Opinion
Civil Action 2:21-cv-01228 ECF 29 34
03-02-2023
SAMUEL L. BROOKS., Plaintiff, v. ORLANDO L. HARPER, Warden of Allegheny County Jail, LAURA K. WILLIAMS, Chief Deputy Warden of Healthcare Services, DAVID ZETWO, Chief Deputy Warden, JASON BEASOM, Deputy Warden, COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, SERGEANT RAIBLE, OFFICER TUCKER and TRINITY SERVICES GROUP Defendants.
Judge Cathy Bissoon
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON CORRECTION DEFENDANTS' AND TRINITY SERVICES GROUP'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS
LISA PUPO LENIHAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 29) filed by Defendants Allegheny County; Warden Harper; Deputy Wardens Williams, Zetwo and Beasom; Sergeant Raible and Officer Tucker (“Corrections Defendants”) be GRANTED. It is further recommended that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed by Defendant Trinity Services Group (“Trinity”) (ECF No. 34) be GRANTED.
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Samuel L. Brooks (“Plaintiff”), at all relevant times a pre-trial detainee housed at the Allegheny County Jail (“ACJ”), commenced the present civil rights action, per 18 U.S.C. § 1983, by the filing of a Complaint through his legal counsel on September 10, 2021. ECF No. 1. The Court initially granted the Correction Defendants' Motion to Dismiss claims against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities with prejudice (ECF No. 8) and Plaintiff was given leave to amend. ECF No. 23 adopted by Order at ECF No. 26. Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint in June, 2022. ECF No. 28. The Correction Defendants and Trinity, a Florida corporation and Allegheny County's food service provider, both filed Motions to Dismiss, which have been fully briefed by the parties and are now ripe for review.
The Court notes that, to the extent the Amended Complaint appears to reincorporate claims against the Individual Defendants in their official as well as individual capacities, Plaintiff is referred to the Court's prior filings at ECF No. 23 and 26.
See ECF No. 28; ECF No. 30 at 2.
On the morning of September 15, 2019, Plaintiff alleges that he was in his Pod eating oatmeal from his food tray, which had been prepared by Defendant Trinity. ECF No. 28 at 6. Plaintiff bit into a bag containing “what was believed to be a poisonous substance.” ECF No. 28 at 1, 6. Corrections Officer Tucker was present at the time. Id. Plaintiff spat the bag onto the floor. Id. Tucker picked up the bag and put it on his desk. Id. He did not immediately call authorities or send it off for testing. Id. Plaintiff “immediately became lightheaded, his head was spinning, his mouth became numb,” and he requested medical assistance. Id. at 7. Tucker replied that the nurse was on another unit, and he would need to wait. When the nurse arrived, she ignored [Plaintiff]'s medical complaints and left.” Id. at 7.
This was previously described by Plaintiff as “a substance which apparently was or included cocaine”, presumably in consideration of his positive test for cocaine metabolites (see infra). ECF No. 1. Plaintiff's revised allegation is in accordance with his revised theory of the case, i.e., from one of his consumption of cocaine not intended for him but being smuggled through the prison food service, to include his being the intended target of a “poisoning” by possible other unidentified substance contained in his breakfast tray. ECF No. 28. As the Corrections Officers observe the fact that the substance was ““bagged' denotes it was intended to be delivered intact, and not dissolved in the fluid emulsion of a bowl [of] oatmeal” making it more likely that said bowl of oatmeal was “intend[ed to] be received by someone other than” Plaintiff. ECF No. 30 at 12.
Plaintiff then sat down on a chair, and lost consciousness. Id. at 7. Plaintiff alleges that during this time, he also convulsed, vomited, bled, and lost control of his bladder and bowel. According to an unidentified inmate, medical staff arrived 15-20 minutes later and removed Plaintiff by stretcher. Id. at 7. Defendants Raible and Beason, together with five individuals not parties to this litigation, arrived at the unit. Id. at 7. Sergeant Raible allegedly “confiscated . . . and destroyed” the baggie containing the foreign substance to preempt internal or external investigation. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff identifies no basis for this assertion of facts occurring while he was unconscious nor his attribution of malevolent intent. He also asserts that other inmates cleaned and disinfected the area and that his food tray was returned to Trinity's food service processing, cleaning and reuse, which Plaintiff avers without explanation placed other confinees “at substantial risk.” Id. at 7.
Plaintiff woke up in the medical unit covered in vomit, urine, and blood. Id. at 8. The “medical unit” prescribed Tylenol and discharged him back to his prison unit that same day. Id. Plaintiff alleges that a nurse told him that there were cocaine metabolites in his system. Id. at 9. Plaintiff demanded more answers and refused to return to his unit. Id. Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs and taken to Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU). Id. Plaintiff further alleges that he was denied a shower and continued to vomit and to vomit blood through September 16, 2019. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he “did not receive proper medical care and his request for [outside] hospital treatment was denied” because Defendants wished to “escape any liability.” Id. at 1-2.
While Plaintiff was in RHU, he was visited by Dr. Park, who gave him an unknown medication and, in response to his statement that he felt unsafe eating prison food, gave him bottles of Ensure. She denied his request for outside medical care, stating that the ACJ would not let her take him there. Plaintiff protests he was thus denied the basic human need of food. Id. at 9; see also id. at 11.
Plaintiff's averment is that Dr. Park attended and assessed Plaintiff and provided the treatment of medication and Ensure. He does not aver an interval or communication in which any assessment of a need for additional medical care might have been countermanded by ACJ. Moreover, to the extent Dr. Park's alleged statement reflects a statement of background medical treatment protocols such as those guiding transfer of a detainee for medical treatment beyond that available on site, Plaintiff's other factual averments do not call them into question. At bottom, he avers denial of transfer to outside medical care by a treating physician who assessed his current medical need as addressable with Tylenol.
Cf. id. at 2, 11 (attesting that in addition to the Ensure provided, while refusing his food trays, Plaintiff spent significant monies to purchase cafeteria/prison commissary food to meet “a portion of his daily nutritional needs”).
Plaintiff feared “additional instances . . . of poisoning” and so while in the RHU filed grievances asking for a secure food tray. Defendant Zetwo removed Plaintiff from the RHU on September 18th, i.e., on the third day following the incident. ECF No. 28 at 2, 8. See also ECF No. 28-1 (Defendant Williams' September 19, 2019 reply to Plaintiff's Inmate Request of September 17th - indicating that he believed he had eaten from “a breakfast tray that had drugs in it,” and confirming that Plaintiff's “urine test was positive for cocaine”, he had been assessed by a physician who made treatment recommendations, and he had been removed from restricted housing (“IC”)). Cf. ECF No. 28 at 14 (complaining that Williams did not “advise Brooks she would investigate the matter”).
Barring other consumption of cocaine by Plaintiff, this result as officially communicated by the Deputy Warden strongly suggests that the bag contained cocaine. Plaintiff further attests that a medical nurse advised him “that more was found” but “never once advised [him] what was found.” ECF No. 28 at 9.
Plaintiff was subsequently subjected to unfair and retaliatory treatment and harassment by “prison staff”, including the “failure to investigate”, denial of medical treatment (those repeatedly specified are recurring stomach pain and headaches while declining food trays) or “safe and secure” food accommodations, withholding of his mail, disparaging remarks and rumors, false disciplinary action, improper disposal of personal property, denial of showers/basic hygiene, denial of request to be returned to a shared cell with his Uncle, moving him “from pod to pod”, failure to allow him to “write-up meal refusals” and breaking protocol regarding his “food strike”, non-responsiveness to his requests/grievances, and impeding his access to the court system by improper disposal of his “legal effects”. On October 15, Plaintiff filed another Complaint that he had not yet been provided with a secure food tray. In meeting with Defendant Warden Harper on November 13th, Harper advised Plaintiff he had not received his requests or grievances because they were not important. ECF No. 28 at 2-3, 10-11, 13 (asserting some of these mistreatments by “prison staff” or “jail staff”).
The Amended Complaint removes prior allegations specifying false “write up” for being out of his cell and attempt(s) to draw Plaintiff into fights. It does, however, assert that Plaintiff was subject to “intimidation”. Id. at 23.
Plaintiff avers “specifically” only that he grieved being denied a secure food tray from September 15th through 23rd. Id. at 10.
In addition, between October 17th and mid-December, Plaintiff filed “dozens of grievances” complaining of incidents regarding Corrections Officers Arlotta, LaFeuer, Rush, Young and an unnamed individual who made personal attacks/disparaging remarks or accosted him, fabricated stories, denied his requests for housing with his Uncle or a shower for two intervals of 3-4 days, requested to search him and improperly disposed of his food and legal documents, labeled him a “snitch” and thus placed him in imminent peril, threated to send him to RHU, or failed to take action on his behalf. Id. at 11-12. His reporting of the incidents “to ACJ staff” was ignored or retaliated against, and for reporting of his “headaches and stomach pains” to the medical department he was “prescribed minimal doses of Tylenol or was told he needed to purchase medications from the commissary.” Beasom, Raible (and Officer Young) and others failed to investigate his complaints. The internal evidence - substance, food tray, reports, requests, complaints and grievances - were allegedly disappeared. And the failure to write reports of the September 15th incident, Plaintiff's placement in RHU, denial of outside medical care and subsequent harassment were a concerted effort, including by the institution, to cover up the incident. Id. at 13-16. Each of the Defendants failed to investigate the cover-up of drug smuggling or boot-legging of which they had knowledge. Id. at 19-20.
Referred to as a “pod shakedown” by Plaintiff, this occurred during an ACJ “pod-wide cell search for contraband”. ECF No. 30 at 3.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint further attests generally to the Corrections Defendants' failures to act or respond in accord with Plaintiff's demands, and to unspecified Defendants' generalized wrongful conduct regarding the various matters complained of. The above summation reflects, however, Plaintiff's specific factual allegations as to the actions/inactions attributed to and asserted against the Defendants. See also ECF No. 30 at 5-6 (concise summation of allegations against each Corrections Officer Defendant).
Plaintiff states broad attestations that ACJ and its staff have an official policy of “cover[ing] up incidents of serious misconduct, abuse, suicide and lack of proper medical treatment, to their pretrial detainees, inmates and prisoners.” ECF No. 28 at 8. He later generally alleges that ACJ employees “cover-up excessive force, beatings, .. poisonings, destruction of personal property . . . [and] harassment.” And that the “unfair treatments” complained of were the jail staff's “concerted efforts” to “cover up their actions” and “obstruct[] an investigation.” ECF No. 28 at 17. He further broadly and generally attests that the Defendants failed to take adequate steps to train, supervise and correct employees. Id. at 17-18. See also id. at 18-19 (listing twelve objectionable practices without correlation to facts alleged against Defendants).
Cf. ECF No. 30 at 19 (correctly noting that a “litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties”) (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991); Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 288 (3d Cir. 2002)); id. (“[P]leading that the universe of adverse events at the jail are all “covered-up” does not give rise to an additional claim that can be litigated here.”).
Cf. ECF No. 30 at 21 (noting that “[a] plaintiff pressing a § 1983 claim must identify a failure to provide specific training that has a causal nexus with their injuries and must demonstrate that the absence of that specific training can reasonably be said to reflect a deliberate indifference to whether the alleged constitutional deprivations occurred.”) (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1030 (3d Cir.1991)); id. (“[P]laintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force' behind the injury alleged”) (quoting Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997)). See also Reitz v. Cnty. of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997).
Finally, in support of his novel claims under the Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (“RICO”), Plaintiff attests that ACJ “affects and traffics in interstate commerce” through its administration of the prison facility, the Individual Corrections Defendants and/or Trinity. Id. at 6. And he baldly avers that “a similar and previous poisoning occurred at ACJ”, Defendants knew or should have known that contraband and narcotics are smuggled into the facility through Trinity, the prison food service, or other outside vendors, and they have a custom or policy to ignore it. Id. at 8.
Plaintiff brings claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Corrections Defendants as follows:
Count I for “the poisoning:” All Defendants poisoned or allowed him to be poisoned in willful and flagrant disregard of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
Count II for “deliberate indifference to medical needs:” Corrections Defendants failed to ensure he received prompt and adequate medical care in willful and flagrant disregard of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Count III for “denial of access to the Courts:” Corrections Defendants delayed/denied/were indifferent to his requests/complaints/grievances in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Court IV for “conditions of confinement:” By failing to keep the jail free from contraband and provide “poison-free” food, send Plaintiff to an emergency room, correct the conditions complained of, make a reasonable investigation, and adopt other policies and procedures, and by subjecting him to retaliation, Corrections Defendants acted with objective unreasonableness and violated his Eighth Amendment rights to basic protections.
Count V for “cover up of the poisoning:” Corrections Defendants' cover-up actions taken pursuant to an official ACJ policy violated his Fourteenth Amendment (due process) rights.
Count VI for violations of RICO and Count VII for RICO conspiracy: All Defendants committed multiple acts of a criminal nature or obstruction in corruptly allowing “tobacco, controlled substances including poisons, to be entered into the ACJ through the inmates food ordered, prepared and served by Trinity” and intentionally conspired, conducted and participated in a racketeering enterprise.
See id. at 21-27 (setting forth Counts I-VII).
Plaintiff makes blanket averments that (a) interstate commerce is affected by the purchases/procurement of nutrition, medication and mail systems and the movement of detainees, (b) the purchases of specialized prison equipment constitute interstate commerce, and thus (c) ACJ is an enterprise engaged in/whose activities affect interstate commerce. Id.
Finally, in support of his negligence claim against Defendant Trinity at Count VIII, Plaintiff asserts (with no other grounding factual allegations as to Trinity) that it acted negligently by “allowing a practice of drug importation to inmates by and through their food services and/or (2) distributing poisoned food to Plaintiff” and in other unspecified ways by its employment, supervision and other policies and practices. Id. at 27-28.
Other than his claim of negligence against Trinity, Plaintiff brings no Count for state tort law claims, e.g., infliction of mental and emotional distress. Cf. id. at 3.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive and RICO treble damages as well as declaratory relief. Id. at 28-29. The Court notes here, similarly to its prior Report and Recommendation, that Plaintiff's claims are fundamentally premised on Defendants' alleged (a) creation/allowance of a dangerous condition caused by illegal substance distribution and (b) failures to provide a contraband free and “poison free” food environment, to investigate, or to adopt/correct policies or procedures and negligence as to Trinity. It also notes that strident characterizations, generalized non-party allegations, and allegations clearly insufficient to the Constitutional violation alleged, cannot substitute for plausible factual foundations for claims against the Defendants. Plaintiff's alleged consequential harms include malnourishment, headaches, trauma, temporary hygiene impairments and other improper conditions of confinement, prison food anxiety, and other pain and suffering.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6): Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Although “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18 (3d Cir. 2013); Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014). When dismissing a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) in a civil rights case, the Court permits a curative amendment unless it would be inequitable or futile. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). Finally, Plaintiff is represented by legal counsel whose work product is not entitled to the other liberal constructions afforded pro se pleadings in a § 1983 action. Cf. e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003).
In addition to the complaint, courts may consider matters of public record and other matters of which a court may take judicial notice, court orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint when adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 5A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, § 1357; Chester County Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. § 1983 Requirement of “ Person Acting Under Color of State Law”
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, private citizens are afforded a means to redress violations of federal law committed by state actors. In pertinent part, § 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....Id. Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but merely a method for vindicating violations of federal law. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir.1996). To establish a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show a deprivation of a “right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States . . . by a person acting under color of state law.” Id. (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir.1995)). The pending Motions to Dismiss do not dispute that the Defendants were acting under color of law with regard to the matters alleged. See also ECF No. 49 at 7.
B. Failure to Allege Plausible Liability as to a 14th Amendment Claim Under Counts I-III or V and a 1st Amendment Claim as to Count III
In general, personal liability may be found under § 1983 on the basis of a defendant's “personal involvement” in the deprivation of a Constitutional right. Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 73 (3d Cir. 2011). That is, when a defendant plays an “affirmative part” in the alleged Constitutional violation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 677. Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 151 (3rd Cir. 2005); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). And supervisory liability may be found where a defendant in a position of authority personally participated or personally directed others in the violation of a plaintiff's rights, or knew of and acquiesced in a subordinate's unconstitutional conduct.
Supervisory liability may also attach where a defendant, with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy or procedure that directly caused constitutional harm. Dinote v. Danberg, 601 Fed.Appx. 127 (3d Cir. 2015). In this context, a plaintiff must prove that the policy or procedure created an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation; the defendant was aware of and subjectively indifferent to that unreasonable risk; and the Constitutional injury was caused by the failure to implement an appropriate policy or procedure. Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 134 (3d Cir. 2001). See also ECF No. 30 at 7-8 (discussing standards of liability, citing Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 289-90 (3d Cir. 2018)).
In other words, to establish personal liability against a defendant in a Section 1983 action, that defendant must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Personal involvement by a defendant can be shown by alleging either personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate's actions. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. See also Keenan v. Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir. 1992). Moreover, a supervisory official has no affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her subordinates. Notwithstanding, when a supervisory official knowingly permits a continuing custom or policy that results in harm to the plaintiff, 1983 liability may attach. Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 673 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989) (Colburn I). However, at a minimum such liability may be imposed "only where there are both (1) contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents, and (2) circumstances under which the supervisor's inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate." Id. (quoting Chinchello, 805 F.2d at 133). See also Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997).
To the extent Plaintiff intended to assert a claim under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) as to any Defendant, including Trinity, the Supreme Court in Monell held that a municipality (or other local government unit) may be held liable where its “policy” or “custom” is the moving force behind a constitutional violation. Id. at 694. Later, in Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989) the Supreme Court found that municipal liability may be based on supervisory officials' “failure to train” where the lack of training results in constitutional right violations. The principles announced in Monell and Canton do not apply at all, however, where the supervisory defendant is a state employee: “Although municipal officials may be subject to Section 1983 liability under Monell where their execution of a government policy or custom inflicts constitutional injury, or under the “failure to train” theory adopted in Canton, the same is not true for state officials.” Thomas v. Barkley, No. 13-0551, 2013 WL 4786124, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2013) citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Cf. also ECF No. 36 at 4.
Inmates have a constitutional right to humane conditions. See e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). A Constitutional violation occurs, however, only where the deprivation alleged is objectively sufficiently serious and the defendant official has acted with “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Id. at 825-26. Deliberate indifference is more than negligence, and is in essence acting recklessly. Moreover, to give rise to a Constitutional violation, a defendant must have been subjectively aware of the risk and disregarded it. Id. To sustain a claim, the allegations must be more than conclusory.
In addition, as Plaintiff observes, as a pretrial detainee, he is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 173 (3d Cir. 1997) (the Due Process Clause provides protections for pretrial detainees similar to those protections afforded to sentenced prisoners); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544 (1979). And the Eighth Amendment sets forth the minimum standard by which claims of pretrial detainees' rights should be evaluated. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 544 (“pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners”); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (a pretrial detainee's due process rights are said to be “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.”).
As reflected in the Factual History, and fairly recounted in the Correction Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 30, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint makes sometimes broad and conclusory allegations and fails to allege facts sufficient to ground plausible liability for a 1st or 14th Amendment Constitutional violation on the part of any Corrections Defendant, or a reasonable expectation that discovery would reveal evidence of the requisite elements. More particularly, Plaintiff alleges a 14th Amendment violation in the form of allowing and covering up his “poisoning” (Counts I and V); a 14th Amendment violation in the form of deliberate indifference to his medical needs (Count II); and a 1st and 14th Amendment violation in the form of denial of access to the courts (Count III):
“ The Poisoning”
As to Counts I and V, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint allegations are largely conclusory and speculative, and where they are not so are otherwise patently insufficient to a plausible claim that any of Defendants (including Defendant Trinity) poisoned Plaintiff or conspiratorially covered up his poisoning. See ECF No. 30 at 5-6 (listing specific factual allegations). His sweeping and unsupported allegations that Defendants “allowed” his poisoning through (a) deliberate indifference to serious risk of harm in the form of poisonous contraband, or (b) unreasonable policies/procedures, are similarly insufficient to a plausible claim. The presence of and risk of exposure to illegal drugs in prison does not in itself give rise to a Constitutional violation, and an isolated instance of Plaintiff's consumption of it in a bag in his oatmeal cannot alone sustain a claim that Defendants knew of and recklessly disregarded an unreasonable risk of such an occurrence. See ECF No. 30 at 9 (citing e.g., James v. Bartow Cty., Georgia, 2017 WL 748738, at *7 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 27, 2017) aff'd, 798 Fed.Appx. 581 (11th Cir. 2020)). Cf. ECF No. 36 at 7-8 (“isolated and random event of the presence of a foreign object [rusty paper clip] in Plaintiff's lunch” failed to state claim against correction officials or food service contractor) (citing Parrish v. Aramark Foods, 2012 WL 1118672 (April 2012)); id. at 9 (noting that Parrish Court concluded Complaint failed to state a claim of due process violation; id. at 12 ("It is not enough to generically allege an influx of drugs into the jail, Plaintiffs Complaint must also demonstrate that each individual County Defendant subjectively knew of the risk of [the inmate]'s ingesting the illegal drug from the influx.")(quoting James v. Bartow Cty., Georgia, 2017 WL 748738, at *7 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 27, 2017) affd, 798 Fed.Appx. 581 (11th Cir. 2020) (dismissing § 1983 claim that jail officials knew that the jail, jail's search procedures were inadequate and jail officials had failed to protect inmate who died of a drug overdose).
As noted supra, Plaintiff makes an entirely unparticularized assertion of one prior undated incident of involuntary consumption of an unspecified drug by an unnamed inmate.
In addition, as to the alleged conspiratorial cover-up, the Court notes that in order to set forth a § 1983 cognizable conspiracy claim, a plaintiff cannot rely on broad or conclusory allegations. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1377 (3d Cir.1992); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 366 (3d Cir.1989). The essence of a conspiracy is an agreement or concerted action between individuals. See D.R. by L.R., 972 F.2d at 1377. A plaintiff must therefore allege with particularity and present material facts which show that the purported conspirators reached some understanding or agreement or plotted, planned and conspired together to deprive plaintiff of a protected federal right. Id. Where a civil rights conspiracy is alleged, there must be specific facts in the complaint which tend to show a meeting of the minds and some type of concerted activity. Deck v. Leftridge, 771 F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir.1985). A plaintiff cannot merely rely on subjective suspicions and unsupported speculation. Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405, n. 16 (3d Cir.1991). See also Capogrosso v. Supreme Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (A conspiracy claim “must include at least a discernible factual basis to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.”). In the present case, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts whatsoever beyond his conclusory statements of conspiracy, let alone any that plausibly suggest a meeting of the minds, agreement or plan.
“ Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs”
As to Count II, asserted as a 14th Amendment violation in the form of deliberate indifference to medical needs, Plaintiff's allegations are that when Plaintiff was lightheaded with localized numbness, Tucker informed medical staff at Plaintiff's request; within 15-20 minutes Plaintiff received medical care at the incident location; was then taken to the prison medical unit and was discharged back to his unit with OTC/Tylenol for headache and Ensure the same day.Plaintiff was seen by a physician and received follow-up regarding the headaches and stomach aches Plaintiff suffered while he refused his food trays. Deputy Warden Williams responded to Plaintiff's grievance regarding the incident with information regarding the substance ingested and medical care. The Court's analysis of the inadequacy of Plaintiff's allegations to a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical need is set forth below.
Because Plaintiff refused to return to his unit, he was taken into disciplinary custody in the restricted housing unit.
As set forth in the Court's prior Report and Recommendation, the legal parameters of an 8th Amendment claim (applicable by way of Plaintiff's detainee status) are as follows:
The Supreme Court has admonished that “[n]ot every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny....” Whitney v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Rather, “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.'” Id. (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670) (ellipsis in original). The Eighth Amendment's protections include a prohibition against exhibiting deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of inmates. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To set forth a cognizable claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) a serious medical need and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Id. at 104; Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Plaintiff has “no right to choose a specific form of medical treatment,” so long as the treatment provided is reasonable. Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 138-40 (2d Cir. 2000).
Allegations of medical malpractice are also insufficient to establish a Constitutional violation. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-34 (1986) (negligence is not compensable as a Constitutional violation). And "[w]hen making a determination as to deliberate indifference, the court must focus [on] what a defendant's mental attitude actually was (or is), rather than what it should have been (or should be)." Blackstone v. Thompson, 568 Fed.Appx. 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2014).
With respect to the first requirement, a medical need is “serious” if it is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Pace v. Fauver, 479 F.Supp. 456, 458 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1981)). A medical need may be similarly “serious” if “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain results as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision of adequate medical care,” or if “denial or delay causes an inmate to suffer a life-long handicap or permanent loss.” Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347 (citations omitted).
With respect to the second requirement set forth by the Supreme Court in Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, a prison official acts with “deliberate indifference” “if he knows that [an] inmate[] face[s] a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Deliberate indifference is a subjective standard and one fundamentally different than medical negligence. It requires obduracy and wantonness that constitutes recklessness or a conscious disregard of a serious risk. Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. Deliberate indifference to a prisoner-plaintiff's serious medical needs consists of “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Pearson, 850 F.3d at 534. That denial or delay must be motivated by “non-medical factors”. Id. at 537.
Accordingly, courts have found deliberate indifference under the following combined circumstances: (1) prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment, (2) knowledge of the need for medical care is accompanied by the intentional refusal to provide it, (3) necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons, and (4) prison authorities prevent an inmate from receiving recommended treatment for serious medical needs. Id. at 538, Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347; Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993).
Prison administrators cannot be found deliberately indifferent “simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being [medically] treated ....” Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69. Rather, a non-medical prisoner official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). “[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirements of deliberate indifference.” Id.
Under the applicable standards, Plaintiff has not alleged specific factual personal acts or omissions committed by a Corrections Defendant sufficient to maintain (or suggest discovery of) a plausible 14th or 8th Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Correspondingly, he has not alleged specific facts sufficient to a supervisory liability claim that a Corrections Defendant knew or had reason to know that Plaintiff had a serious medical need that was being treated with deliberate indifference or otherwise disregarded in violation of his Constitutional protections. To the contrary, Plaintiff attests that a nurse was called, attended him, and within 15-20 minutes medical personnel attended him and he was conveyed by stretcher to the medical unit where he was assessed, treated and discharged to his unit later that day. He then received physician follow-up care - for which Tylenol and Ensure were medically-determined appropriate.
That is, Plaintiff has alleged no facts supporting or plausibly suggesting a claim that these Defendants, acting with knowledge or deliberate indifference, played an affirmative part in alleged misconduct either by (a) establishing and maintaining an identifiable policy or practice which caused Plaintiff constitutional harm, or (b) personally and knowingly participating or communicating acquiescence in a constitutional violation.
See also ECF No. 30 at 15: “Here Plaintiff alleges that as a result of his ingestion of the substance, he was immediately ill, vomited and lost consciousness. He was taken by stretcher to the medical unit [and] . . . treated by Dr. Parks and staff . . ., observed and cleared to return to his pod-which he refused. He suffered from nausea and vomited for another day. Dr. Parks saw him on the Restricted Unit, provided him more medication and when he indicated he would not eat food . . . from the kitchen, supplied him with nutritional supplements. [Plaintiff] states no other acute symptoms from the ingestion of the substance. Although he alleges he desired to go to a hospital emergency room, in essence that he disagreed with his treatment, this alone does not create a basis for a constitutional violation.” Id. at 15-16 (noting that original complaint also alleged Plaintiff was seen for follow-up on November 19 and December 3).
“ Denial of Access to the Courts”
Finally, as to Count III, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint allegations fail to state a plausible claim of denial of access to the courts under the 14th or 1st Amendments.
The United States Supreme Court has established an “actual injury” requirement in right to-court-access cases. See Lewis v. Casey, 518U.S. 343 (1996) (lack of access to prison library did not impede litigant from meeting a filing deadline or presenting a claim). Thus, “the inmate must show that his or her exercise of the right . . . of accessing the courts to secure judicial relief, has been infringed in some consequential way.” Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2006). See also ECF No. 30 at 16-17.
As the Corrections Defendants fairly note, Plaintiff alleges that (a) his filed requests, complaints and grievances were not replied to in the time, to the extent, or to the result, he preferred; (b) some unidentified mail was not delivered; and (c) unspecified legal documents were removed, together with unspecified food, during a pod-wide search. He does not, however, state any factual allegations sufficient to a plausible claim of liability for an actual-injury denial of his access to the courts by a Defendant. See ECF No. 30 at 17.
In response to Plaintiff's allegations that shortcomings in the responses to his various requests, complaints and/or grievances are actionable under the 14th Amendment, the Court sets forth the following:
In analyzing any procedural due process claims under the 14th Amendment, “the first step is to determine whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the [Amendment's] liberty or property' language.” Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)). Should the Court determine that a protected property or liberty interest has been implicated, “the question then becomes what process is due to protect it.” Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). Should the court determine, however, that a protected liberty or property interest has not been implicated, then no further analysis is warranted. See, e.g., Evans v. Fanelli, Civ. No. 1:CV-12-2385, 2013 WL 3049112, *4 (M.D. Pa June 17, 2013).
It is well-settled that a prisoner has no due process rights that are implicated by the prison grievance system, as access to a prison grievance procedure is not a constitutionally-mandated right and confers no liberty interest. Allegations about mishandling the grievance system thus fail to state a cognizable claim. Williams v. Armstrong, 566 Fed.Appx. 106, 108-09 (3d Cir. 2014); Fears v. Beard, 532 Fed.Appx. 78, 81 (3d Cir. 2013); Williams v. Folino, 2015 WL 1212951 at *8 (W.D. Pa. 2015). See also Jones v. N. Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 137-38 (1977) (Burger, J., concurring); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that “the existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on a prisoner”); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). The allegations do not suggest any circumstances which would give rise to a Constitutional violation regarding Plaintiff's grievances. And in further response to the extent Plaintiff intends a claim for violation of his First Amendment rights in the form of retaliation for filing a grievance, see infra at n. 24.
See Simonton v. Tennis, 437 Fed.Appx. 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2011); Brooks v. Beard, 167 Fed.Appx. 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (a state prisoner's allegation that prison officials and administrators responded inappropriately, or failed to respond to later-filed grievances about his medical treatment, did not establish that the officials and administrators were involved in any underlying allegedly unconstitutional conduct). See also Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 782 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (“merely participating in the grievance process is insufficient to confer knowledge of, and acquiescence to, a constitutional violation”); Croom v. Wagner, 2006 WL 2619794, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2006); Ramos v. Pa. Dept. of Corr., 2006 WL 2129148, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2006). See also generally Washington v. Wetzel,, 2022 WL 1782509, at *5 (W.D. Pa. June 1, 2022). Similarly, involvement in after-the-fact reviews or investigations of inmate complaints is not sufficient to establish the necessary personal involvement under Section 1983. See Miller v. Knight, 2021 WL 4445014, at *5 n.4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2021) (citing cases).
C. Failure to Allege a Plausible Conditions of Confinement Claim in Violation of the 8thAmendment (Count IV)
Plaintiff premises alleged 8th Amendment “conditions of confinement” liability on Correction Defendants' “failing to keep the jail free from contraband and provide poison-free food, send Plaintiff to an emergency room, correct the conditions complained of, make a reasonable investigation, and adopt other policies and procedures, and . . . subjecting him to retaliation”. Here again, the Amended Complaint patently fails to state any plausible claim. As explicated above, the facts (as opposed to speculations) alleged do not plausibly suggest (or present a likelihood of discovery of) reckless disregard, deliberate indifference or unreasonable policies and procedures - including those regarding food service, prison security and/or incident investigation - as to Plaintiff's unfortunate ingestion of bagged contraband in oatmeal on his food tray. Nor do they plausibly suggest a Constitutional violation by the Correction Defendants as to Plaintiff's subsequent medical care. See discussion supra. See also ECF No. 30 at 18-19 (explaining applicable standard and facts alleged).
Plaintiff brings this Count under the 8th Amendment. The Court notes in addition, the absence of a plausible claim under the 14th Amendment. Specifically, the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on a prisoner. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224. Rather, a liberty interest inherent in the Constitution arises when a prisoner has acquired a substantial, although conditional, freedom such that the loss of liberty entailed by its revocation is a serious deprivation requiring that the prisoner be accorded due process. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973); see also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 531 (3d Cir. 2003) (A plaintiff's “procedural due process rights are triggered by deprivation of a legally cognizable liberty interest.”). Interests recognized by the Supreme Court as falling within this category include the revocation of parole, Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, and the revocation of probation, Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782.
To the extent Plaintiff intends to raise a conditions of confinement (or other Constitutional) claim on the basis of procedural irregularities such as documentation of his transfer to RHU on refusal to return to his unit or his refusal of food trays, the Court notes that a violation of Inmate Handbook procedures does not rise to a constitutional violation pursuant to § 1983. See Curry v. McCann, 2019 WL 77441, at *7 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2019) (quoting Laufgas v. Speziale, 2006 WL 2528009, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2006) (“[A] prison's departure from the policies and procedures outlined in the facility's handbook does not, in and of itself, amount to a constitutional violation actionable under § 1983.”)). See also ECF No. 30 at 20-21 (citing Islaam v. Kubicki, 838 Fed.Appx. 657, 661 (3d Cir. 2020); Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2004); Estrella v. Hogsten, 2007 WL 2065879 (M.D. Pa. July 16, 2007). Relatedly, with regard to his brief confinement in RHU, the Court notes that no protected liberty interest entitled to 14th Amendment due process was implicated by his disciplinary confinement. To the contrary, such protections generally extend to restrictions which “impose atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995). For many prisoners, the “ordinary incidents of prison life” include confinement in segregated housing at some time or another, especially for limited periods such as that experienced by Plaintiff. See Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1997).
In sum, Plaintiff's allegations of retaliation in the form of adverse conditions of confinement fail to allege any plausibly actionable conduct on the part of any Corrections Defendant. See ECF No. 30 at 18-19 (noting allegations against individual Corrections Defendants). Similarly, his allegations of unconstitutional conditions of confinement - which are either stridently speculative or where not so speak to alleged conduct of non-parties - raise no plausible foundation for a supervisory-liability claim. See factual summary and discussion, supra.
The Court pauses to note that although the First Amendment protects claims of retaliation that encompass the filing of a prison grievance, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege any such claim against a Defendant. In order to set forth a cognizable claim for First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) he engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) he suffered, at the hands of [defendant state actor], adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the state actor's decision to take adverse action.” Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)). Plaintiff does not assert, nor do the allegations plausibly suggest, that he was deterred from exercising his right to file complaints/grievances under the purview of a Defendant by the retaliation alleged, moreover, against non-parties.
D. Failure to Allege Plausible Negligence Against Trinity (Count V)
In Pennsylvania, as elsewhere, the "test for negligence is one of 'reasonable foreseeability.'" Toney v. Chester County Hosp., 961 A.2d 192, 198-99 (Pa. Super. 2008), aff'd, 36 A.3d 83 (Pa. 2011); Armstrong v. Paoli Memorial Hosp., 633 A.2d 605, 608 (Pa. Super. 1993); Amarhanov v. Fassel, 658 A.2d 808, 810 (Pa. Super. 1995). The Court looks to "whether the wrongdoer could have anticipated and foreseen the likelihood of harm to the injured person, resulting from his act." Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 84 A.2d 289, 290 (Pa. 1951). And an employer's liability for negligent supervision also turns on reasonable foreseeability. See generally Dempsey v. Walso Bureau Inc., 246 A.2d 418, 419-22 (Pa. 1968) (emphasis added); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 317; ECF No. 36 at 11-13. As explicated above, Plaintiff's vague allegations of a prior incident of contraband in a food tray and strident but unsupported allegations of drug trafficking in the prison, however often repeated, are insufficient to a plausible claim, including one for state law negligence.
The Court further observes that Plaintiff's asserted negligence claim fails by reason of its dependence on the same flawed and conclusory analysis that runs throughout the Amended Complaint, i.e.: “Plaintiff has pled that Trinity had a legal duty to provide him and other pretrial detainees and inmates reasonably safe food services. Allowing drugs or poison to be passed through the food system at the ACJ is not reasonable. Trinity breached their legal duty by allowing such substances to be smuggled through the food they were providing inmates and Plaintiff has pled that all Defendants were aware such activity was ongoing at the ACJ.” ECF No. 49 at 11. And it notes that a plaintiff is entitled to discovery to support plausible claims. Cf. id. at 12.
E. Failure to Allege a Plausible Violation of RICO or RICO Conspiracy (Counts VI-VII)
As Defendants correctly note, civil remedies under RICO may be pursued by: “ Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court . . . “ 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c)(emphasis added). But its express restriction to “injury to business or property” does not encompass physical or emotional harm to a person (i.e., personal injuries); rather it is limited to pecuniary property loss. See Genty v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 918 (3d Cir. 1991)(quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). Moreover, Plaintiff fails to meet the requisite elements of §1962: (1) the existence of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce; (2) that the defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise; (3) that the defendant participated, either directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise; and (4) that he or she participated through a pattern of racketeering activity that must include the allegation of at least two racketeering acts. See ECF No. 30 at 23 (parsing elements and citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)); id. at 24 (correctly noting the utter implausibility of any predicate act under §1962(c)(4) under the facts alleged and Plaintiff's misinterpretation/misapplication of other statutes); id. generally at 22-24.
With regard to Plaintiff's claim of RICO conspiracy, Count VII, as Defendants succinctly observe: “Any claim under section 1962(d) based on a conspiracy to violate the other subsections of section 1962 necessarily must fail if the substantive claims are themselves deficient.” ECF No. 30 at 25 (quoting Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1191 (3d Cir.1993)). See also Vavro v. Albers, No. 2:05CV321, 2006 WL 2547350, at *28 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2006) aff'd sub nom. Vavro v. A.K. Steel Co., 254 Fed.Appx. 134 (3d Cir. 2007).
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court sympathizes with Plaintiff's ill-fated September 15, 2019, reaction to contraband cocaine in his oatmeal while a detainee, and his resultant nervousness surrounding consumption of prison food for a time thereafter, and the headaches and stomachaches suffered as a result. But the circumstances specifically alleged in the Amended Complaint, while regrettable, do not arise to plausible violations of his Constitutional or other legally-actionable rights by any Defendant. The Court further concludes, based on its thorough review of the factual allegations and its legal analysis above, that any attempt to further amend would be futile as a matter of law.
This Court recognizes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, in civil rights cases, a court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend a deficient complaint-regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so-when dismissing a case against a defendant for failure to state a claim, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Correction Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 29, be GRANTED. It is further recommended that the Trinity Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 34, be GRANTED.
In accordance with the Federal Magistrate Judge's Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. Any party opposing such objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.