed by him.