Opinion
# 2013-018-434 Claim No. 121722 Motion No. M-83688
08-28-2013
KORAN BROOKS v. STATE OF NEW YORK
Synopsis
Claimant's action for wrongful confinement must be limited to the four days following the July 2, 2012 administrative reversal of the Superintendent's Hearing during which Claimant remained in the Special Housing Unit. The cause of action for malicious prosecution must be dismissed. Such a hearing is not an adversarial hearing akin to a judicial proceeding, and the charges are part of the administrative process not a criminal prosecution; therefore, the first element of a malicious prosecution claim has not been met. The motion is denied in part and granted in part.
Case information
UID: 2013-018-434 Claimant(s): KORAN BROOKS Claimant short name: BROOKS Footnote (claimant name) : Defendant(s): STATE OF NEW YORK Footnote (defendant name) : Third-party claimant(s): Third-party defendant(s): Claim number(s): 121722 Motion number(s): M-83688 Cross-motion number(s): Judge: DIANE L. FITZPATRICK Claimant's attorney: No Appearance ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York Defendant's attorney: By: G. Lawrence Dillon, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Third-party defendant's attorney: Signature date: August 28, 2013 City: Syracuse Comments: Official citation: Appellate results: See also (multicaptioned case) Decision
The defendant brings a motion to dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and (8). Claimant has not responded to the motion.
The claim was filed on September 10, 2012, and seeks damages for Claimant's wrongful confinement from April 12, 2012 until July 6, 2012, and malicious prosecution. The affidavit of service attached to the claim indicates it was mailed by first class mail.
Defendant asserts that Claimant served a notice of intention to file a claim by certified mail, return receipt requested on July 31, 2012. The claim was served by regular mail on September 12, 2012. A copy of the envelope in which the claim was served is attached to Defendant's moving papers as Exhibit D and reflects only $.45 postage. Defendant argues that the claim was not served in accordance with Court of Claims Act § 11.
The Defendant interposed a verified answer to the claim on January 23, 2013. As a first affirmative defense in the answer, Defendant sets forth with sufficient particularity the Claimant's alleged failure to properly serve the claim in accordance with section 11 of the Court of Claims Act. The problem is that the answer and affirmative defense were interposed well after the time frame for submitting a timely responsive pleading.
Section 206.7 of the Uniform Rules for the Court of Claims (22 NYCRR 206.7) provides that the Defendant has 40 days after service of the claim to serve a responsive pleading. Here, Defendant has presented no explanation for the late service of the answer.
Court of Claims Act § 11 (c) provides that any defense based upon the failure to comply with the manner of service requirements set forth in subdivision 11 (a) is waived unless raised by a motion to dismiss made before service of the responsive pleading, or in the responsive pleading. The statute explicitly provides that if the defense is waived the claim cannot be dismissed for the failure.
Since Defendant did not timely interpose an answer with the affirmative defense objecting to the manner of service within 40 days after service of the claim, the defense has been waived and the claim cannot be dismissed for improper service (Roy v State of New York, UID No. 2000-009-414 [Ct Cl, Midey, J., June 13, 2000]; see also Harris v State of New York, 190 Misc 2d 463 [Ct Cl 2002]; Knight v State of New York, 177 Misc 2d 181 [Ct Cl 1998]; cf Naccarato v Kot, 124 AD2d 365 [3d Dept 1986]).
In likely anticipation of this result, Defendant also argues, by its motion, that the claim must also be dismissed for failure to state a viable cause of action against the State of New York. Defendant argues that the notice of intention and claim seek damages for Claimant's wrongful confinement at Riverview Correctional Facility due to the issuance of a misbehavior report and a finding that Claimant was guilty of the charges after an administrative hearing. The findings were later reversed and Claimant's record expunged. Defendant raised as an affirmative defense that the actions Defendant took were privileged as judicial, quasi-judicial, or discretionary determinations of State employees acting within the scope of their duties as public officers and, therefore, immune from liability.
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), for failure to state a cause of action, the Court must give the claim a liberal construction and give Claimant the benefit of every possible favorable inference (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Torok v Moore's Flatwork & Founds., LLC, 106 AD3d 1421 [2013]). The question is "'whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" (Torok v Moore's Flatwork & Founds., LLC, 106 AD3d at 1421, quoting Scheffield v Vestal Parkway Plaza, LLC, 102 AD3d 992, 993 [3d Dept 2013]).
A cause of action for wrongful confinement is a species of the tort of false imprisonment (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 407 [Ct Cl 1986]). It is Claimant's burden to show that " (1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged." (Broughton v State of New York,, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975] cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). Defendant is entitled to immunity for claims for money damages arising from disciplinary matters within a prison setting that involve discretionary determinations (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212 [1988]; cf Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011]; McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194 [2009]). The Court of Appeals in Arteaga v State of New York, held that in situations where governmental action "involves the conscious exercise of discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature" absolute immunity will attach to those decisions where the "exercise of reasoned judgment . . . could typically produce different acceptable results" (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d at 216). In Arteaga, the Claimants brought actions seeking money damages because the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision prosecuted disciplinary charges against them which they contended resulted in unlawful sanctions being imposed. One claimant's guilty determination was reversed on appeal, and the other claimant's finding of guilt was annulled after an article 78 proceeding. Despite the ultimate reversal of those findings, the Court of Appeals adjudged that claimants could not bring a viable claim against the State under these circumstances because the correction officers and prison employees were exercising their judgment to assess each inmate's conduct in light of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision's rules and regulations and in compliance with established procedural requirements; therefore, the State was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity (see also Holloway v State of New York, 285 AD2d 765 [3d Dept 2001]; Davis v State of New York, 262 AD2d 887 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 819 [1999]).
Two cases were actually consolidated for appeal, Arteaga v State of New York and Treacy v State of New York..
Then known as the Department of Correctional Services.
Here, Claimant contends that correction officials failed to present adequate proof at the administrative hearing to support the charge that "family photos were gang related." Although Claimant cites in the claim to DuBois v State of New York (25 Misc 3d 1137 [Ct Cl 2009]), a case which found a prima facie case had been established because the hearing officer had refused to allow that claimant to call a witness at the hearing in violation of the rules and regulations. Since the record had been administratively expunged, defendant failed to meet its burden to show that the missing witness at the hearing would not have made a difference in the outcome. Claimant here, however, does not assert any specific violation of any rules and regulations. No defect in the process is alleged. Claimant only takes issue with the findings after the hearing. Accepting Claimant's allegations as true, which the Court must do on this motion, Claimant has failed to state a cause of action for wrongful confinement.
Claimant, however, has stated a cause of action for wrongful confinement for the four days following the July 2, 2012 administrative reversal of the Superintendent's Hearing during which Claimant remained in the Special Housing Unit. Claimant was not released from confinement until July 6, 2012.
To the extent Claimant seeks damages for a cause of action for malicious prosecution, no such cause of action is cognizable for a finding of guilt at a Superintendent's Hearing. Such a hearing is not an adversarial hearing akin to a judicial proceeding, and the charges are part of the administrative process not a "criminal prosecution"; therefore, the first element of a malicious prosecution claim has not been met (see Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d at 457; Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d at 405).
Accordingly, Defendant's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part in accordance herewith.
August 28, 2013
Syracuse, New York
DIANE L. FITZPATRICK
Judge of the Court of Claims
The Court has considered the following documents in deciding this motion:
1) Notice of Motion.
2) Affirmation of G. Lawrence Dillon, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, in support, with exhibits annexed thereto.