Messrs Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., Joseph C. Coleman,Dep. Atty. Gen., and Paul S. League, Staff Atty., of Columbia, for Appellants, cite: As to the County Court ofRichland County not having jurisdiction of a case againstthe State to which the State has not considered: 234 S.C. 428; 190 S.C. 379, 3 S.E.2d 42; 180 S.C. 329, 185 S.E. 490; Section 46-344, South Carolina Code of Laws, 1962, as amended; 166 S.C. 481, 165 S.E. 197; Sections 2001 et seq., South Carolina Code of Laws, 1962; 253 S.C. 76, 78, 169 S.E.2d 148. Daniel A. Speights, Esq., of Glenn, Porter and Sullivan, Columbia, for Respondent, cites: As to the doctrine of sovereignimmunity not being applicable to the instant suit: S.C. Code § 46-344 (Supp.

Joseph W. Cabaniss, Esq., of Grimball Cabaniss, Charleston, for Respondents, cites: As to the Court's properlyruling on Defendant's demurrer: 61 Am. Jur.2d Sec. 242; 5 Am. Jur.2d Appeal and Error, Sec. 799. Asto the Court's not having erred in ruling that the complaintdid not set forth facts supporting on inference of bad faith: 197 S.E.2d 659; 116 S.C. 77, 106 S.E. 855; 249 S.C. 592, 155 S.E.2d 591; 15 South Carolina Digest, Pleadings, Sec. 214(4); 104 S.C. 311, 88 S.E. 565; 188 S.C. 14, 198 S.E. 425. As to the Court's not having erred inholding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity applied inan action for wrongful death brought against a countyschool board and school officers in their official capacity: 57 Am. Jur.2d Municipal School and State Tort Liability; 188 So.2d 508; 51 N.J. 230, 238 A.2d 685; 219 Cal.App. 542, 33 Cal.Rptr. 333; 190 S.C. 379, 3 S.E.2d 42. April 3, 1974.

July 31, 1961. Harold W. Funderburk, Esq., of Camden, for Appellant, cites: As to a husband or wife not having a cause of actionfor damages and loss of consortium when the other partyhas suffered an injury resulting from an alleged defect in astreet: 234 S.C. 428, 108 S.E.2d 825; 227 S.C. 458, 88 S.E.2d 617; 190 S.C. 379, 3 S.E.2d 42; 167 S.C. 231, 166 S.E. 120. Messrs.

The appellant also contends because the City of Florence and National Surety Corporation entered into a bond "for the use and benefit of the police department" such constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity up to the amount of the bond. In the case of Brooks v. One Motor Bus, 190 S.C. 379, 3 S.E.2d 42, 43, this Court said: "As we understand the rule relating to the immunities attaching to sovereignty, such attributes are never to be considered as waived or surrendered by any inference or implication.

6; 82 Ct. C1. 1, 299 U.S. 545, 57 S.Ct. 113, 81 L.Ed. 457; 229 U.S. 53, 33 S.Ct. 667, 57 L.Ed. 1063; 324 U.S. 499, 65 S.Ct. 761, 89 L.Ed. 1101; 308 U.S. 271, 60 S.Ct. 231, 84 L.Ed. 240; 264 U.S. 146, 44 S.Ct. 264; 230 U.S. 1, 33 S.Ct. 1011, 57 L.Ed. 1363; 74 F.2d 112; 312 U.S. 592, 61 S.Ct. 772, 85 L.Ed. 409; 240 U.S. 572, 36 S.Ct. 422, 60 L.Ed. 808; 113 F.2d 387; 192 U.S. 217, 24 S.Ct. 238, 48 L.Ed. 414; 46 F.2d 798; 309 U.S. 18, 60 S. Ct. 413, 84 L.Ed. 554; 107 U.S. 678, 2 S.Ct. 185, 27 L.Ed. 442; 99 U.S. 635, 25 L.Ed. 336; 201 U.S. 506, 26 S.Ct. 518, 50 L.Ed. 845; 165 Va. 538, 178 S.E. 48; 165 Va. 552, 178 S.E. 44, 298 U.S. 674, 56 S.Ct. 942, 80 L.Ed. 1396; 20 How. 84, 15 L.Ed. 816; Nichols on Eminent Domain, 2d, Vol. 1, p. 432, Sec. 143; 95 S.C. 268, 78 S.E. 980; 27 S.C. 137, 3 S.E. 55; 112 S.C. 528, 538, 100 S.E. 355, 358; 90 S.C. 568, 74 S.E. 26. As to theliability of the Authority being limited to just compensationfor a "taking", if any: 24 S.C. 543; 181 S.C. 453, 187 S.E. 921; 190 S.C. 379, 3 S.E.2d 42; 42 S.C. 17, 19 S.E. 1018; 25 S.C. 416, 1 S.E. 141; 178 S.C. 504, 183 S.E. 311; 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842. Asto allegations of negligence being neither necessary norproper allegations in an action for a taking without just compensation: 165 S.C. 120, 163 S.E. 137; 178 S.C. 504, 183 S.E. 311, 316; 205 S.C. 258, 31 S.E.2d 451; 211 S.C. 17, 43 S.E.2d 615. As to there being no liability onthe Authority for exemplary or punitive damages: 71 S.C. 340, 51 S.E. 121; 178 S.C. 47, 182 S.E. 101; 115 S.C. 489, 106 S.E. 780; 117 S.C. 1, 108 S.E. 181; 217 U.S. 189, 30 S.Ct. 459, 54 L.Ed. 725; 229 U.S. 53, 33 S.Ct. 667, 57 L.Ed. 1063.

Messrs. Odom Bostick and Johnson, Johnson Foster, all of Spartanburg, for Respondent, cite: As to CountyBoard having the authority, and it being its duty, to pay ajudgment against the County, if there are surplus funds inthe treasury: 190 S.C. 379, 3 S.E.2d 42; 35 Am. Jur. 19, Sec. 245; 34 Am. Jur. 950, Sec. 176; 195 S.E. 843; 10 S.E.2d 359. As to the judgment being, in legal effect,a contract: 131 S.E. 769; 34 C.J. 133, Sec. 142. Asto the contract being legally enforceable: 147 S.C. 433.

50. Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940). 51. Brooks v. One Motor Bus, Etc., 190 S.C. 379, 3 S.E.2d 42 (1939). 52. Home Building Loan Ass'n v. City of Spartanburg, 185 S.C. 353, 194 S.E. 143 (1937).

tate HighwayDept., 264 S.C. 369, 215 S.E.2d 430 (1975); Truesdale v. S.C.Highway Dept., 264 S.C. 221, 213 S.E.2d 740 (1975); Belton v. Richland Memorial Hospital, 263 S.C. 446, 211 S.E.2d 241 (1975); Harrison v. S.C. Tax Commission, 261 S.C. 302, 199 S.E.2d 763 (1973); Division of General Services v.Ulmer, 256 S.C. 523, 183 S.E.2d 315 (1971); ElmwoodCemetery Association v. Wasson, et al., 253 S.C. 76, 169 S.E.2d 148 (1969); Vance v. S.C. Tax Commission, 249 S.C. 214, 153 S.E.2d 841 (1967); Campbell v. S.C. State Highway Dept., 244 S.C. 186, 135 S.E.2d 838 (1964); Jones v. Jones, 243 S.C. 600, 135 S.E.2d 233 (1964); Brazell v. City of Camden, 238 S.C. 580, 121 S.E.2d 221 (1961); Hinson v. A.T. SistareConstruction Co., 236 S.C. 125, 113 S.E.2d 341 (1960); RiceHope Plantation v. S.C. Public Service Authority, 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950); Sanders v. State Highway Dept., 212 S.C. 224, 47 S.E.2d 306 (1948); Bell v. S.C. State HighwayDept., 204 S.C. 462, 30 S.E.2d 65 (1944); Brooks v. OneMotor Bus, 190 S.C. 379, 3 S.E.2d 42 (1939); Owens v.State Highway Dept., 165 S.C. 180, 163 S.E. 473 (1932); Ouztsv. State Highway Dept., 161 S.C. 21, 159 S.E. 457 (1931); Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dept., 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1931); U.S. Casualty Co. v. State Highway Dept. ofS.C., 155 S.C. 77, 151 S.E. 887 (1930); Columbia Water PowerCo. v. Columbia Electric Street Railway, Light Power Co., 43 S.C. 154, 20 S.E. 1002 (1895); Ex parte Dunn, 8 S.C. 207 (1875).

May 3, 1977.Ney B. Steele, Esq., of Chesterfield, for Appellants, cites: As to the sewer system of Windsor Park Subdivision beingprivate property on a private subdivision: 237 S.C. 144, 116 S.E.2d 13; 240 S.C. 426, 126 S.E.2d 360; 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, Sec. 40, et sequa.; 190 S.C. 399, 3 S.E.2d 42; 243 S.C. 544, 134 S.E.2d 744; 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280. As to the Circuit Judge'shaving erred in not finding and holding that the Complaintalleged no positive, overt, aggressive act on the part of theAppellants, and in not finding and holding that private propertycannot be taken for public use in a negative sense by thefailure to act: 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E.2d 704; 251 S.C. 220, 161 S.E.2d 815. As to the damages complainedof by the Respondents being at most temporary damagesand not permanent: 247 S.C. 232, 146 S.E.2d 863. As to error in not finding and holding that the temporaryimpairment of property values is not a taking of privateproperty but at most a tort: 258 S.C. 206, 188 S.E.2d 188; Public Works Eminent Domain Act, S.C. Code 25-101 to 25-154, by Section 25-139; 239 S.C. 1, 121 S.E.2d 236; 242 S.C. 357, 131 S.E.2d 44; 242 S.C. 397, 131 S.E.2d 257. Messrs. Sanders Quackenbush, of Columbia, and Charles G. Vaughan, Jr., of Bennettsville, for Respondents, cite: As to the activi

Fletcher C. Mann and Joseph E. Major, of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd Mann, Greenville, and Charles Spencer, of Spencer Spencer, Rock Hill, for Respondent, cite: As to the Lancaster County Natural GasAuthority, a quasi Municipal Corporation and an agencyof the State, sharing in its sovereign immunity from actionsagainst it ex delicto: Section 1 of Act No. 879 of the 1954 Acts of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina; 226 S.C. 442, 85 S.E.2d 716; 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645; 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132; 143 S.C. 178, 141 S.E. 274; 221 S.C. 417, 71 S.E.2d 7. As to the power to "sue and be sued" given tothe Respondent in Act No. 879 of the 1954 Acts of theGeneral Assembly of the State of South Carolina not beinga clear and express waiver of the Bar against bringing anaction ex delicto against the Respondent as an agent of theState: 238 S.C. 580, 121 S.E.2d 221; 262 S.C. 314, 204 S.E.2d 384; 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132; 169 S.C. 191, 168 S.E. 391; 190 S.C. 379, 3 S.E.2d 42; 263 S.C. 446, 211 S.E.2d 241; 243 S.C. 421, 134 S.E.2d 247. March 16, 1976.