Brooks v. Kerry

22 Citing cases

  1. Humane Soc'y Int'l v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.

    Civil Action No. 16-720 (TJK) (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2021)   Cited 3 times

    "Rule 56 clearly contemplates the submission of declarations in support of summary judgment." Brooks v. Kerry, 37 F. Supp. 3d 187, 203 (D.D.C. 2014). But such declarations "must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated."

  2. Guillen-Perez v. Dist. of Columbia

    415 F. Supp. 3d 50 (D.D.C. 2019)   Cited 7 times
    Scheduling decisions, increased scrutiny, and verbal criticism

    See Pl. Opp., Exh. 5. Guillen's mere speculation about Warrick's awareness of her filing an EEOC charge is thus insufficient "to contradict [Warrick's] statement that [s]he did not know that ... the plaintiff was engaged in EEO-protected activity before [s]he made h[er] non-renewal decision." Brooks v. Kerry, 37 F. Supp. 3d 187, 211 (D.D.C. 2014). Guillen has thus failed to meet her burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to her EEOC charge.

  3. Toomer v. Austin

    No. 20-5184 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2022)   Cited 3 times

    Unfortunately, this misunderstanding remains common despite our clarification in Johnson, in part due to continued reliance on preJohnson decisions. See, e.g., Phillips v. Spencer, 390 F.Supp.3d 136, 170 (D.D.C. 2019); Jangjoo v. Sieg, 319 F.Supp.3d 207, 223 (D.D.C. 2018); see also Brooks v. Kerry, 37 F.Supp.3d 187, 210 n.12 (D.D.C. 2014) (collecting preJohnson cases holding "self-serving" testimony insufficient to survive summary judgment). We are nevertheless satisfied that this error was immaterial because the district court made clear that the "self-serving" nature of Toomer's testimony was merely an alternative basis for its decisions.

  4. Standley v. Edmonds-Leach

    783 F.3d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2015)   Cited 17 times
    Explaining that the term "solely" modifying the word "impeachment" is to be interpreted strictly

    The First Circuit in Klonoski, 156 F.3d at 270 (citing Chiasson, 988 F.2d at 517–18), and other courts, have taken the same approach. See Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 877 (10th Cir.2001); Brooks v. Kerry, 37 F.Supp.3d 187, 204–05 (D.D.C.2014); Newsome v. Penske Truck Leasing Corp., 437 F.Supp.2d 431, 434–36 (D.Md.2006). Likewise, in Wilson v. AM General Corp., 167 F.3d 1114, 1122 (7th Cir.1999), the Seventh Circuit concluded that because the testimony of witnesses offered to impeach was a part of the defendant's “primary line of defense,” the witnesses should have been disclosed prior to trial and their testimony was properly excluded.

  5. The Intercollegiate Women's Lacrosse Coaches Ass'n v. Corrigan Sports Enters.

    694 F. Supp. 3d 625 (M.D.N.C. 2023)   Cited 3 times

    But this misunderstands the nature of "surprise" in this context, which comes not from learning the declarants' identities, but from learning that the opposing party intends to use those declarants in support of its version of the facts. See Brooks v. Kerry, 37 F. Supp. 3d 187, 205 (D.D.C. 2014) (rejecting argument that defendant's familiarity with declarant negated surprise, and explaining that surprise comes from learning that opposing party is using declarant to support its case), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. Perez, 823 F.3d 701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2016). IWLCA's other argument — that the late-breaking declarations corroborate what is established in other deposition testimony and otherwise support

  6. Ulysse v. Stokes

    Civil Action 1:19-cv-01465 (CJN) (D.D.C. Sep. 30, 2021)   Cited 1 times

    See Brooks v. Kerry, 37 F.Supp.3d 187, 206 (D.D.C. 2014). She also asserts that allowing the witnesses to testify without first permitting an opportunity to depose them would be prejudicial.

  7. Smith v. Blinken

    Civil Action 1:18-cv-03065 (CJN) (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2021)   Cited 1 times

    In addition to denying the State Department's motion for summary judgment, this Court also denies the State Department's alternative motion to dismiss. Tyson v. Brennan, 306 F.Supp.3d 365, 369 (D.D.C. 2017); Brooks v. Kerry, 37 F.Supp.3d 187, 199 (D.D.C. 2014). For clarity's sake, this memorandum opinion will refer to the State Department's motion as a motion for summary judgment. I. Background

  8. Borough of Edgewater v. Waterside Constr., LLC

    Civil Action No. 14-5060 (D.N.J. Jun. 30, 2021)

    Waterside SOMF ¶¶ 94, 96, 97. A court deciding a motion for summary judgment is not required to accept unsupported, self-serving testimony as evidence sufficient to create a jury question. Hammonds v. Collins, Civ. No. 12-236, 2016 WL 1621986, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2016) (citing Brooks v. Am. Broad. Co., 999 F.2d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 1993)); see also Brooks v. Kerry, 37 F. Supp. 3d 187, 210 (D.D.C. 2014) (non-movant "cannot defeat a summary judgment motion on the basis of such self-serving testimony alone."). As affirmative proof, Edgewater indicates that North River paid $8 million for the Alcoa Property and its structures.

  9. Borough of Edgewater v. Waterside Construction, LLC

    Civil Action 14-5060 (D.N.J. Jun. 30, 2021)

    Waterside SOMF ¶¶ 94, 96, 97. A court deciding a motion for summary judgment is not required to accept unsupported, self-serving testimony as evidence sufficient to create a jury question. Hammonds v. Collins, Civ. No. 12-236, 2016 WL 1621986, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2016) (citing Brooks v. Am. Broad. Co., 999 F.2d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 1993)); see also Brooks v. Kerry, 37 F. Supp. 3d 187, 210 (D.D.C. 2014) (non-movant “cannot defeat a summary judgment motion on the basis of such self-serving testimony alone.”). As affirmative proof, Edgewater indicates that North River paid $8 million for the Alcoa Property and its structures.

  10. Crabtree v. Miller Pipeline, LLC

    Case No. 1:19-cv-01596 (TNM) (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2021)

    The Court will accordingly deny Miller's motion. See Brooks v. Kerry, 37 F. Supp. 3d 187, 202 (D.D.C. 2014) ("The decision to grant or deny a motion to strike is vested in the trial judge's sound discretion." (cleaned up)).