Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-11337 No. 6124
12-10-2014
ALPHONSO D. BROOKS, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: David Seid, Assistant Public Defender, Juneau, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Aesha Pallesen, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 3AN-10-12641 CI t/w 3AN-03-2862 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Michael L. Wolverton, Judge. Appearances: David Seid, Assistant Public Defender, Juneau, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Aesha Pallesen, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Hanley, District Court Judge. Judge HANLEY.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d).
In March 2003, Alphonso D. Brooks shot William Gaines, resulting in Gaines being paralyzed. Brooks pleaded guilty to attempted murder in the first degree and assault in the third degree and was sentenced to a composite term of 55 years with 35 years suspended (20 years to serve).
AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A); AS 11.31.100.
AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A).
After serving about 6½ years of his sentence, Brooks filed an application for discretionary parole. A probation officer submitted a progress report to the Alaska Parole Board and recommended that the board deny Brooks' application. The parole board held a hearing and denied Brooks' request, concluding that releasing Brooks on parole would "diminish the seriousness of the offense" and that Brooks continued to pose a significant risk to the public. Brooks filed a motion for reconsideration, which the board also denied.
Pursuant to Alaska Criminal Rule 35.1(a)(5), Brooks filed an application for post-conviction relief challenging the board's denial of his discretionary parole. In his application, Brooks claimed that: (1) the parole board erred when it denied his request for discretionary parole; (2) the parole board denied him due process during the application and hearing process; (3) the parole board, when deciding his parole request, relied on inaccurate information and did not allow Brooks to present favorable, accurate information; and (4) he was not afforded the assistance of a lawyer to help him argue for discretionary release.
The State filed a motion to dismiss Brooks' application on the pleadings. Superior Court Judge Michael L. Wolverton, without explanation, issued an order granting the State's motion. Brooks appeals the superior court's order.
To resolve the State's claim that Brooks' application should be dismissed on the pleadings, the superior court was required to decide whether Brooks' assertions of fact, if ultimately proved, would entitle him to relief from the parole board's decision. In its order, the superior court concluded that Brooks had not set forth a prima facie case for relief, but the court did not explain how it reached its conclusion. That is, the court did not indicate whether Brooks failed to adequately plead assertions of fact, or whether his well-pleaded facts were insufficient, even if proved, to entitle him to relief.
LaBrake v. State, 152 P.3d 474, 480 (Alaska App. 2007).
Brooks also asserted in his application that he was indigent and was entitled to the assistance of counsel at his discretionary parole hearing. The State has not disputed Brooks' assertion that he satisfied the income requirements to be eligible for a court-appointed attorney and that he was not represented by an attorney at his discretionary parole hearing. Instead, as a legal matter, the State argues that there is no right to appointed counsel during the discretionary parole process in Alaska. Given that the State did not dispute Brooks' factual assertions, Brooks raised a legal question that was properly before the superior court for a ruling. However, given the court's general dismissal of Brooks' application, it is not clear that the court resolved this claim.
A trial court's conclusions of law generally must be sufficiently explained to permit meaningful appellate review. Because the superior court's order in this case provides no explanation of its conclusion that Brooks failed to set forth a prima facie claim for relief, we cannot meaningfully evaluate the superior court's decision.
See State v. Schmidt, 323 P.3d 647, 668 (Alaska 2014); Hanlon v. Hanlon, 871 P.2d 229, 233 (Alaska 1994).
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We therefore VACATE the superior court's order denying Brooks' application for post-conviction relief and REMAND the case. Within sixty days the superior court shall review Brooks' amended application for post-conviction relief, the State's motion to dismiss the application, and the pleadings associated with the motion and rule on the motion.
If the court again issues a final order granting the State's motion, the court shall explain its decision. Brooks shall have thirty days from the date the trial court's order is distributed to file a supplemental brief to this Court. The State shall have thirty days after Brooks files his brief to file its supplemental brief. Brooks may file a supplemental reply brief twenty days after the State files its brief. We will then resume consideration of this case.
If, however, the superior court concludes that further litigation is required to resolve Brooks' application and rescinds its order dismissing the application, it is to notify this Court, and we will close this case.
We retain jurisdiction of this appeal.