Opinion
No. CA 08 1384.
April 15, 2009.
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 2006-2578-D HONORABLE EDWARD D. RUBIN, PRESIDING.
James S. Gates, Opelousas, LA, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE: Kayla M. Brooks.
James D. "Buddy" Caldwell, Attorney General Sylvia Fordice, Assistant Attorney General Louisiana Department of Justice Division of Risk Litigation, Floor Lafayette, LA, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: State of Louisiana and Andrae Ford.
Court composed of SYLVIA R. COOKS, ELIZABETH A. PICKETT and BILLY H. EZELL, Judges.
Defendants appeal the judgment of the trial court awarding the plaintiff $50,000.00 in damages for injuries she sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 8, 2005, Andrae Ford, an employee of the State of Louisiana's Department of Public Safety and Corrections (the State), was driving a state-owned van. At that time, Kayla Brooks was driving a vehicle that was stopped at a traffic signal. Ms. Ford stated her foot slipped off the brake pedal causing the van to hit the rear of Ms. Brooks' vehicle. Fault for the accident was not at issue, as Ms. Ford admitted Ms. Brooks did nothing to cause the accident. Ms. Brooks was transported from the scene by ambulance to the emergency room at Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital in Lafayette, Louisiana.
Ms. Brooks sued the State and Ms. Ford for the injuries she suffered as well as damages to her automobile clutch due to the accident. Ms. Brooks elected to limit her damages to the $50,000.00 threshold and present her case for a bench trial. After a three-day trial, the trial court issued oral reasons for judgment, awarding the $50,000.00 amount sought by Ms. Brooks for her general and special damages.
The State appealed the trial court's judgment, asserting the trial court erred in awarding Plaintiff $50,000.00 in damages and in refusing to allow Dwayne Brown to testify as an expert for the State.
ANALYSIS
Defendants argue the trial court erred in giving great weight to the expert testimony of Dr. George Williams, an orthopedic surgeon, because Ms. Brooks was not forthright with Dr. Williams about her previous medical problems. In the patient history given to Dr. Williams, Ms. Brooks complained of lower back, neck and shoulder pain and stated she did not have any similar injuries in the past. Through the discovery process, it was revealed that Ms. Brooks was involved in several past accidents for which she complained of both neck and back pain. Defendants note that Ms. Brooks also failed to disclose her past accidents and problems to her employer, Our Lady of Lourdes. Defendants also point out that Ms. Brooks suffered accidents after the incident in question, one of which required knee surgery. Defendants argue Dr. Williams' conclusion that the impact from the accident produced a flexion-extension type injury was not reliable because the testimony upon which it was based was not credible.
Counsel for Ms. Brooks argued there was no intent on Ms. Brooks' part to deceive Dr. Williams. They point to the testimony of Dr. Michael Berard, a clinical pyschologist, who testified Ms. Brooks suffered from cognitive defects that rendered her essentially mentally retarded. The full scale IQ test for Ms. Brooks revealed a score of 56. Ms. Brooks was also fund to suffer from Attention Deficit Disorder. Dr. Bedard concluded that Ms. Brooks' inability to provide accurate factual data had little to do with her trustworthiness, but was a function of her neurological and/or psychological insufficiency. The trial court, in his oral reasons for judgment, noted the limited intellectual abilities of Ms. Brooks.
The record revealed that up to the date of the accident, Ms. Brooks performed her manual labor position at Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital with no restrictions. Immediately after the accident, Ms. Brooks was transported to the emergency room at Our Lady of Lourdes. She then began conservative treatment with her family doctor, Dr. Keith Mack, and eventually saw Dr. Williams for an evaluation due to her continued neck and back pain. Dr. Williams concluded from an MRI taken on October 24, 2005, which was before any of Ms. Brooks' subsequent accidents, that Ms. Brooks suffered from disc herniations at C4-5 and L4-5. He performed surgery to repair the herniated nucleus pulposus at C4-5 on January 21, 2008. He testified it was his medical opinion that the disc injury was caused or, at a minimum, aggravated by the June 8, 2005 accident.
The fact that Ms. Brooks demonstrated cervical and lumbar disc pathology subsequent to June 8, 2005 and before any intervening trauma corroborates Dr. Williams opinion that the disc injury was caused and/or aggravated by the June 8, 2005 auto accident. Coupled with the presumption of causation that arises from the fact that prior to the accident Plaintiff was able to perform her work duties without restriction, and could not do immediately after the accident, we cannot find the trial judge manifestly erred in relying on Dr. Williams's causation opinion.
The law is well settled that a plaintiff's injuries are presumed to have resulted from an accident if the injured person was in good health prior to the accident but, commencing with the accident, the symptoms of the disabling condition manifest themselves, providing that the medical evidence shows a reasonable possibility of causal connection between the accident and the disabling condition. Housley v.Cerise, 579 So.2d 973 (La. 1991); Maranto v. GoodyearTire Rubber Co., 94-2603 (La. 2/20/95), 650 So.2d 757.
Defendants also contend the $50,000.00 award of damages was excessive. Our review of a general damage award is guided by Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257 (La. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114, 114 S.Ct 1059 (1994). In Andrus v. State Farm Mutual Automobile InsuranceCompany, 95-801, p. 8 (La. 3/22/96), 670 so.2d 1206, 1210 (citations omitted), our supreme court stated:
In appellate review of general damage awards, the court must accord much discretion to the trial court judge or jury. The role of an appellate court in reviewing awards of general damages is not to decide what it considers to be an appropriate award, but rather to review the exercise of discretion by the trial court. Only if the reviewing court determines that the trial court has abused its "much discretion" may it refer to prior awards in similar cases and then only to determine the highest or lowest point of an award within that discretion.
Because discretion vested in the trial court is "great," and even vast, an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages. Reasonable persons frequently disagree about the measure of general damages in a particular case. It is only when the award is, in either direction, beyond that which a reasonable trier of fact could assess for the effects of the particular injury to the particular plaintiff under the particular circumstances that the appellate court should increase or reduce the award.
Ms. Brooks suffered the accident in July of 2005. The record revealed she underwent continuous medical treatment up to trial, and underwent surgery on her back. She also suffered lost wages due to her injuries. Ms. Brooks testified she continue to suffer from her injuries through the date of trial. For these reasons, we find no manifest error, and the trial judge did not abuse his vast discretion in the award of damages.
Lastly, we find no error on the trial court's part in refusing to allow Dwayne Brown to testify as an expert. The State attempted to call Mr. Brown to testify that the damages to Ms. Brooks' clutch occurred due to a lack of maintenance rather than from the accident. The trial court questioned Mr. Brown, who was a certified master mechanic, as to his credentials. Noting that Mr. Brown never evaluated the vehicle at issue, the trial court refused to allow him to testify as an expert. "A district court is accorded broad discretion in determining whether expert testimony should be held admissible and who should or should not be permitted to testify as an expert." Cheairs v. State of Louisiana, through DOTD, 03-680, p. 7 (La. 12/3/03), 861 So.2d 536, 541. We find no abuse of discretion occurred.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Defendants-Appellants.