Opinion
CIVIL CASE NO. 02-CV-72026-DT
January 14, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. Introduction
Petitioner Myron Brooks, a state prisoner currently confined at the Southern Michigan Correctional Facility in Jackson Michigan, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that he is being held in violation of his federal constitutional rights. Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and felony firearm following a jury trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court and was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and two years imprisonment in 1998. In his pleadings, Petitioner raises claims concerning the trial court's denial of corporeal lineup request, the suggestiveness of the identification procedures, and the sufficiency of the evidence. For the reasons stated below, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
II. Background Facts and Procedural History
Petitioner's convictions arise from the shooting death of Michael Thomas in the parking lot of the Dearborn Inn Motel in Inkster, Michigan on December 2, 1996. The testimony at trial revealed that Thomas died from two gunshot wounds, one to the shoulder and one to the back. Thomas' friend, Thomas Carter, testified that he left Room 206 at the motel to go to Debbie Seiter's room that evening after smoking marijuana. He saw Seiter outside of Room 104 with a white man and a black man whom he identified at trial as Petitioner. Carter thought that he recognized Petitioner but did not know his name. The three people were trying to get into Room 104, but the key did not work. Michael Thomas came downstairs from Room 206, said that he recognized Petitioner, and asked Petitioner who he was. Petitioner denied knowing him. Thomas went upstairs to get his coat and had and came back downstairs. Carter testified that a fight was about to ensue when Petitioner pulled out a pistol and shot at Thomas four or five times before fleeing the scene. Carter stated that he and Thomas were selling drugs from Room 206 and Seiter would buy $20 to $40 worth each day. Carter testified that he did not know Petitioner, but thought that he had seen him once before. He described the shooter to police as stocky and short with dark skin.
Roberto Enriquez testified that he went to the motel to smoke cocaine and he met Seiter whom came to his room with him. While he was in the bathroom, she took his car keys and car. When Seiter returned, she was with a man whom he identified at trial as Petitioner. He asked for his car keys and Seiter said she would return them when she got into her room. Two men then came downstairs and questioned Seiter about where she had been. Thomas indicated that he knew Petitioner and began following him. Enriquez testified that Petitioner was walking away but Thomas continued to pursue him for 15 to 20 feet. Petitioner then turned toward Thomas and fired several shots before running away. Enriquez testified that he did not know Petitioner, but identified him in court as the shooter. Enriquez acknowledged that police walked him by Petitioner prior to trial while Petitioner was in a cell with his attorney.
Alphonso Sims testified that he would bring drugs to Creacy Shepherd's apartment and that she would earn $60 a day for helping him store and sell drugs. He stated that after he received a telephone call from Debra Seiter on December 2, 1996, he picked up Tasha Gunn and went to the Dearborn Heights Police Department to bail Seiter out of jail. He left Petitioner at Shepherd's apartment. Sims testified that when he spoke to Petitioner on the telephone later that day, Petitioner told him that he had to shoot because the men tried to surround him.
Creacy Shepherd testified that Thomas was her godson and that people were at her apartment to sell drugs earlier in the day on December 2, 1996. A man whom she identified at trial as Petitioner came to her house with Tasha Gunn and Alphonso Sims. She testified that Seiter had complained about being hit by Thomas and that Petitioner has responded, "a nigger like that needed to be popped." She described the man as short and skinny. Shepherd admitted that she was doing crack cocaine at the time of these events.
Latasha Gunn testified that she first met Petitioner when she went to the police station to bail out Debra Seiter. Gunn identified Petitioner at trial and stated that she gave $200 worth of crack cocaine to Seiter and Petitioner to sell.
Debra Seiter testified that she was a prostitute and had lived at the Dearborn Inn Motel for several months prior to the incident. After getting bailed out of jail on the morning of December 2, 1996, she returned to the motel and went to Room 215 with another man. While he was in the bathroom, she took his car and went to Shepherd's apartment. She eventually gave Petitioner, whom she did not previously know, a ride back to the motel. While trying to get back into her room, Thomas and Carter came downstairs and Carter indicated that he knew Petitioner. Thomas went upstairs and returned a short time later. While Petitioner was backing away from Thomas, she heard several shots being fired.
Police testimony established that a .32 caliber revolver was used in the shooting, but the gun was never recovered. When police questioned Petitioner about the incident, Petitioner denied going at the motel, denied owning a .32 caliber gun, denied meeting Seiter or Gunn, and said that he had not been to the City of Inkster in 11 years. Petitioner did not testify on his own behalf.
At the close of trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree murder and felony firearm. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the murder conviction and a consecutive term of two years imprisonment on the firearm conviction.
Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal as of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals asserting several grounds for relief, including the claims presented in the instant petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentence. People v. Brooks, No. 212737 (Mich.Ct.App. Dec. 19, 2000) (unpublished). Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied. People v. Brooks, 632 N.W.2d 141 (Mich. 2001).
On May 20, 2002, Petitioner, through counsel, filed the instant habeas petition raising the following claims:
I. The state court denied due process by denying a reasonable and timely motion for a lineup where the prosecutor's case relied on identification by strangers made under highly suggestive circumstances.
II. The court denied due process by refusing to suppress in-court identifications acquired by way of a highly suggestive identification procedure.
III. There was insufficient evidence to support a verdict of first-degree murder. Respondent filed an answer to petition on August 28, 2002 asserting that the claims should be denied for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a reply to that answer on November 1, 2002.
III. Standard of Review
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., govern this case because Petitioner filed his habeas petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim——
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the United States Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of the correct standard of review under the AEDPA. According to the Court:
Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied— the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.Id. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court on this issue).
In evaluating a state court decision under the "unreasonable application" clause, the Supreme Court further stated that a federal habeas court "should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 411. "Under § 2254(d)(1)'s `unreasonable application' clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the phrase "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. In determining what constitutes clearly established federal law, therefore, a federal habeas court must look to pertinent United States Supreme Court precedent.
Lastly, § 2254(e)(1) requires that this Court presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).
IV. Analysis
A. Lineup Claim
Petitioner first claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because the statetrial court denied his request for a corporeal lineup before the preliminary examination where identification was a material issue. A criminal defendant has no federal constitutional right to a lineup, and the decision of whether to grant a lineup request rests with the trial court's discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Storer, 956 F.2d 1169, 1992 WL 45764, *2 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished); United States v. Marshall, 894 F.2d 403, 1990 WL 2270, *2 (4th Cir. 1990) (unpublished); Sims v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 142, 145 (2nd Cir. 1989); United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 420-21 (3rd Cir. 1985); United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 903-04 (7th Cir. 1985); Branch v. Estelle, 631 F.2d 1229, 1234 (5th Cir. 1980); Payne v. Smith, 207 F. Supp.2d 627, 645 (E.D. Mich. 2002); United States v. Gerard, 781 F. Supp. 479, 481 (E.D. Tex. 1991). The failure to grant a lineup may only constitute a denial of fundamental fairness where the in-court identification is so unreliable that "`a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification'" exists. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977). "Short of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh." Id.
In this case, the trial court found that Petitioner did not have a constitutional right to a lineup and denied his request for a lineup. The Michigan Court of Appeals acknowledged that it is within a court's discretion to determine whether fundamental fairness requires that a lineup be held and determined that any trial court error in failing to investigate the identification issue or grant the lineup request was remedied by the trial court's finding that an independent basis existed for the in-court identifications by the witnesses who testified at the preliminary examination. See Brooks, 2000 WL 33389832 at *1.
Having reviewed the record, this Court concludes that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision is consistent with federal law and constitutes a reasonable application thereof. Petitioner had no constitutional right to a lineup and the witnesses who testified at the preliminary examination (and at trial) each expressed an independent basis for their identifications of Petitioner as the perpetrator — namely their recollections of the events on December 2, 1996. Moreover, for the reasons discussed as to his second habeas claim, infra, Petitioner has not shown that fundamental fairness required that a lineup be conducted prior to his preliminary examination. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
B. Identification Claim
Petitioner relatedly claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because the pre-trial identification procedures in his case were unduly suggestive. Due process protects a criminal defendant against the introduction of evidence that results from an unreliable identification obtained through unnecessarily suggestive procedures. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967); see also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 229 (1977). A conviction based on identification testimony following pretrial identification violates due process when the pretrial identification procedure is so "impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). An in-court identification by a witness to whom the accused was exhibited before trial in an unduly suggestive manner must be excluded unless it can be established that the identification has an independent origin which is not tainted by the suggestive pre-trial identification procedures. Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967).
A two-step analysis applies to decisions concerning the admissibility of identification evidence. First, a court must determine whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive. Second, if the court finds that the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, the court must determine whether, under the totality of the circumstance, the testimony was nevertheless reliable. United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 226, 230 (6th Cir. 1992). "If the defendant fails to show that the identification procedures were impermissibly suggestive, or if the totality of the circumstances indicates that the identification was otherwise reliable, then no due process violation has occurred." Id.
The United States Supreme Court has declared that "reliability is the linchpinin determining the admissibility of identification testimony." Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1972), the Supreme Court listed five factors that should be considered when evaluating reliability: (1) the witness's opportunity to view the perpetrator during the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention during the crime; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the perpetrator; (4) the witness's level of certainty when identilying the defendant at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time that has elapsed between the crime and the confrontation. "The degree of reliability of the identification, as indicated by the above-stated factors, is to be considered in light of the degree of suggestiveness of the identification procedure and of the totality of the circumstances in determining whether due process requires suppression of the identification. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 113-14." Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 605 (6th Cir. 2000).
In this case, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly denied Petitioner's motion to suppress the challenged identification testimony because the trial court's finding that there was an independent basis for each of the witnesses' in-court identifications was not clearly erroneous. See Brooks, 2000 WL 33389832 at *2. Having reviewed the matter, this Court finds that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision is consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent and constitutes a reasonable application of federal law.
The mere fact that Petitioner was first identified by witnesses at the preliminary examination does not make the identification procedure inherently unreliable or impermissibly suggestive. See Baker v. Hocker, 496 F.2d 615, 617 (9th Cir. 1974). Moreover, even assuming that the witnesses' identification of Petitioner at the preliminary examination and/or the police station was impermissibly suggestive, their in-court identification testimony was reliable. Carter and Enriquez viewed Petitioner for several minutes at the time of the shooting, Seiter spent significantly more time with Petitioner prior to the shooting, and Shepherd testified that Petitioner was at her apartment for several hours that day. Although Carter's and Shepherd's descriptions of the shooter varied from another, the other descriptions were relatively consistent. While Enriquez acknowledged seeing Petitioner at the police station, he also indicated that his identification was based upon his recollection of the shooting. None of the witnesses expressed any doubt about their identifications of Petitioner despite the 16-month period between the shooting and their in-court identifications. Lastly, it should be noted that several witnesses identified Petitioner as the perpetrator at trial such that their testimony was corroborative. Considering the totality of the circumstances, this Court concludes that the witnesses' in-court identification were sufficiently reliable and Petitioner's due process rights were not violated by the admission of that testimony. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
C. Insufficient Evidence Claim
Lastly, Petitioner claims that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence of premeditation to support his first-degree murder conviction. In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Supreme Court established that a federal court's review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim must focus on whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319; see also Warren, 161 F.3d at 360.
Under Michigan law, first-degree premeditated murder requires proof that the defendant intentionally killed the victim and that the act of killing was premeditated and deliberate. People v. Schollaert, 194 Mich. App. 158, 170, 486 N.W.2d 312 (1992). Premeditation and deliberation require sufficient time to allow the defendant to take a second look. Id. Premeditation and deliberation may be established by evidence of "(1) the prior relationship of the parties; (2) the defendant's actions before the killing; (3) the circumstances of the killing itself; and (4) the defendant's conduct after the homicide." Id. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom may be sufficient to prove the elements of the crime. People v. Jolly, 442 Mich. 458, 466, 502 N.W.2d 177 (1993). A defendant's intent or state of mind, like all the elements of a crime, may be shown by circumstantial evidence. People v. Dumas, 454 Mich. 390, 398, 563 N.W.2d 31 (1997).
Applying the Jackson standard, the Michigan Court of Appeals determined that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of premeditation to support Petitioner's conviction. See Brooks, 2000 WL 33389832 at *2. Having reviewed the record, this Court agrees and finds that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision is consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent and constitutes a reasonable application thereof Several witnesses identified Petitioner as the shooter. At least one witness testified that Petitioner made a statement before the shooting that the victim should be shot for abusing Seiter. Witness testimony, including that of Carter and Enriquez, also established that Petitioner had time to consider his actions and take a second look before firing several shots at the victim and then fleeing the scene.
Petitioner's insufficiency of evidence claim essentially challenges the credibility and weight to be accorded certain testimony and pieces of evidence. Such determinations, however, are not matters for federal habeas review. In Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 970 (6th Cir. 1983), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained: "A federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." Petitioner has not shown that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction is contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent or constitutes an unreasonable application of federal law. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, this Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claims presented. Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.