Opinion
No. 111715.
04-03-2015
Michael Lee BROOKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, et al., Appellees.
Michael Lee Brooks, appellant pro se. Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Michael Lee Brooks, appellant pro se.
Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before BUSER, P.J., LEBEN and STRANDRIDGE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Michael Lee Brooks appeals the district court's summary denial of his K.S.A. 60–1507 motion. The district court dismissed Brooks' motion as untimely because it was not filed within the 1–year deadline found in K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(1). Brooks claims he is innocent of the crimes that led to his imprisonment and that he did not file a K.S.A. 60–1507 motion earlier because his attorney told him nothing could be done to challenge his convictions other than a direct appeal.
In 1982, Brooks was convicted of attempted rape, aggravated burglary, and theft. The district court sentenced him on January 21, 1983, to a controlling sentence of 10 to 40 years in prison. Brooks filed a notice of appeal challenging his convictions, but he later withdrew his appeal. On November 29, 2012, Brooks filed a pro se K.S.A. 60–1507 motion for writ of habeas corpus. In his motion, Brooks alleged he was innocent and unlawfully incarcerated.
The district court dismissed Brooks' motion because he failed to comply with the time limitation set forth in K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(1). Brooks filed a motion to reconsider. In the motion, Brooks argued the deadline to file his habeas corpus motion should have been extended because his attorney told him that, aside from a direct appeal, there was no other way to challenge his convictions and sentence. Brooks claimed it was not until October 2012 that he discovered he could access the court system to assert his innocence by filing a K.S.A. 60–1507 motion.
The district court denied Brooks' motion for reconsideration. The court found nothing in his original motion or his motion to reconsider justified an extension of the statutory deadline for filing K.S.A. 60–1507 motions.
Analysis
Brooks argues that the district court erred by dismissing his K.S .A. 60–1507 motion as untimely. Review of the district court's decision requires this court to interpret K.S.A. 60–1507(f). Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to unlimited review. Clemons v. State, 39 Kan.App.2d 561, 563, 182 P.3d 730, rev. denied 286 Kan. 1176 (2008).
A defendant has 1 year from the date his or her conviction becomes final to file a motion under K.S.A. 60–1507(a). K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(1). Litigants seeking relief under K.S.A. 60–1507 did not always face this 1–year deadline. It became effective on July 1, 2003, due to a statutory amendment by the legislature. The Kansas Supreme Court later found that anyone who had a claim that existed before July 1, 2003, had until June 30, 2004, to file a K.S.A. 60–1507 motion. Pabst v. State, 287 Kan. 1, 22, 192 P.3d 630 (2008).
Because Brooks' conviction became final prior to 2003, his deadline to file a K.S.A. 60–1507 motion was June 30, 2004. He did not file his motion until November 29, 2012. Therefore, it was clearly untimely. The 1–year time limitation may only be extended by the district court to prevent a manifest injustice. K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(2). “Manifest injustice” has been interpreted to mean “ ‘obviously unfair” ’ or “ ‘shocking to the conscience.’ “ State v. Kelly, 291 Kan. 868, 873, 248 P.3d 1282 (2011). Courts analyze manifest injustice claims under the totality of the circumstances. Our Supreme Court has identified the following nonexclusive list of factors that a court should consider when determining whether to extend the filing deadline:
“whether (1) the movant provides persuasive reasons or circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the 60–1507 motion within the 1–year time limitation; (2) the merits of the movant's claim raise substantial issues of law or fact deserving of the district court's consideration; and (3) the movant sets forth a colorable claim of actual innocence, i.e., factual, not legal, innocence.” Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 616, 325 P.3d 1114 (2014).
In support of his argument that the deadline should have been extended to prevent a manifest injustice, Brooks relies on Vontress to assert that (1) there were persuasive reasons that prevented him from filing a timely motion and (2) he successfully set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence, i.e., factual, not legal, innocence. See 299 Kan. at 616.
1. Prevented from filing a timely motion
Brooks claims that he failed to file his K.S.A. 60–1507 motion earlier because his attorney told him that there was nothing Brooks could do about his convictions other than file a direct appeal. He asserts that he did not learn that he could file a motion for writ of habeas corpus until October 2012. But the evidentiary record in this case contradicts Brooks' claim that he did not know he could seek postconviction relief under K.S.A. 60–1507. Brooks filed his first motion for transcripts on January 31, 1985, approximately 2 years after he was sentenced. In this motion, Brooks asserted that he needed the transcripts because they would provide a basis for postconviction relief. In a later court filing, Brooks specifically referenced a K.S.A. 60–1507 motion that he allegedly filed in August 1993. Although there is no other information regarding this K.S.A. 60–1507 motion in the record, the fact that he referenced such a motion necessarily means that Brooks was aware he could seek postconviction relief under K.S.A. 60–1507. Yet, he filed his K.S.A. 60–1507 motion 29 years after he was sentenced and 8 years after the statutory 1–year deadline for filing such motions became effective.
This court has previously noted that by enacting the 1–year time limitation, the legislature intended to promote an efficient judicial system by preventing stale claims from being raised years after the resolution of a criminal case. Baker v. State, 42 Kan.App.2d 949, 953, 219 P.3d 827 (2009). Given the substantial amount of time since Brooks' convictions became final, this reasoning is particularly persuasive here. Brooks' claim that he was unaware of K.S.A. 60–1507 prior to October 2012 does not constitute a manifest injustice that would warrant the extension of the 1–year time limitation found in K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(1).
2. Actual innocence
Next, Brooks contends his claim of factual innocence readily establishes that it was necessary for the district court to extend the deadline in order to prevent a manifest injustice. In support of his claim of innocence, Brooks alleges “that he did not commit the crimes he was unlawfully convicted of [,] based on the fact that the victim, eyewitnesses and investigation officer stated that Michael Lee Brooks is innocent.” Specifically, Brooks states that “the victim [ ], eyewitnesses Cathy Elser, Marion Toland, and the Investigation Officer” all testified at trial that “Michael Brooks the defendant is innocent.” Because there is no transcript in the record on appeal, Brooks relies solely on his memory of the court proceedings to support his allegation that several witnesses testified to his innocence. But the district court noted in a ruling denying Brooks' request for a transcript about 2 years after sentencing that Brooks previously sent a letter to the trial judge confessing that he had, in fact, committed the crimes for which he was convicted. We conclude that Brooks' claim of factual innocence is not supported by the record.
For the first time on appeal, Brooks alleges that we should not reject his claim of manifest injustice based on a failure to provide a trial transcript to support his claim of innocence because he attempted in good faith to obtain the trial transcripts on several occasions but was not successful. Despite withdrawing his direct appeal, Brooks filed a motion asking the district court to provide him transcripts free of charge. As noted in the preceding section, this motion was filed on January 31, 1985, approximately 2 years after Brooks was sentenced. As also noted above, Brooks asserted that he needed the transcripts because they would provide a basis for postconviction relief. The district court ultimately denied the motion, however, because Brooks failed to pursue a direct appeal, the transcripts had not been created for any other purpose and, after trial, Brooks sent a letter to the trial judge confessing that he had, in fact, committed the crimes in question. Because Brooks does not allege the district court erred in denying his 1985 request for transcripts, we find no reason to relieve Brooks of his duty to designate a record on appeal sufficient to establish the claimed error. See State v. Walters, 284 Kan. 1, 15, 159 P.3d 174 (2007) (litigant claiming district court erred has duty to designate record on appeal that is sufficient to support finding of error).
Affirmed.